#### CHAPTER 6

# COMMUNITY RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN THA-GYAR-HIN-O VILLAGE

#### 6.1. Introduction

The delta region, a big producer of rice, faced major damage to agriculture fields due to the influx of sea water, brought in by Cyclone Nargis. The areas affected are rural, with agriculture as the primary source of income. The agriculture sector, encompassing crops, plantations, livestock and fisheries, were all affected. Other sectors of livelihoods like fishery, livestock and some small enterprises also faced substantial amounts of damage. The overall recovery of livelihoods will require long-term interventions in the agriculture and related sectors. This chapter discusses the reconstruction of the community after Cyclone Nargis in Tha-Gya-Hin-O village. The reasons for the strong recovery in this village will be analyzed. It will be seen that the people from the village were motivated to work together and also with the NGO projects. This has immensely contributed to the socio-economic advancement of the village.

# **6.2.** Experiences in the Post-Disaster ReconstructionPhase in Tha-Gyar-Hin-O Village

After the cyclone, the village received different types of aid, such as food, water, farming and fishing inputs, household goods, cash and shelter from the government, international and local organizations, religious groups and individual aid providers. Three years after they began receiving assistance from NGOs, the priority of the aid communityshifted from relief assistance to rehabilitation. This meant that relief assistance such as providing food, shelter, capital for agriculture and fishing and

household goods was later transitioned into providing village infrastructure, water and sanitation, and capacity building trainings.

Nearly a month after Cyclone Nargis, Tha-Gyar-Hin-O village finally started getting assistance from local donation groups and local organizations. Firstly, "Byamaso" group came to their village and provided rice, cooking oil, clothing, dry food, salt and beans to almost all the villagers. The aid was initially given to the village volunteer group at the monastery. Then the village volunteer group managed the distribution. After that "Amara" group came to the village and provided medicine and given health care assistance. "Lokha Ahlinn" supported the village with rice, and waterproof coverswith which to repair their shelters." Kyout-Pa-Down" group distributed drinking water, and "Aung-Ya-Dana" group gave the village clay pots to store water in.

In addition, Myanmar Egress and Nargis Action Group, both Myanmar organizations, provided 65 fishing nets for the fishers. There was no problem with the distribution of fishing nets, because the villagers could provide requests to the providers about which kind of fishing net they wanted to receive. Later on, Nargis Action Group built a bridge near the school and undertook a renovation for the village street together with the villagers. The organization provided the materials needed to rebuild the road and the villagers contribute as volunteer laborers.

Another provider of aid to the village was Save the Children, an international non-government organization. Soon after the cyclone, the villagers heard about the Save the Children from a nearby village. The village volunteer group tried to contact the organization and requested assistance for their village. Because of their outreach, Save the Children provided blankets and mosquito nets for Tha-Gyar-Hin-O village. The INGO also gave 50,000 kyats to the households to buy the shelter materials and provided three small baskets of rice per household to every household in the village from August to November 2008. Moreover, World Vision, another international NGO, supported 12 hand tractors, seeds and fertilizers for the farmers and 12 small fishing boats for the fishers.



Figure 6.1 The Bridge from the Village

The international NGO called CESVI also provided drinking water and drinking water containers to every household. Farmers also received paddy seed from this organization. Most of the aid providers offered the aid to the village leader and the aid was then managed by a distribution committee. The villagealso establishedEarly Recovery Committees (ERCs) shortly after the cyclone.



Figure 6.2 Drinking Water Storage Baskets from the village house

#### **6.3.** The Issue of Newcomers

The aid was distributed according to village household records. This posed a problem for those survivors who came to the village after the disaster and who were not considered as natives of the village. These newcomers did not have proper documentation in the village as they had just recently arrived under emergency conditions. So when donors left the relief items with the village aid management committee, those newcomers were not being prioritized when the assistance was limited.

However, Ko Tun, a newcomer to Tha-Gyar-Hin-O village said that; "My wife and I came to Tha-Gyar-Hin-O village one month after the cyclone. My wife's sister lives in the village. Before the cyclone, my mother-in-law, my wife and I stayed at another village. After my mother-in-law passed away during the cyclone, my wife wanted to stay near her sister. I understand her; she has only one sibling, so they might want to stay together. Our sister's family shared their aid with us whenever they got assistance. They also welcomed us to stay with them even though the assistance was scarce."

