

Appendix A

History of Sultan Syarif Abdurrahman the Founder of the Alkadri Dynasty

Syarif Abdurrahman Alkadri bin Sayid Alhabib Husein Alkadri Jamalulail was born in Matan sultanate (Ketapang to date) in 15 Rabiul Awal 1151 H (Islamic Calendar) or 1739 AD. His father, Sayid Alhabib Husein Alkadri Jamalulail (from Hadramaut or a city in Arab peninsula) arrived in Matan Sultanate in 1735 AD and married Nyai Tua, a pretty maid of Matan Sultanate (*dayang-dayang* or palace maids) (from Islamized Dayak ancestors). Sayid Alhabib Husein worked as a judge in the Islamic Court of Matan Sultanate as well as teacher of Islamic tenets. In the environment of the busy port of Matan, Syarif Abdurrahman Alkadri learnt about the sailing and trading. When Sayid Alhabib Husein moved to Mempawah Sultanate in 1755 AD, he brought along his family to teach Islam in a Sultanate led by Opu Daeng Menambun (a Bugis) who set his sultanate's capital at Sebukit in Mempawah Hulu subdistrict to date. His well-done jobs as a judge in the Matan Sultanate's Islamic Court had been heard by Opu Daeng Menambun who thus asked him to move to his Mempawah Sultanate since 1740 AD (Rahman, Ja' Achmad, and Muhadi 2000: 43-46).


A son-in-law of the Sultan of Matan himself, Daeng Opu Menambun (who married Putri Kesumba, the daughter of the Sultan of Matan) was offered by Sayid Alhabib Husein a marriage between her daughter Putri Utin Candramidi with Sayid Alhabib Husein's son Syarif Abdurrahman Alkadri. The Sultan of Mempawah (350 northern of Pontianak) agreed with a very heavy condition of a dowry as high as 1,000 ringgit (old Malay monetary unit). With the blessing of Allah (after a serious prayer), the dowry requirement was cancelled by Opu Daeng Menambun. Sayid Alhabib Husein was freed to decide the amount of dowry. After the marriage, Syarif Abdurrahman Alkadri, now a Prince of Mempawah Sultanate, sailed to Palembang, South Sumatera, as a trader in 1765. (Opu Daeng Menambun passed away in 1761 after he abdicated his throne to Sayid Alhabib Husein, who acted as ad interim *Tuan Besar Mempawah* or Lord of Mempawah until Opu Daeng Menambun's son—Adi Jaya Kesuma Negara, the Crown Prince—was fit to rule.) When he returned to

Mempawah from Palembang after a two-month trading, the Islamic teachers and Muslim traders he met in Palembang granted him a fortune of 2,000 ringgit (Rahman, Ja' Achmad, and Muhadi 2000: 51). (No reasons stated. But granting such a fortune for a Prince of Mempawah Sultanate was a great investment for future business.)

In 1767, Syarif Abdurrahman sailed from Mempawah to Banjarmasin (South Kalimantan), collected 258 *piculs* of spice, and brought them to Pasir (East Kalimantan). To a British ship captain he exchanged the spice with 14 chests of opium which he sold later to the Chinese traders with good price. Banjarmasin-Pasir route was traversed for trading of spice and opium (Rahman, Ja' Achmad, and Muhadi 2000: 52-53). The good fortune enabled Syarif Abdurrahman to buy a big sailing ship he called "*Tiang Sambung*," a trading ship with cannons. This achievement quickly made him noticeable by the Sultan of Banjarmasin (Sultan Saad) who offered him a wife from the Sultan's own daughters. After three years of trading in Banjarmasin vicinity, Syarif Abdurrahman returned to Mempawah in 1771, docking in Bangka (Banca) Island and the other [spice] islands on his way. (In Pasir, just before his return to Mempawah, he hijacked a French ship bulked with silks, fine clothes and opium, killed its French captain, and recruited its Bengali crew to be his own ship's crew. The Dutch and the Sultan of Banjar forbid him to visit Banjarmasin for this "crime.")

Having no where else to go as a "criminal," Syarif Abdurrahman brought his family—in 14 ships armed with cannons—from Mempawah on 17 October 1771 to open a new settlement in a place called Pontianak to date. For five days and nights his ships were harassed by ghosts called "Puntianak" where they reached a small island known as Batu Layang (few kilometers from Pontianak to date) that he must shoot the ghosts (to scare it off) with the cannons' salvos. (Most likely these "ghosts" were pirates hiding in the place where Landak and Kapuas rivers diverged.) After the ghosts' harassment was overcome, on 23 October 1771 the crew landed in a forested site near the meeting point between Landak river and Kapuas river. On 21 October 1968, the Mayor of Pontianak decided to take 23 October 1771 AD as the official birth date of Pontianak.

For seven years from 1771 to 1778 he slowly increased the power of his chiefdom among the other sultanates. He granted farm lands to the migrants who pledged allegiance to his chiefdom. Syarif Abdurrahman built alliances by marrying 25 women in surrounding places near Pontianak (from these marriages he begot 60 children) (Rahman, Ja' Achmad, Muhadi 2000: 78). He visited many other Islamic sultanates in Tayan, Simpang, Sukadana, Matan, Landak, Mempawah, and Sambas.



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Appendix B

The Short History of Malaysia Confrontation

On 23 February 1963, or two years after Malaysian PM Tengku Abdul Rahman announced a plan of Greater Malaysia (with Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah in North Kalimantan), President Sukarno declared that Malaysia was a neo-colonialist design for the protection of imperialist economic privileges (Crozier 1966: 152-53). In a campaign to frustrate the creation of Greater Malaysia, Sukarno found A.M. Azahari (Azhari) came in handy. A Brunei politician of Arab-Malay descent, Azahari was a frustrated leader of Brunei's People Party who had won all the elective seats in Brunei's elections in August 1962 but was outnumbered and hijacked by the Legislative Assembly composed by the officially-nominated members. When he was twelve the Japanese occupation authorities sent him to Indonesia to study; he also fought along with Indonesian guerrilla against the Dutch in Java and Sumatra (Crozier 1966: 155).

The frustrated Azahari led—although he was allegedly somewhere else at the time of assault—an enthusiastic but under-trained forces called TNKU (National Army of North Kalimantan) to capture Brunei on 8 December 1962 but the quick responding British forces secured the situation by the end of December 1962 when the TNKU rebels fled to the jungle. (President Sukarno himself “announced” his war when 30 Indonesian raiders penetrated three miles into the [British] First Division, and attacked a police post at Tebedu, killing a corporal and wounding two policemen [James and Sheil-Small 1971: 59-60].) At a negotiation in the end of July 1963 in Manila, Malaysian PM agreed to postpone the proclamation of Greater Malaysia before a United Nations team found the views of Sarawak and Sabah population. Two days after the proclamation of Greater Malaysia on 16 September 1963, a mob burned the British Embassy in Jakarta to the ground. By the end of 1963, around 12,000 guerillas—mostly members of Tentara Nasional Kalimantan Utara or TNKU—were being trained by “volunteers” from Indonesian Army. On 6 August 1963 Gen. Nasution, the Indonesian Defense Minister said: “It is no longer a secret that we give them military training and war equipment to drive the colonialists out of North Kalimantan” (Crozier 1966: 157). In January 1964, Robert Kennedy, the American

Attorney-General, visited Indonesia and Malaysia on President Johnson's behalf to bring a cease-fire in Kalimantan. Previously, on 24 December 1963 President Sukarno told a delegation from the South Vietnam Liberation Front that he hoped the Front would soon be victorious so that he could visit a free Saigon. A few weeks later, in a public speech, President Sukarno turned toward the American Ambassador Howard Jones and said in English, "Go to hell with your aid." Between 1956 and 1965 Sukarno visited Moscow four times and prominent Soviet figures like Nikita Kruschev and K. Voroshilov went to Jakarta to demonstrate their government's approbation of Indonesian policies. Soviet economic assistance (USD365 million) and military aid valued at USD 1.25 billion—missiles, destroyers, submarines and MiG-21s—had got under way (van der Kroef 1980: 245). The Russians might have regretted this support when Sukarno turned toward closer relationship with Beijing in 1963 as well as toward risky foreign gambits like the 'Confrontation' against the Malaysian Federation (van der Kroef 1980: 245).

