

The background of the cover is a dense, abstract pattern of vertical, multi-colored strokes in shades of red, orange, yellow, green, blue, and purple. Each stroke is topped with a small, solid black circle, creating a rhythmic, textured effect.

# INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS

An Introduction

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