When the aid assistance was scarce, the villagers still shared their resources with their relatives. Some families shared their shelter with other families in the village before rebuilding the needy families had a chance to build their own shelter. Despite the sharing, the official registration issue after the disaster cause some people to have difficultly accessing aid.

#### 6.4. Shelter and HabitatReconstruction

Immediately after the disaster, the villagers stayed together at the monastery as a temporary shelter. The villagers collected broken woods and bamboo and built small huts that two or three families shared together. This local solution was imperative because it wasn't until 3 months after the cyclone that the village received its first donoation of shelter material from an outside organization. Later on, UN-Habitat and

Save the Children came to help with the housing reconstruction. UN-Habitat organized a carpenters group and gave them a training where they were taught about housing design.

Under the Post-Nargis Recovery and Preparedness Plan (PONREPP) from the Myanmar government and the TCG, there was a prioritized sector plan was developed that named two types of shelter as essential in the recoveryphase: permanent houses for families who lost their homes to Nargis and community cyclone shelters, both to be constructed in consideration with future probable hazards in the area. Shelter assistance options range from provision of a basic grant starting from USD 35 to a more comprehensive grant of USD 400-500, provision of necessary construction materials and kits to build an adequate shelter, conducting of carpentry skill trainings, provision of technical assistance and development of guidelines manuals and handbooks.



Figure 6.3 The house from the village built by NGOs support

The carpenter group leader from Tha-Gyar-Hin-O village said: "The NGO called the meeting with the villagers and explained the procedure. They told us they will provide ten houses for our village. The budget is around 300,000 kyats per house. Firstly,

we need to organize a carpenters group to attend the training. We got twenty peoples in our group with 5 leaders. During the training, the NGO trainers' taught us the carpentering skills and also instruction for the housing design. After the training, when we built the houses, we faced big challenges. The material prices were high and hard to find, even if we tried using local materials. In the instruction, the house life expectancy should be 5 years or more. To meet that standard the material quality must good, but we couldn't find the quality material with the allowed budget."

There were only ten houses supported by that NGO. These would help only 17 families of 160 families in the village. The uniform design and size did not fit all families. In reality, different types of designs were needed depending on the level of damage and destruction to the original home, location of the shelter and for different cultural and livelihood mix. The village head man said that it was extremely difficult for them to choose who should get the houses. They needed to be very careful not to cause damage to the unity of their village. They had to hold a meeting with the villagers and decided together.

The villagers decided together for criteria. They decided to give priorities to those most needy, such as elders over 55 years old, the poorest of the poor and the women-headed households. Another 150 families from the village got assistance of material that they could use to repair their houses. Nearly half of the population of the village didn't receive the housing assistance. However, the villagers helped each other to rebuild their homes.



Figure 6.4 The Cyclone Shelter from the village

In the village, the big cyclone shelter also built by an NGO. The shelter was constructed near the monastery and the school. It is meant to work in conjunction with the early warning system to improve the preparedness of the community. It also helped a bit with livelihoods since during the construction, the villagers got paid to work at the construction site.

When I visit the village, it was already three years after the cyclone so many stories about the relief and recovery phase had already been discussed amongst the villagers. Even with the aid that Tha-Gyar-Hin-O received, there were still some things that the villagers thought they missed out on. Through informal conversations, these types of stories came out.

One day, I heard a story from the women's group in the village. I went to a religious ceremony in another village was cooking together with many different women. I was in a group conversation with some women from Tha-Gyar-Hin-O village and some women from other neighboring villages. I was surprised when one woman from another village turned to a woman from my study village and said, "I pity you. If your village headman had accepted the NGO housing project, then now you wouldn't need to worry and save money. The NGO would have just come and built the house for you and your family." The woman from Tha-Gyar-Hin-O village responded, 'Yes, that is so unfortunate for us. We missed a good chance." I had never

heard the women talk like this before and didn't know the story behind their conversation. So I tried to ask them what happened but the woman didn't seem to want to continue talking about it and she lead us on to another topic. But I couldn't get it out of my mind and decided to investigate the problem. On the way back to my study village, I asked again about the case that they had been talking about and the Tha-Gyar-Hin-O women's group told me. They had heard from the other village is that an NGO came and offered housing assistance to them. The other village had a good experience getting many houses built. The women had also heard that the same NGO has come to Tha-Gyar-Hin-O village and had come to talk with their village head. But the village head would not take responsibility for helping with the project, so the project was cancelled for Tha-Gyar-Hin-O village.