In June 1964 in a "Summit" talks in Tokyo, President Sukarno refused to withdraw his guerillas from Malaysian Borneo. (The Sukarno guerilla forces, however, having to infiltrate deep inside enemy territories with scanty local supports, were vulnerable to the most effective tactics built by the British Army: "striking them on the way in and on their homeward journey" (James and Sheil-Small 1971: 131). After an intelligence report at the end of 1964 that Sukarno increased the build-up of forces along the Borneo border, and forward island bases flanking Singapore and the south-west of Malaysia Peninsula, Gen. Walker increased his forces into about 18 battalions of British forces (Royal Marine Commandos, 8 Gurkha battalions, and British), 8 battalions of Malaysian Army, 2 battalions of Singapore Regiment, and 8 thousands Australians and New Zealanders, not to mention 80 navy vessels including aircraft carriers Victorious and Centaur, RAF bomber squadron with extra Javelin all-weather fighters and the Bloodhound defense missiles (James and Sheil-Small 1971: 152-53). By the time Gen. Walker was replaced by Maj. Gen. George Lea in March 1965, most of the guerillas had been smashed. After Gen. Suharto took over and stripped Sukarno off real power in 1965, the final of the Confrontation came to an end as the Peace Agreement was signed on 11 August 1966.

Appendix C

Statistics of Ramin Log Production

The value of this *ramin*-rich peat-swamp forest is incredible. The initial standing stock of *ramin* in the West Kalimantan peat-swamp forest is estimated at around 66,271,500 cu. m (Directorate of Planning, 1983). If every cubic meter of *ramin* weighs about 260 to 500 kg (an average of 380 kg), and the price for each kg of *ramin* log is USD 1.56, the whole values of this forest (logs alone) would be staggering USD 39,285,745,200 (data of *ramin* standing stock from 1983). *Ramin* is suitable for furniture, wall paneling, light flooring, toys, turnery, broom handles, Venetian blind slats, dowels, rulers, picture frame and drawing boards. It also commonly used for general light construction such as door and window frames, mouldings, skirtings, ceilings, partitions, stair treads and counter tops. Indonesian government tried to protect ramin through National Park system; in West Kalimantan there have been two National Parks for ramin protection which are Muara Kendawangan Nature Reserve (150,000 ha) and Gunung Palung National Park (130,000 ha) (both in Ketapang District). Given the total [reported] annual production of *ramin* in Indonesia from 1994 to 2003 was merely 3,069,340 cu. m or about 4.6 percent of the standing stock counted since 1983, the rate of illegal logging must have been very high. (The reported exports from 1994 to 2003 amounted to 139,810 cu. m as reported by National Bureau of Statistics. The export rate of 139,810 cu. m out of 3,069,340 cu. m of *ramin* production from 1994 to 2003, or a measly 4.5 percent, begs a question about the fate of the rest of the logs produced.)

From the Table below for the yearly production of ramin in Indonesia from 1994 to 2003, the statistical test to see the level of probability that the decreasing rates of production in 1998, 1999, and 2000 were taking place “by happenstance.”

Year	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Prod. (m ³)	665,245	652,198	601,130	498,289	292,176	211,995	131,307	logging ban	8,000	8,000

Table A.3 Yearly rate of production of *ramin* in Indonesia (1994-2003). The known rates of Indonesian *ramin* production in 1991-1992 were around 900,000 cu. m per year (CITES, 1994). By rank, the five main destinations of *ramin* exports were Japan, Taiwan, Italy, Singapore and China.

Test for statistical significance (using the Student's t- test for such a data) is done in three steps. The first step is to decide the universal average (or M), which can be done by adding the rates of 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997 and then dividing the result with 4 to get the average. The result is 604,215.5 (or $M = 604,215.5$). The second step is to find the Standard Deviation of the data taken as samples (the rates of 1998, 1999, and 2000). This needs a table and a formula.

X	d (x - x ₀)	d ²
292,176 (1998 rates)	81,176	6,589,542,976
211,995 (1999 rates)	995	990,025
131,307 (2000 rates)	- 79,693	6,350,974,249
x ₀ (assumed mean) = 211,000 n = 3 m = 211,826	82,171 A = 2,478	12,941,507,250 = B

Table A.4 Data to Calculate the Standard Deviation or *Ramin* Productions

The formula to find the Standard Deviation (s) out of the information above is

$$s = \sqrt{\frac{B - A^2/n}{n - 1}}$$

$$s = \sqrt{\frac{12,941,507,250 - 2,478^2/3}{3 - 1}}$$

$$s = \sqrt{\frac{12,941,507,250 - 2,046,828}{2}}$$

Now the third step to launch the Student's t-test is possible as the values of s, n, m, and M are available.

Thus,

$$t = \frac{\sqrt{n} \cdot |M - m|}{s}$$


$$t = \frac{\sqrt{3} \cdot |604,215.5 - 211,826|}{80,434.63}$$

$$t = \frac{1.73 \times 392,389.5}{80,434.63}$$

$$t = 8.43$$

Juxtaposed against the "Student's t Table" (Langley 1971: 162) the value of 8.43 for t for the calculation with 3 samples means that the probability of the series of numbers (rates of ramin production in 1998, 1999, and 2000) to take place as happenstance is between 1 and 5 percent (although the value of t=8.43 is closer to 1 percent probability). This means that the rates of *ramin* production with such a sequence are "probably significant." (If the rates of 1990-91, which were 900,000 cu. m per year, were added to get a new universal average or M, M would become 702,810. If this M is used in the last operation, the t value would increase to 10.56 and the probability of the number sequence to appear as "incidental" would become lower than one percent or "significant.") When the *ramin* production rates of 2001 and 2002 are added into the previous calculation, the t value becomes 8.33, which is amazingly close to the previous t (8.43). But when juxtaposed with the Student's t Table (Langley 1971:

162), the probability that the series of rates as appear from 1998 to 2003 appear as “accident” is lower than 0.2 percent. In other words, if the rates of *ramin* production (1998 to 2003) from 100 tropical countries were taken, the rates shown by the Indonesian case would appear only in 0.2 times (two per 1,000 occasions). However, the last operation to add the rates of *ramin* production from 2001 and 2002 is becoming increasingly incredulous as the statistics given by government reports are growingly ridiculous (0 cu. m in 2001 and 8,000 cu. m in 2002). This statistics provides a general overview about the arbitrariness of the state management and control over the extraction of forest resources.



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Appendix D

Wasteful Extraction of Forest Resources

This sample is taken from wasteful logging practice (600 ha of Inhutani III or PT. Sumber Alam Ramin), Kapuas Regency, Central Kalimantan in 1989. The forest concession covered 600 ha in Kapuas Regency in a forest dominated by *ramin* (*Gonystylus bancanus* Kurtz) by 70.21 percent (13,035 cu. m) of the whole log volumes (18,566 cu. m). If only ramin trees (larger than 40 cm in diameter) were allowed to cut, the production potential was 10,704 cu. m (82.12 percent) or around 4,782 trees (57.01 percent of all eligible *ramin* trees). The required development of schools, villages, mosques, church, Village Cooperatives, etc was not managed well by the company. The inland road, presumably to break the isolation of the forest area from the other cities, was only good for the logging activities. As the result, the city of "Pulau Pisang," once a producer of 75 percent of timber from Central Kalimantan, had turned into a ghost city when the logs had gone.

The theoretical price of *ramin* of USD 150 per cu. m of log (undervalued price compared to the average USD 592.8 per cu. m of *ramin* log in Endnote i of this Chapter) would have brought (in legal style of logging regime) USD 1.60 million for the whole project (not to mention other eligible species, which, if also cut, would have brought a total value of about USD 2.78 million). Trapped in indebtedness to the logging "bosses," casual logging loggers (non-Dayaks for the Dayaks were usually inefficient logging workers) must accept 'happily' the IDR 270 thousand (USD 30 at 2006 rate) paid by "bosses" per cu. m of log they cut. The middlemen would fetch from each cu. M of log some IDR 1 million (USD 111 at 2006 rate) from logging "bosses." These middlemen sold the logs for IDR 2 million (USD 222 at 2006 rate) in Surabaya (East Java) markets. (The loggers got only approximately 13 percent of the log values.) Some loggers working in this logging concession site stated that they illegally cut the logs for five months but failed to properly support their families; and "bosses" sometimes ran away with their "wages." The extremely low wages for the loggers had brought down the logging efficiency to between 50 to 60 percent. SKEPHI (Secretariat of Forest Conservation Collaboration) reported that despite the

theoretically high capacity of logging industries (40 million cu. m of legible logs annually), the real production only reached 33 million cu. M per year from logging concessions (*Hak Pengelolaan Hutan*), Industrial Forest Plantation (*Hutan Tanaman Industri*), Wood Utilization License (*Izin Pemungutan Kayu*), and People's Forest (*Hutan Rakyat*) (Source: Limin and Putir 2000).



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Appendix E

The Listed Logging Companies and Their Owners

The number of logging company has decreased to 46 companies in 1995 (La Ode 1997: 219) and 36 in 2002 (Thomas Tion et al. 2004: 9). Below the company lists are shown.

No	Company	Acreage (Ha)	Principal Owner	Note
1	PT. Anugerah	51,000	Soedirman	Indo-Chinese
2	PT. Aria Jaya	66,000	Ibrahim Saleh	Indo
3	PT. Barito Pacific Timber	176,000	Prayogo Pangestu	Indo-Chinese (C)
4	PT. Batasan	143,000	Than Tahy Cuan	Indo-Chinese
5	PT. Benua Indah	195,000	Ny. Ultari	Indo-Chinese
6	PT. Buling Trading, Ltd.	60,000	Suhadi	Indo-Chinese
7	PT Bumi Raya Utama	224,300	Adijanto	Indo-Chinese
8	PT Delapan Delapan	120,000	Herman	Indo-Chinese
9	PT Duaja Corporation	125,000	Ny. Sofia Korompis	Indo-Chinese
10	PT Erna Djuliawati	102,000	Ridwan M. Roysen L.	Indo
11	PT Gelora Dayak Besar	140,000	A.E. Manihuruk (*)	Indo
12	PT Halisa	100,000	Agus Susanto	Indo-Chinese
13	PT Harapan Kita Utama	138,500	Andree Salim	Indo-Chinese
14	PT Harjohn Timber, Ltd.	161,000	Suhadi	Indo-Chinese
15	PT Hutan Raya Utama	45,000	Ny. Sofia Korompis	Indo-Chinese
16	Coy I	45,000	Ny. Sofia Korompis	Indo-Chinese
17	PT Hutan Raya Utama	120,000	Ir. Titus S. M.Sc	Company
18	Coy II	110,000	H. Hasyim Ning	Indo
19	PT Inhutani II	131,000	Ny. Ultari	Indo-Chinese
20	PT Inyutas	90,000	Soetopo Janantu	Indo-Chinese
21	PT Kartika Kapuas Sari	177,000	Agus Susanto	Indo-Chinese
22	PT Kawedar Mukti	182,000	Suhadi	Indo-Chinese
23	Timber	75,000	Soenaryo P.	Indo-Chinese
24	PT Kayu Lapis Indonesia	45,000	Sudwikatmono(**)	Indo-Chinese
25	PT Kayu Pasugan	80,000	David N. Wijaya	Indo-Chinese
26	PT Kurnia Kapuas	60,000	Ny. Ultari	Indo-Chinese
27	Plywood	58,000	Ny. Theresia Bawe	Indo-Chinese
28	PT Kusuma Alas Timber	59,100	H. Achmad F.W. MA	Indo
29	PT Kusuma Perkasa Indah	90,000	Santoso Pukarta	Indo-Chinese
30	PT Lanjak Deras Jaya	40,000	Ny. Tok Siam Nai	Indo-Chinese
31	Raya	107,000	Soenaryo P	Indo-Chinese
32	PT Markita Borneo	52,500	Sunardy	Indo-Chinese
33	Timber	105,000	Ny. Sofia Korompis	Indo-Chinese
34	PT Marsela Wana	99,000	Chang Hui Ngin	Indo-Chinese

35	Sekawan	71,000	Agatha E.S. Sumitro	Indo-Chinese
36	PT Papa Guna	84,000	Ny. Erna Setiawati	Indo-Chinese
37	PT Pelita Rimba Alam	66,000	Suhadi	Indo-Chinese
38	PT Persada Kawi ITC	50,000	Vinny Marsujo	Indo-Chinese
39	PT Pulau Maya	295,000	Suhadi	Indo-Chinese
40	PT Puntjak Sawmill	84,000	Lim Yurika	Indo-Chinese
41	PT Raja Rimba	137,000	Ny. Ultari	Indo-Chinese
42	PT Rimba Adijaya	100,000	H.D. Iswan Tarsip	Indo
43	Nusantara	91,000	Jane Lamas	Indo-Chinese
44	PT Rimba Ramin	80,000	Alex Korompis	Indo-Chinese
45	Pontianak	843,000	Maj. Gen. (Pol) J. Mardo	Indo
46	PT Sari Bumi Kusuma	40,000	Arie Petra	Indo-Chinese
	PT Saritama Indah Raya			
	PT Suka Jaya Makmur			
	PT Sumber Jaya Baru			
	Utama			
	PT Tawang Meranti			
	PT Tri Kakka			
	PT Tunas Indo Timber			
	PT Wanati Utama			
	PT Jamaker Kalbar Jaya			
	PT Rimba Agung Utama			
	(*) Police			
	(**) Suharto's cousin			

Table A.3: Logging companies and their principal owners in West Kalimantan, 1995.