The women's group said that there were some people in their village that still could not properly rebuild their houses. They were still living in a temporary hut. The women of Tha-Gyar-Hin-O village felt as if they had missed the chance for improved housing and were truly disappointed. They also didn't expect that kind of thing to happen because the village head was so active and was always working hard for their village. Even though they felt disappointed, they didn't ask directly to the village head about the issue. They felt like they didn't have the position to question or blame the village head.

I was asked the village headman about that rumor when I interviewed him. He said that it was true that he denied the new housing project. He explained to me that the NGO project always requires accountability and transparency. There are a lot of meetings and paper work for every project. The NGO dictated how many regular meetings to have, how many peoples to attend; how many men and women to participate in the projects and also how to do the accounting work for the projects. The people who participate in the project have to follow rules and regulations of the NGO as a requirement for the project. Before the project starts in the village, the village headman has to take responsibilities for the project's successful. He has to promise to follow all the NGO's guidelines and to fulfill all the requirements. For example, the household shelter program was designed as community-led procurement and distribution of shelter materials. After the selection of an individual or family as a

beneficiary, the beneficiaries would select the materials they required (up to 25,000 kyats) and submit their list to the village recovery committee, who would then procure these materials on their behalf. There were a few people who were educated in accounting and monitoring for projects. It was hard to find that kind of person to take responsible from the village side. Most of the educated young people had gone to city for work. The young people from the informal village groups had also done the same. Therefore the village head has to take on all the responsibilities to make sure the project is successful. There are only a few people, if any, who can help him. He told me that the NGO documents very complicated. For example, the account sheet for purchasing the products, the balance sheet and the records for the saving groups – all these documents were extremely difficult for villagers, who only know how to read and write, to understand. This is why all the responsibility would eventually fall on the village headman.

The other concern that the village head had was that he has sometimes seen how aid from outside can destroy the unity of the village. The village recovery committee is tasked with the difficult job of choosing the project beneficiaries from among a group of severely affected households, all of whom have an equal right to claim shelter assistance. This process can potentially strain community relationships and lead to tensions. So, as a committee leader, he really needs to monitor carefully.

The village headman said that he got overloaded with taking all the responsibly and he worried that he would make a mistake if he was overloaded with work. If this happened, the project would withdraw. Also the village's reputation, and his own, can be damaged. That why he declined the new project – he believed the village did not have enough capacity and human resource to take on the accountability and the responsibilities.

#### 6.5. Women's Role in Post-Disaster Reconstruction

When considering community participation in the disaster recovery process, an inclusive perspective needs to be taken and gender equity should be encouraged in the decision making process. The International Recovery Platform (IRP) report stated that for the community level project planning process, it is favorable to establish

Village Tract Recovery Committees (VTRC) which have a minimum of two women representatives for overall coordination of therecovery program. Community mobilization should be done through VTRC and all the details of theprogram as per agreed guidelines should be explained in community meetings. However, in reality on the ground gender equity is difficult to achieve. Even if women are participating in projects, the women's role in decision making and active participation have a barrier because of the cultural norms.

In a patriarchal society like Myanmar, the extra tasks that women have to take on during emergencies, on top of their regularhouse-hold chores, are hardly acknowledged. Nither is their exposure to higher risks due to their lesser physical strength. In addition, their traditional role as in-the-background care takers of the family provides women with hardly any opportunity to take on any prominent decision making roles.

Myanmar rural communities are generally male dominated. Usually, women do not allow complain to or argue with their father, husband or elders, especially to males, in public. This is considered highly rude in Myanmar culture. When we talk about participation, it not only means attending the meetings or just participating as a group member. Meaningful participation must include active involvement such as offering ideas, re-framing discussions, and being involved in decision making. In meetings, most women in Myanmar rarely complain or speak out in public; they just accept what the other people are saying even if they have a better idea or something to ask. Some women feel shy to speak in front of other people. Therefore, in order to get real participation from women in projects organizations need to carefully take into account the culture and its perspective on women into the design of the projects.