Source: La Ode (1997: 219).

No	Company	Acreage (Ha)
1.	PT Anuraga	51,000
2.	PT Aria Jaya	66,000
3.	PT. Batasan	143,000
4.	PT. Benua Indah	195,000
5.	PT. Buling Trading, Ltd.	60,000
6.	PT Bumi Raya Utama	198,025

7.	PT Duaja Corporation II (Hutrindo Wanabangun)	125,000
8.	PT Duta Rendra Mulia (Kalamur/Indo Plywood)	72,300
9.	PT Erna Djuliawati Kalbar (Lyman)	102,000
10.	PT Halisa (KLI)	100,000
11.	PT Harapan Kita Utama	138,500
12.	PT Harjohn Timber, Ltd. (Alas Kusuma)	161,000
13.	PT Hutan Raya Utama II (Hutrindo Wanabangun)	45,000
14.	PT Inyutas	110,000
15.	PT Kartika Kapuas Sari (Benua Indah)	131,000
16.	PT Kayu Lapis Indonesia (KLI)	177,000
17.	PT Kawedar Mukti Timber	90,000
18.	PT Kayu Pesaguan (Alas Kusuma)	182,000
19.	PT Kusuma Perkasa Indah Timber (Batasan)	80,000
20.	PT Kurnia Kapuas Plywood (Bumi Raya Utama)	75,000
21.	PT Lanjak Deras Jaya Raya (Benua Indah)	60,000
22.	PT Maragadaya Woodworks Kalbar (Barito Pacific Timber I)	176,000
23.	PT Marsela Wana Sekawan (Kahayan Lumber)	59,100
24.	PT Papa Guna	90,000
25.	PT Pelita Rimba Alam Timber Coy	40,000
26.	PT Puntjak Sawmill (Hutrindo Wanabangun)	105,000

27. PT Raja Rimba	99,500
28. PT Rimba Adijaya Nusantara (Batasan)	115,000
29. PT Rimba Agung Utama	40,000
30. PT Rimba Ramin	84,000
31. PT Sari Bumi Kusuma Kalbar (Alas Kusuma)	66,000
32. PT Saritama Indah Raya (Barito Pacific)	50,000
33. PT Suka Jaya Makmur (Alas Kusuma)	294,000
34. PT Sumber Jaya Baru Utama	84,000
35. PT Tawang Meranti (Benua Indah)	137,000
36. PT Tri Kakka (Barito Pacific)	100,000
Total	4,811,750

Source: www.aphi-pusat.com (2002)

Table A.4 Company List, 2002.

Appendix F

Palm Oil Industry and Suharto's Family and Cronies

Most of the palm oil industry businesses had links with Suharto's buddies and family members. In the mid-1980s, a joint venture of the Salim and Sinar Mas Groups was established involving two sons of Suharto (Sigit Harjojudanto and Tommy Suharto), and Suharto's cousin (Sudwikatmono). The Salim and Sinar Mas Group split their joint venture in late 1980s and each group developed their own division for production of Crude Palm Oil (CPO). However, Suharto family's interests were still represented in both groups. Sinar Mas then developed its division of edible oil in collaboration with the second son of Suharto, Bambang Trihatmojo, who also had shares in a plantation company belonging to another conglomerate, the Bakrie Group. Also involved was Bambang's sister Siti Hediyyati. She and her brother-in-law, Hashim Djojohadikusumo, established a joint venture with a Sino-Malaysian tycoon (Robert Kuok) to develop a 44,000 ha-large palm oil plantation in South Sumatra in 1994. In that year, the third generation of Suharto's family jumped into business. Ari Harjo Wibowo, Sigit's eldest son, owned a company which received a special quota from the Indonesian Logistic Board to market 70,000 tons of crude palm oil a month (more than the joint quota for the Salim and Sinar Mas Groups). When Ari decided that he wanted to manage his own plantations, the Minister of Transmigration provided him a contract to establish an 80,000 ha of palm oil plantation in East Kalimantan, which used transmigrants as captive laborers. In March 1996, using the First Family connections, Ari signed a memorandum of understanding with a Pakistani trading corporation to export USD 1.24 billion-worth of crude palm oil to Pakistan.

In 1985, oil palm plantations covered 600,000 ha in whole Indonesia. By 1996 they extended over 2.2 million ha. More recent figures suggest that there are now 2.4 million ha of palm oil plantation (state-owned companies possess 443,000 ha, smallholders have 824,000 ha, and private companies the rest). Besides the existing plantations, some 6.8 million ha of land has been recently reserved for future

plantations (*Suara Pembaruan* 10 October 1997). This figure excluded applications to develop new plantations, which reached 9 million ha by June 1998 (*Suara Pembaruan*, 26 July 1998).



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
Appendix G

The Economic Ruins President Suharto Left Behind

When Suharto resigned, the damages reached the staggering (still at least) USD 429 billion (Winters 2004: 202). Around USD 64.4 billion (from USD 334.9 billion total oil earning) was stolen from the state oil company since the early 1970s; around USD 10 billion was stolen from World Bank-funded projects; at least USD 15 billion was stolen from ADB and World Bank loans. The state audit BPK (*Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan* or Bureau of State Treasury Audit) found that around USD 100 billion disappeared mysteriously from government revenues and spending between 1998 and 2002. Thus USD 189.4 billion had vanished into thin air. The 1998 IMF rescue package and new domestic obligation (to bring more capital into asphyxiated banks) amounted to USD 121 billion (Winters 2004: 200)—and their interests were USD 40 billion (the quickly-made IBRA or Bank Restructuring Agency must scavenge for whatever tatters left for the dead or half-dead banks to repay all of these obligations). The other USD 18.3 billion-worth liquidity credits thrown around by Bank Indonesia to 48 asphyxiated banks to fill the banks vault disappeared through misuse of abuse by bank managers (also by Bank Indonesia's managers squeezing for kickbacks from smaller banks). Another USD 179.3 had already and had almost certainly been flying to the blue sky.

Added with the old unpaid pre-1997 debts of USD 70 billion, the total MIAs (Missing in Abuse) amounted to USD 438.7 billion. Like his predecessor in the art of plundering, Ferdinand Marcos, Suharto claimed himself as a poor destitute shortly after his resignation; Suharto and his lawyers scoffed and threatened off all rumors about his hidden wealth. (For comparison, Ferdinand Marcos stolen USD 17.1 billion from the total USD 27 billion-worth debts incurred to the Philippines in his 1986 downfall—not to mention 651.1 metric tons of gold—at USD 400 per ounce—he plundered from state treasury. All bank accounts worthy around a minuscule USD 400 million in Switzerland, Austria, Hong Kong, etc related clearly to Marcos family were frozen and taken back to the Philippines [McDougald 1997: 206, 175]. In 1994 Marcos family paid almost USD 2 billion—decision upheld by the US Supreme Court

later in 1995—for the victims of their human rights abuses; in July 1996, USD 22 billion was awarded to the *Golden Budha Corporation* (Buddha with one d) because of the torture by Marcos hit men against Roger Roxas, the owner of Golden Budha Corporation.)



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Appendix H


Short Biography of A.R. Mecer

Born in Menyumbung, Sandai subdistrict, Ketapang District on 27 March 1944 in a family of a local adat [Krio Dayak] leader, Drs. Anselmus Robertus Mecer was learning early to attend *adat* meetings with his late father, Ambrosius Dura who bore a leadership title of *Petinggi Adat Dayak Krio* or Adat Leader of Krio Dayak (Advertorial 2002: 22). A.R. Mecer studied in Faculty of Teachership and Education Science (*Fakultas Keguruan Ilmu Pendidikan*) of Tanjungpura University (Pontianak) in Mathematics in 1966 while he taught in SD Bruder (Elementary School Bruder) Pontianak until 1974. In 1975 he continued a full study for a bachelor degree (also in Mathematics) in Faculty of Teachership and Economic Sciences in (*Fakultas Keguruan Ilmu Ekonomi-Institut Keguruan Ilmu Pendidikan*) Institute of Teachership and Education Sciences of Bandung (West Java) and was graduated—that what “Drs.” or *Doktorandus*, a Dutch term for bachelor degree holders stood for—in 1978.

He became a full lecturer (*dosen tetap*, with status as state employee or *pegawai negeri*) in Faculty of Teachership and Education Science of Tanjungpura University immediately upon his return to Tanjungpura University. Later, after a successful campaign he was chosen as one member of People Representative Assembly, Province Level (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah*) for 1987-1992 period. (In 1981 he was one of the important pioneers in the establishment of the Church-supported Pancur Kasih Foundation that turned out to be a successful Credit Union.)

In the general election of 1999, this religious person was elected as a member of the People Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia*) to serve from 1999 to 2004. He believed that “the marginalized groups must regain their same dignity as the others among God’s creatures.” If he was elected as governor of West Kalimantan (he campaigned for governorship for 2003-2008 period but failed), he would (1) build infrastructure especially roads, (2) empower people-based economy, (3) increase the quality of human resources in West Kalimantan, (4) widen the roles of people in politics, and (5) eradicate corruption. A.R. Mecer offered a concept of “*pemberdayaan berkelanjutan*” or sustained empowerment in which the empowerment process respected a certain scale of

priorities. First priority was the self-empowerment (“how could a disempowered person empower others?”, the rhetoric goes), then family, then the Dayak society, and finally the whole other members of society from any groups (Albertus 2005: 62). To show his readiness to be a means of empowerment, he planned to campaign for the District Leader position in Ketapang District for the 2005-2010 period—which unfortunately also failed. His latest ambition is to be the governor of West Kalimantan for 2008-2013 period; the campaign and election period start on November 2007.



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
Appendix I

Short History of WALHI

After a UN-sponsored Conference about the Environment in Stockholm, Sweden (June 1972), the Indonesian government issued a Decision (*Keputusan Presiden No. 16 of 1972*) to found a commission on the environment. Another Presidential Decision (*Keputusan Presiden No. 35 of 1978*) created a ministerial post dubbed *Menteri Negara* (non-portfolio) *Pengawasan Pembangunan dan Lingkungan Hidup* (Minister for Development and Environment Inspection) with Emil Salim, a Suharto protégé as its first minister (Culla 2006: 103-104). Soon afterwards, the new minister invited all Indonesian NGOs (350 NGOs at that time) in a conference in Jakarta and then formed a representative commission composed of 10 notable NGOs called “*Kelompok Sepuluh Pengembangan Lingkungan Hidup*” (Team of Ten) on 23 May 1978 to work within the minister’s office. After a shocking Mercury poisoning that killed some children in North Jakarta in the middle of 1980, the [useless, criticized as Java-centric] Team of Ten was invited again to the fore. This time the Team answered its critics through a Conference of Center for Environmental Studies (*Pusat Studi Lingkungan*) in Jakarta in October 1980. On 15 October 1980, the majority of conference attendants declared a new loose forum called WALHI (*Wahana Lingkungan Hidup* or Forum for Environment).

Its non-political, pro-government activities, were turned into more confrontational—throughout many criticisms against its pro-government policies—when WALHI (directed then by Abdul Hakim G. Nusantara, a lawyer), together with other national and foreign NGOs, exposed the case of Kedung Ombo Dam in Central Java amidst a meeting of Inter-NGO Conference on IGGI Matters in Belgium, 1989 (“Brussel Incident”). In 1992, the director of WALHI Abdul Hakim G. Nusantara (1986-1989, 1989-1992), affirmed that WALHI would work on *advokasi* (direct campaign on real cases) on political changes toward a more democratic society (Culla 2006: 122). During the post-Suharto era, WALHI worked on *advokasi* related with governmental policies. It tried consistently to stand out of the government structure. In July 1999 (before 1999 general election) WALHI planned, although latter cancelled it for protests from the majority of members) to join the National People

Consultative Assembly Republic Indonesia (MPR RI) as the elements for environmental and resource management issues. WALHI built its local (25 provincial branches per 2004), national, and international networks with many environmental NGOs such as Friends of Earth International, Southeast Asia Climate Action Network, Waste Wise, etc. In 2001 WALHI was an umbrella for 421 NGO members gathered under a forum called “*Sahabat Walhi*” (Friends of WALHI).



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Appendix J**Short History of L.H. Kadir, Dayak Vice-Governor 2003**

Drs. Laurentius Herman Kadir was a loyal government officer (*pegawai negeri*) who was born in Nanga Tisi Temeru, Kapuas Hulu District on 28 May 1941 as a son of Dayak peasant. His childhood was spent in a village hunting and horticultural life (he used to catch crocodiles for their precious leather). In 1950 he studied in Sekolah Rakyat (SR) or Elementary School two days of sampan-rowing away from his family's house; so he stayed with a Chinese family near his school. After SR he went to a private *Sekolah Menengah Pertama* (three-year Junior High School) in Putussibau. In 1958 Kadir continued study in *Sekolah Menengah Ekonomi Atas* (three year Senior High School for Basic Economics) in Pontianak and lived in the vicinity of Grand Arch-Bishop Complex of Pontianak. Six months after he was graduated from the Senior High School he took a course called *Kursus Dinas C* (Course for Government Officer, C-Class) and immediately was assigned in Kapuas Hulu District as a *mantri pamong praja kabupaten* (clerk for government service, district level) in 1961. In 1965 he took further study to APDN (Academy for State Governance, commonly known as school for subdistrict leaders or *camat*) Pontianak and was graduated in 1968. He quickly resumed his service in Putussibau, this time as the Head of Analyses for Society Development (*Analisa Perkembangan Masyarakat* which is known more as Directorate of Social Politics to date). He moved on ranks and assumed a new position as the Head of Governance Surveillance Section (*Seksi Pengawasan Pemerintahan*) until 1973. The next 12 years Kadir spent as the Head of Bureau for Village Development (*Biro Pembinaan Desa*) until he became First Assistant for Governance Section in Pontianak Municipal Office on 12 October 1999 (Profil 2000: 22). After a long industrious service as a government officer for 42 years, he was appointed by the PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*, Islamic Party) and PBI (*Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*) as the vice governor candidate of the parties and finally was elected in January 2003.