#### 6.6.Reconstruction Infrastructure and Livelihoods

The Cash for Work (CFW) program was implemented starting in the month of October 2008 and was completed by May 2009. The objectives of the program were to generate wage employment opportunities for the most vulnerable cyclone affected households, to ensure food and economic security among the most vulnerable households with specific **r**eference to women and restore community assets and

infrastructures linked to community livelihoods systems at the same time. It is also intend to restore natural and environmental resources affected by the cyclone at community level. The program was designed to mainstream gender strategies at all levels of implementation (IRI Report, 2008). The Cash for Work program created job opportunities for the wage labourers and also encouraged women to earn their own income.

While the program aimed to create income opportunities for women, the project faced difficulties in engaging women's participation because of the work nature and working time. Most women cannot participate in a full days work due their commitments to children, other family members and the home. The work activities for the Cash for Work program were village road repair, jetty reconstruction, wooden bridge repair, river embankment repair and the construction of the big cyclone shelter. These activities are hard work and make it difficult for women to participate. Nonetheless, people working for this program can earn 2000 kyats per day of work. The widow women who participated in this program said she earned enough money to cover daily survival and also some materials she needed to repair her house. Because of this, she felt this project benefited for her.

The participation of the affected communities is important for the success of disaster response and recovery development projects. If the projects lack meaningful community participation, it can lead to time consuming and costly delays, and worse, it can mean that the projects will not be successful in reaching its aim. In Tha-Gyar-Hin-O village there is a case where the same organization had two completely different outcomes for two different projects, the livelihoods project and drinking water pond project, due to the level of community participation.

In the village, the livelihoods project from an international NGO called CESVI had several activities for the villagers. Traditionally, farmers in Myanmar used oxdrawn ploughs to till their land but most livestock, the oxen, water buffalo, hens, goats, oxen and even ducks were killed by the storm. To solve the problem, the NGO provided the village with a mechanized tractor. They also organized a tracker management group and gave a training on tractor driving and repairing. A tractor is

really essential for the farmers of Tha-Gyar-Hin-O village because they needed to quickly recover fertility in the salt-damaged soil and get their crops in for the next growing season. The management group had the responsibility to make a schedule for the use of the tractor and also for maintenance. The farmers who wanted to hire the tractor had to pay petrol, maintenance and driver fees. The tractor driver explained to that, "the farmers can hire the tractor for 1 acre at 6000 kyats. 4000 kyats is for the patrol fee and maintenance and I can get 2000 kyats." There is one group member doing the accounting for the group and reporting at the group meetings about the balance of the money for their group.



Figure 6.5 The Pigs from the Pig Bank from the village

The other groups being supported by CESVI are the paddy seed bank and the pig bank groups. In the paddy bank, there is 122 baskets available. (A basket is called *tin* in Burmese and it is the unit of Burmese measurement of grain.) At this bank, the famers can take a "loan" of paddy seeds to grow. After the harvest season, they then need to return the same amount of paddy seeds that they had originally taken. The pig bank was created to help wage laborers and landless families. The NGO provided 4 pigs in total: 3 female pigs and 1 male pig. First, all the group members needed to

attend the training given by the NGO, after that, the group had to make rules and regulations to govern their group. This process was participatory and facilitated by the organization. Then, the group made the decision for who will take the pigs first (to mate the pigs and raise the piglets) and who will get them next time. After one year, the one who took the pigs had to pay back the original pig plus one pig from the new litter. The leader of the group said they got 18 pigs within a year, this was a clear illustration of the groups success in continuing the pig bank under their own management.

The village head commented that after Cyclone Nargis the villagers were more confident in terms of participation and cooperation in the activities of the NGOs. They got more practices with working in groups. Compared to the past, now the villagers have good practices such as working systematically on group activities. Also when working with NGOs, they now they understand that the most important thing for the group is legitimacy and accountability to maintain the group. The villagers want to maintain their groups and continue working effectively.

## 6.7. Education, Capacity Building and Vocational Training

A WASH (Water and Sanitation) project from CESVI was giving a which hygiene promoters training to the some villagers in Tha-Gyar-Hin-O village. The trainees were to become peer educations who would then, in turn, give hygiene training for the children from the school.

They also provided materials to build latrines as the villagers had requested when the NGO came for the needs assessment. CESVI also distributed water guards and drinking water containers with filters. One of the hygiene promoters remarked that they were concerned with the villagers' health practices and health knowledge.