Appendix K

Short Biography of Usman Djafar Malay Governor 2003

Born in Sekadau District on 10 September 1951 and finished his elementary school and junior high school in 1967, Usman Djafar continued his study in a Jakarta Senior High School (SMA 23 Slipi) when his uncle, a figure in Partai Nasional Indonesia, was elected as the West Kalimantan representative in Jakarta-based People Representative Assembly/People Consultative Assembly in 1969. He took a course in the Academy for Company Manager (APP or *Akademi Pemimpin Perusahaan*) in 1970 and was graduated in 1974. Shortly after graduation he was offered a position in a retail business founded by Abdul Latief (Minister of Manpower under Suharto's cabinet, 1993-1998) who was also a graduate from the APP. On 19 January 1974 he worked in PT IPC Sarinah Jaya (retail business). Abdul Latief assigned Usman Djafar as the General Manager of PT Pasaraya Torsesajaya in Jakarta in 1982 and then as the Executive Director of the same retail company in 1993 when Abdul Latief (its previous Executive Director) got a position as the Minister of Labor (*Menteri Tenaga Kerja*) in Suharto's cabinet of 1993-1997.

Three months before Abdul Latief was assigned as the Minister of Labor under Suharto's Cabinet, he bought most of infrastructure assets of the Freeport (mining company famous for its bleeding hand in West Papua). Abdul Latief joined the group of the privileged few after he was introduced to Freeport executives by Ginandjar Kartasasmita, one of the few Suharto's closest aides (*Wall Street Journal* 29 September 1998, in <http://seas.stanford.edu/freeport/wsj.html>, accessed 24 May 2007). For four years afterwards, Abdul Latief's company (while he was the Minister of Labor) purchased around USD 370 million of Freeport assets, financed by approximately USD 255 million of debt guaranteed by Freeport. The Alatief Corporation began its most lucrative contracts with Freeport McMoran, ITT Sheraton, and the Australian shipping giant P&O.

Usman Djafar's loyalty to Abdul Latief was paid off when the latter asked him to be the Director of Lativi, a TV company, from 2000 to 2003, during which a plan to take a credit from Bank Mandiri—later the credit was found to be a scam as the loan requirements were largely ignored—was discussed. In 2000 a loan of IDR 328

billion (around USD 36.44 million) was applied to the state bank Bank Mandiri to build a new TV station (Lativi Media Karya) but the disbursement from the bank was taking place only from 2001 to 2003 (http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hq/nasional/2006/01/27/brk,20060127-73075_id.html). Abdul Latief (the TV company owner), Usman Djafar (former director, 2000-2003), and Hasyim Sumijana (director) were the formal suspects of the scam by 1 June 2006 (<http://www.antikorupsi.org/mod.php?mod=publisher&op=viewarticle&artid=10024>). They were off the hook after the Bank Mandiri claimed that it had received back the unpaid remaining IDR 211 billion from the Capital Managers Asia Pte. Ltd that allegedly took over all shares of PT Lativi Media Karya. Other sources such as www.tempointeraktif.com/ang/min/02/45/pokok1.htm claimed that Abdul Latief and his PT Lativi were saved by Suharto's involvement to settle the alleged scam. (By April 2005 Bank Mandiri granted credits to more than 28 companies without proper due diligence, leading to state losses of over IDR 12 trillion or around USD 1.33 billion.). In its report entitled "Troubled Company Reporter Asia Pacific," dated 6 February 2006 (Vol. 9, No. 029), Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc. & Beard Group, Inc. put Bank Mandiri as a troubled company because of a lending scam (http://bankrupt.com/TCRAP_Public/060206.mbx).

Appendix L

The Tendency for Voting (per Ethnic Group) in West Kalimantan during the General Election of 2004

No	Ethnic	Sambas District	Bengkay ang District	Landak District	Pontianak District	Sanggau- Sekadau Districts	Ketapang District	Sintang- Melawi District	Kapuas Hulu District	Pontianak Municipal	Singkawan g Municipal
1	Malay (%)	361,615 (79.64%)	35,696 (20.21%)	21,576 (7.65%)	169,402 (26.98%)	104,938 20.65%	193,402 45.49%	90,410 49.58%	90,514 49.58%	146,673 31.57%	45,771 30.19%
2	Dayak (%)	21,287 (4.96%)	98,132 (55.55%)	236,046 (83.70%)	58,634 (9.34%)	318,767 62.71%	126,518 29.76%	80,308 43.99%	80,308 43.99%	21,302 4.59%	13,354 8.81%
3	Chinese (%)	50,241 (11.07%)	17,440 (9.87%)	8,491 (3.01%)	77,077 (12.28%)	18,660 3.67%	10,618 2.28%	2,544 1.39%	2,544 1.39%	109,275 23.52%	64,851 42.77%
No	Candida tes Pairing	Sambas	Bengkay ang	Landak	Pontianak	Sanggau- Sekadau	Ketapang	Sintang- Melawi	Kapuas Hulu	Pontianak Municipal	Singkawan g
1	Megawati- Hasyim	92.45	52.06	122.96	71.586	110.153	63.799	81.567	53.921	56.669	37.224
2	SBY- MJK	36,621	16.62	20.581	95.802	47.291	59.385	46.448	23.912	75.77	16.847
3	Wiranto- Wahid	52.179	17.94	14.64	92.89	28.914	50.886	31.446	19.603	59.918	11.91
4	Amin- Siswono	23.384	4.42	2.421	34.776	8.23	13.934	13.316	9.938	51.152	7.17
5	Hamzah -Agum	24.581	2.521	1.26	16.368	3.747	37.387	3.854	7.184	9.508	2.035

Table A.5: Voting Tendency per Ethnic Groups

Note: SBY-MJK pair prevailed only in Pontianak Municipal and District, and Sanggau-Sekadau District. Megawati-Hasyim pair swept the rest.

Source: E. Ngiuk 2004b: 44.

Appendix M

Results of the General Election of 2004 for Representatives in People Representative Boards at National and Provincial Levels

Party	Representative	District
For Provincial People Representative Assembly		
Partai Merdeka	Tobias Ranggie, SH(*)	Sintang/Kapuas Hulu
PPP	H. Jalaludin	Pontianak Municipal
	KH Chairuman Arrahbini	Pontianak District
	Drs. Herman Hovi M, MBA	Pontianak District
	H Zainal Abidin Hz	Singkawang/Bengkayang
	H Adjir Sulaiman BA	Sambas
	Drs. Muhammad Sufie	Sanggau/Sekadau
	Drs. Zainuddin Isman M.Pil	Sintang/Kapuas Hulu
	Mokh. Sahidollah	Ketapang
Partai Demokrat	Hierony Bulang BA(*)	Sanggau
	Drs. Herman Ivo(*)	Singkawang Bengkayang
	Ir. Albertus Batara Budi(*)	Ketapang
	Setiyo Gunawan SE	Pontianak Municipal
	Drs. H. Herman Fauzi	Pontianak District
	M. Arya Tanjungpura S. Sos (*)	Landak
	Mikael Mahin S.Sos (*)	Sintang/Kapuas Hulu
Partai PDK	RA Rachmad Sahudin B.Sc	Ketapang
PNBK	Ir. Harry Try Yoga	Sanggau/Sekadau
PAN	Ir. Ichwani A. Rahim	Pontianak Municipal
	Asmaniar SH	Pontianak District
	Tony Kurniadi ST	Sambas
PKPB	AM Idrus	Sintang/Kapuas Hulu
	HR Zechri Baijuri	Pontianak District
PKB	Sy. Abdullah Alkadrie	Pontianak District
PKS	Drs. Abdul Rahmi	Pontianak Municipal
	Supriadi S. Ag.	Pontianak District
PBR	Erfani Islami SH	Pontianak District
	HM Ali Said SH	Sambas
PDI P	Alexander Lamusu	Pontianak Municipal
	Moses Alep(*)	Pontianak District
	Yulhelmi SE	Singkawang/Bengkayang
	Andreas Kenny Kumala	Singkawang/Bengkayang
	Rosliyan Ramli Saleh SH	Sambas