Figure 6.6 The School in Tha-Gyar-Hin-O village

#### 6.8. Health, Water and Sanitation

The delta region has a long standing record of being affected by recurrent drinking water scarcity, and as a consequence of the passage of Cyclone Nargis, many ponds were contaminated either by salt or by various kinds of debris. Tha-Gyar-Hin-O village didn't have a drinking water pond before Nargis. Villagers have to go to the other village, Swe Daw Gone, in order to get drinking water. After the cyclone, the SweDaw Gone ponds were destroyed by salt water. The villagers hired a boat and spent a lot of money bringing drinkable water to their families.

An NGO, CESVI distributed drinking water, but the amount couldn't meet the demand of village population. Thus, the drinking water problem became one the most important problems to solve for the village. In order to implement the WASH Project, the NGO workers said the two parties -the organization and the village have to mutually agreed on the coordination contract. The village organized groups for Peer Hygiene Promoters (PHP) and Pond/System Caretakers (PCT). CESVI gave the groups the training. The Village WASH Committee shall take responsibilities of close

monitoring and supervising the project activities jointly with NGO. From the interview with an NGO worker who worked on the project, he explained that the Village WASH Committee was to work together closely with the project staff and was to be involved in every stage of the project. This approach was trying to promote a sense of ownership among the community so that expected outputs and impacts would be achieved. It was understood that the village should work with the NGO staff, extension workers, etc, to support the selection of the neediest vulnerable families to receive project inputs. This was to be done following the NGO criteria and in a free and transparent manner. The contract seems aimed at the community participation. In the reality though, we can see the level of complicity of the community participation.



Figure 6.7 The Un-used Drinking Water Pond at Tha-Gyar-Hin-O village

Although, some projects were successful, some were, unfortunately, not. As water scarcity was the most important issue for the village at the time, CESVI started the pond construction in the village in 2009. Yet when I visited the village in June, 2011, the pond was still not in use.

Surprised to see the pond going un-used, I asked the villagers about that case. The villagers explained that the soil in their region is loam soil. In the hot season, it becomes dry and gaping, making it difficult for drinking water ponds to hold their water. According to the villagers, they said that in the CESVI-led meetings before the ponds were made, the villagers tried to give advice to the CESVI engineers about the construction of the ponds. Unfortunately, the group did not accept the villagers' idea. The CESVI engineers created the drinking water pond with their own designs. In the end, their pond does not function. Because of the dry ground, water does not stay in the pond and therefore it is useless for the villagers. The villagers continue to go to another the village to get the drinking water and are facing the same difficulties as before.

I asked some villagers their opinion about the consultation meeting with NGO and they said that, for most of the meeting they attended, they didn't really understand the expectations for their participation. They didn't know that they should have given information about their community. They didn't know that they could give their opinion of what projects the village really needed. They didn't know that they could give an idea for the project. The villagers just thought that they have to listen to the NGO telling them about what kind of projects will implement in their village and how they will be implemented. Most of people believe that since the NGO was giving them the money and helping them for free, they shouldn't complain or asking for anything more. Therefore most of the consultation meetings run by the NGO simply informed the villagers about the project and did not really open up the space for consultation with the villagers.

I met with another project staff from CESVI at the Dedaye, another town in the delta and interviewed her in May 2011. At that time, she was working with another organization implementing recovery projects in the delta area since her CESVI project was ended. With her background in Nargis relief and recovery work, she could explain the idea of the projects and the CESVI's pond project activities. Pond projects activities are related to water, sanitation, and hygiene promotion. The projects are called WASH. The team held an assessment in the area of the Dedaye Township during the month of January, eight months after the cyclone. What they

found was that there was a basic need for provision of water and sanitation. The assessment findings suggested thatit was urgent to assist populations especially since the cool season and upcoming hot season do not see much, if any, rain fall.

The WASH team realized that not all the people living in its target zone have easy access to potable water sources. Moreover many ponds of the abovementioned area have been damaged by Cyclone Nargis, and many of the ponds were now full of salty water. This meant that there was a water emergency. With reference to this point, the WASH team thought distribution of water was urgent, and so, they planned and distributed water to 500 households providing them with five gallons per day for three months in the Tha-Gyar-Hin-O village. Another urgent activity was the pond reconstruction as Tha-Gyar-Hin-O didn't have drinking water pond in the village and the villagers have to go another village for the drinking water.