PDS	Thamrin S. Sos E. Delasor(*) Tommy Ria SE Indra Mintarsih S.Sos Hamdani Adeni Suprianto Dip. Th. Katharina Lies S.Pd(*) Pdt. Harry Saderach S, S.Th <i>Ir. H. Zulfadhl</i> Michael Yan Sriwidodo SE, MM H. Moh Naib Tappi Anwar S.Pd Drs. Awang Sofian R. Drs. Kashmir Bafiroes M.Si Drs H Uray Darmansyah Drs A Purwanto Soewita H Mulyadi H Yamin H Lutfhi Ali SE H Muzakir Usman Andreas Lani(*) Drs Adrianus Senen(*) Hadlir Noor S.Sos	Sambas Landak Sanggau Sintang/Kapuas Hulu Ketapang Landak Sanggau/Sekadau Sanggau/Sekadau <i>Pontianak Municipal</i> Pontianak Municipal Pontianak District Pontianak District Singkawang/Bengkayang Sambas Sambas Sanggau Sanggau Ketapang Ketapang Landak Sintang/Kapuas Hulu Sintang/Kapuas Hulu
GOLKAR	For National People Representative Assembly	
PDI P	M. Akil Mochtar Gusti Syamsumin, BA Hj Asiah Salekan, BA Max Moein MA Agus Clarus(*)	
PPP	H Urai Faisal Hamid	
Partai Demokrat	Albert Yaputra	
PDS	Walman Siahaan	
PAN	H Ishaq Saleh	

Table A.6: The Results of General Election 2004.

Note: (*) Dayak.

Source: Thomas Tion and Edi Petebang 2004: 8.

Appendix N

Marriage Ceremony and Family Genealogy in Lingga Village

The most complicated of all complex *adat* ceremonies is the marriage ceremony. A man who proposes a woman to be his wife sends a token of seriousness (something iron or gold) to the family of the future wife. After three or certain days the female side would reply to the man: keeping the token means agreement, returning it means refusal. (A stubborn man may re-propose with tokens in higher values.) *Romo manta'* (*manta'* is raw) ceremony (without slaughtered pigs in the ceremony, just chickens) is done when an agreement for a marriage has been reached. *Romo masa'* (*masa'* means cooked) is the next sequence when both sides have no longer the slightest hesitation with the marriage. This time, pigs and chickens are slaughtered for the parts of the ceremony. (At this stage, cancellation would bring heavy *adat* fines for the one who cancels the marriage.) All *waris* (family members who have inheritance rights over the bride and groom) are called. In the past, *waris* could be as extensive as 16 levels of kinship relations but for convenience the common *waris* now is only until four levels (parents, grandparents, grand-grandparents, and parents' kins) for both bride and groom.

When the date of marriage is decided, three pigs and seven chickens are slaughtered and the marrying parties visit the grave of ancestors to do "*kubah padah*" (*padah* means telling to ancestors' grave). Or else the neglected spirits of ancestors would angrily devour the foods prepared for the feast or bring heavy rain. All of these complex ceremonies must be stopped at least three days in case of the death among the family members of the bride or groom. It is believed that if the planned marriage has brought death even it does not happen yet, the ceremony is not auspicious for the families.

The Kanayatn Dayaks are very strict about the marriage taboo that applies extensively to the farthest cousins until eight generations. See the following Figure Kanayatn Kin Terminology below. This rather extended blood lineage, which is also generally observed in most Dayak sub-tribes, explains the high potential for extensive blood feuding whenever a member of Dayak clans is injured. The measurement for the kinds of injury that can provoke "rights of blood relatives" is based on whether the

victimized Dayak sheds blood or not. Simple non-bleeding wounds are usually settled with simple payment with gingered rice but bleeding wounds need sacrifices of living animals (at least chicken or pigs) to symbolize “blood payment” for blood relatives.




Figure A.1: The Kin Terminology of Kanayatn Dayak (seen from **Ego**'s perspective)

Note:

1. Apa' (of Ego)	11. Sakadiriati
2. Uwe'	12. Sakadiriati
3. Ene'	13. Sakadiriati
4. Ene'	14. Sakadiriati
5. Nauda'	15. Sakadiriati
6. Pauda'	
7. Aka'	
8. Adi'	
9. Sakadiriati	
10. Sakadiriati	

Note:

θ Ego = individual as the center of reference

▲ Male

○ Female

= Husband-Wife relationship

- | | Sibling relationship
- | | Parent-Child relationship.

This Kin Terminology is too simple for the Kanayatn Dayaks who have terms up to the eighth generation. They need such an extensive terminology to uphold the inter-cousin marriage taboo down to the seventh generation. The kinship of the Kanayatn Dayak covers five levels up from father, grandfather, father of grandfather, grandfather of grandfather, to father of grandfather of grandfather. Downward, the kinship covers child, grandchild, child of grandchild, and grandchild of grandchild (Sood 1999: 57).

Appendix O

Statistical Significance Test for Villagers' Education Level

The total number of villagers education year is 14,317 villagers education year, based on Table 1 without data from Neighbor Group 03, 12, and 20 (incomplete data). The average education year for each villager is thus 14,317 divided by 4,219 villagers or 3.39 years/villager. This village average is lower than the average of West Kalimantan province, which is claimed as 6.8 year in 2005 by the Governor Usman Djafar (*Pontianak Post* 17 November 2006). This information, however, is sufficient to operate a statistical significance test.

I pick three years (2002 to 2005) as the time limit to run the zI test (Langley 1971: 245-53) for isolated occurrences (village data) and an average (provincial). As changes in length of people's education year are hardly fluctuating, I assume that the villagers education year has remained constant (3.39 years) since 2002 to 2005—so too the province average (6.8 years). Now, I'm putting the data into symbols.

Data: x (village occurrences) = 3.39 years per person \times 3 years = 10.17 years/person

n (time limit of samples) = 3 years

P_x (province average) = 6.8 years/person

P_y (proportion on non-occurrences) = 1

E (expectation of education year) = $P_x \times n$

= 6.8 years/person \times 3 years = 20.4 years/ person

c = a correction factor, whose value in this case is 0 for " x " is smaller than " E ."

Now the zI test can be applied:

$$z = \frac{|E - x| - c}{\sqrt{E \times P_y}}$$

$$= \frac{|20.40 - 10.17| - 0}{\sqrt{20.40 \times 1}}$$

= 10.23

4.51
= 2.27

From the z Table (Langley 1971: 248), the probability that the z value of 2.27 to occur as happenstance stands between the probability of no significance difference of 5 percent and 1 percent (thus, probably significant). From 1,000 villages in West Kalimantan, the villager education years like those of Lingga village may occur in 10 to 50 villages. In other words, Lingga village stands as the worst 50 village out of 1,000 villages in terms of villagers' average education years. Given the fact that the missionaries have been active in Lingga village for the last three decades and Lingga proximity to province capital (and the first female Dayak to get a PhD comes from Lingga), this statistical test's result is very unlikely to be accurate to represent village reality. The remaining explanations are threefold: either the village data collectors underestimate the number or villagers' education years or the governor overstates the provincial education years (governor election coming in 2007); or both.