As mentioned above, many ponds have been damaged by Nargis and their water became undrinkable. Ponds are an essential component for the community life especially for the poor areas, such as Dedaye Township. Knowing the importance of clean drinking water, the villagers from Tha-Gyar-Hin-O village strongly requested the NGO's WASH team that they start to involve them in the pond construction program. The NGO's pond program was to be based mostly on the modifiedhand-pump and canopy system that would ensure the villagers a rapid and useful way to collect water. Beside this, the NGO was also doing awareness rising on hygiene and sanitation at the village/community level. Other activities included training for hygiene promoters and distribution of hygiene and sanitation kits to the villagers. Thus, this pond project was one part of the broader project under the WASH program implemented in Tha-Gyar-Hin-O village.



Figure 6.8 A villager going to get drinking water from the another village

In thinking about how to solve the village's water problem, aman from the village who donated his own land where drinking pond had been constructed. After the project from CESVI finished and the pond still unusable, the land owner said that he wanted to repair the pond. He said he would spend his own money to repair it and then he would sell the water to the villagers. The villagers also agreed with his idea. The villagers said that it was more convenient for them if they could get water without going to another village. When they have to travel to the other villages, they have to spend money to hire the boat. They also have to spend time travelling and waiting to get the water. If the water source was in their village, they would not need to spend money on the boat and they could have extra time other work. The villagers proposed this idea to the CESVI but the organization did not accept it. The villagers did not get permission to do with the pond.

I interviewed an NGO worker from that project. He said that according to the project guidelines no one was allowed to sell the water to make a profit. This is why they denied the villagers' request. According to the report from the project engineer, they suggested waiting to see if ponds condition improved after the next rainy season. However, the engineer admitted that the project was finished already - even he was

now working with another organization - so he was not sure what would happen to the pond in the future. He was not optimistic that the NGO would help if the pond was not working in the next season. He also added his opinion that development projects are well-versed in talking about community participation, but that sometimes the organization itself does not fully implement approaches that promote the ownership of the community and respect for local knowledge. This is an example of the kind of issues that can happen on the ground in the development field. Every development worker should have knowledge about the concept of community participation. Another worker from the same pond project also said that the projects are aimed for recovery but the activities are still take the same top-down approach of the relief stage. And thus, the local community does recover fully and we cannot even think about the sustainability of the community. There is a long way to go but the projects have now stopped due to the budgets and project timeline, he thinks this is not effective for the community.

### 6.9. Summary

Throughout this study, it is evident that the self-recovery abilities of the people affected by Nargis were generally overestimated by NGOs. Most of NGO projects have withdrawn from the village. However, the affected peoples' self-recovery abilities - be they in repairing or rebuilding housing, or re-establishing their livelihoods - is much slower than NGOs expected. Myanmar communities have very strong cultural mores (based on their belief systems) of generously sharing resources with all of the community and being accepting of life's circumstances. Relief and recovery distribution systems that attempted to selectively deliver resources to the most vulnerable in these communities sometimes caused unexpected difficulties due to this cultural context. Relief assistance provided to the most vulnerable often ended up being collected and redistributed evenly and thinly among community members in keeping with the sharing culture.

Three years after Nargis, post-disaster reconstruction has met with mild success in terms of infrastructure construction but economic redevelopment has not yet fully recovered. Even the livelihoods projects in the village are going well it cannot cover all the needy population.

The empowerment of the community through participation and decision making process was critical and needed to become meaningful participation. Most communication appears to have occurred through community meetings that appear to have been only one way communications rather than a more effective two-way communication process, due to the culture barriers. Women's attendance at meetings was high since this was dictated by the NGO guidelines, but in reality women did not take an active role overall.

The NGO projects' requirements and guidelines were sometimes a burden to the community. Additionally, the selection of the beneficiaries, by the NGOs criteria, could lead to conflict and potentially harm the unity of the community. The NGO efforts to implement projects and their focus on completing their projects in a set time period saw mixed outcomes for their beneficiaries. Instead of focusing on the project end date as the time to end the intervention, NGOs need to pay more attention to the beneficiaries as we can see from the pond project in Tha-Gyar-Hin-O village. The pond is still stagnant and not useful for the village but the NGO is neither taking responsibility nor giving the community the chance to decided on the future of the pond. The NGO's need to follow their regulations, while intending to help the community, does not offer the flexibility needed to work with the empowered community and solve their drinking water problem.

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