Appendix P

Dayak Mythology of World Creation and Grand Migration of Foreparents

The myth known among the Kanayatn Dayak appears closer to the Judeo-Christian tradition written in the Book of Genesis. The flying god, Ene' Daniang (*danyang* in the modern Javanese language means “spirit”), created a heaven and an earth in the empty sphere. Then the sun to light the dark nights and the moon and stars to be marks for calendars. Then the three worlds on earth: high-lands for spirits and gods, middle-lands for human beings and animals, and below-lands for demons named *Pantokng Bangok Pilas Galikng* (Satan and Devils). Then Ene' Daniang created the first male human being and named him Nor Adam. (And then a wife was created out of his rib bone, named Siti Hawa.) Nor Adam and Siti Hawa were forbidden to eat the fruit of a tree called *piang piu*, which was then eaten by Siti Hawa and Nor Adam after a deception by a serpent-like *Pantokng Bangok Pilas Galikng*. After that Nor Adam and Siti Hawa were cast out of heaven and cursed that they had to toil hard first on the land to get their foods. The couple bore two sons, one of which killed the other later out of jealousy because Ene' Daniang accepted the sacrifice of Mumukng but not of Mamakng, who later murdered Mumukng and thus was thrown out of Nor Adam's dwelling place. Ene' Daniang then protected the other tree of life (*pebantal pabangun idup pabula' palamputn sengat*) from Nor Adam's reach with fiery swords. {So he drove out the man; and he placed at the east of the garden of Eden cerubhim [angels] and a flaming sword which turned every way, to shield the way to the tree of life: Genesis 3: 23-24 (Bramley 1993: 48)}

Soon after Siti Hawa bore another 45 children, Ene' Daniang asked Nor Adam to hide them inside the bamboo tree except one daughter (who was later sacrificed to Ene' Daniang and turned into rice). The thunder broke the bamboo tree where 44 children of Nor Adam were hidden and thus freed them. Nor Adam kept the secrets that they were brothers and sisters and let the marriages among these children. But they were not allowed to marry the descendants of Mamakng (Nor Adam's first son who murdered his own brother Mumukng). Yet these children and their descendants disobeyed the order and married the sons and daughters of Mamakng. Ene' Daniang

was so angry that a decision to deluge the world was decreed; Pama Noh, the good descendant of Nor Adam who worshipped Ene' Daniang faithfully, was chosen to build a ship (*ajupm*) that would save those who were faithful to Ene' Daniang.

Long after the descendants of Pama Noh (sounding like Noah) survived the great deluge and grew in numbers but kept their one language, they planned to build a tower to reach the heaven. Ene' Daniang grew a poisonous mushroom (*gagalak*) that the descendants of Pama Noh found interesting and then consumed. They were falling asleep and when they woke up, they began to talk to each other in different languages and flocked into groups on the basis of shared languages. {Therefore the name of it is called Babel: because the Lord did there confuse the language of the entire earth: and from there did the Lord scatter them abroad over the face of the whole Earth: Genesis 11: 9} Only a person named Sandu did not eat the poisonous mushroom; his grand-grand-grand-grand child by the name of Ne' Galeber was going to be the ancestors of the Kanayatn Dayaks.

Ne' Galeber evaded a destruction sent by Ene' Daniang against a rebellious group and hid in Mount Marawi. There Ne' Galeber met and married Ne' Anteber. After a month, this new couple brought other seven families and emigrated away from Binua' Aya' (Great Land). After a short prayer (O Daniang O Jubata, if we're really sons of Adam, let this raft bring us to our new homes), the wind blew the raft through thousands of island and brought its passenger to land in Sikulantikng (Sukalanting to date) near Ketapang city, 350 km southern side of Pontianak at around 700 BC. Just after few days upon arrival in Sikulantikng, Ene' Daniang appeared in Ne' Galeber's dream to command further migration to Gunung (Mountain) Bawakng (located in Sambas District, 220 km northern side of Pontianak to date). So here the story went in its local twists about the granting of the island to Ne' Galeber's group, about the name of the island, about the family lineage of the Dayaks, etc.

Appendix Q
Statistical Significance Test for Village Population

The table for the data that will be statistically treated would appear as follows.

Site	Density
Lingga	177.16 persons/km ²
Pancaroba	150.64 persons/km ²
Teluk Bakung	116.66 persons/km ²
West Kalimantan	25.47 persons/km ²

Table 5.4E Data of Population Demography in three villages

So we have:

$$n \text{ (sample)} = 3$$

$$m = (116.66 + 150.64 + 177.16) : 3 = 148.15$$

s (standard deviation) = 30.35 (see the calculation below)

$$M = 25.47$$

The standard deviation (s) of the samples is calculated following Langley's (1971: 57) instruction:

Table 5.5E Data Needed to Calculate the Standard Deviation Value

X	d	d^2
116.66	- 33.98	1154.64
150.64	0.64	0.4096
177.16	26.52	703.31
$x = 150$	27.16	
$n = 3$	- 33.98	
		$B = 1,858.35$
	$A = - 6.82$	
	$A^2 = 46.51$	

Thus,

$$\begin{aligned}
 s &= \sqrt{\frac{(B - A^2/n)}{n - 1}} \\
 &= \sqrt{\frac{(1,858.35 - 46.51/3)}{2}} \\
 &= \sqrt{921.42} = 30.35
 \end{aligned}$$

The calculation (application of the t-test) is thus:

$$\begin{aligned}
 t &= \frac{\sqrt{n} |M - m|}{s} \\
 &= \frac{\sqrt{3} |25.47 - 148.15|}{30.35} \\
 &= \frac{6.98}{30.35}
 \end{aligned}$$

From the Student's t Table (Langley 1971: 162), the probability of no significant difference between M (province population density) and m (of three villages' population density) for the size of three samples for $t=6.98$ is somewhere midway between 1 and 5 percent. The population densities of three villages in Sungai Ambawang subdistrict, a newly opened forest frontier area, are "probably" significant in West Kalimantan. The newly hardened road, abundant forest resources, fertile

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lands, and ostensibly docile and peace-loving local Dayaks are good reasons for new waves of settlers to come to these newly opened forest frontier villages.



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Appendix R

Pollution in West Kalimantan and a Study on It

One of the significant sources of pollution in a riparian province like West Kalimantan has been the mercury from gold mines. Following the reports from local scientists of unacceptably high level of mercury in fish body tissue found around the junction of Kapuas and Landak rivers, near Pontianak (50 μ g/g or body tissue against WHO standard of 0.5 μ g/g of body tissue in 1983; mercury grade of 3.37 ppm—part per million—of snakehead fish tissue) and high mercury content in the river water (199.27 ppm), Yamashita and Serizawa (2004) measured mercury levels in hair and nails of human samples who lived around mining districts northern sides of Pontianak all the way to the human samples in Pontianak. Yamashita and Serizawa (2004) found—without mentioning the levels of statistical significance of the findings—that gold miners had averagely 4.39 μ g of mercury per gram of hair/nails tissue (60 samples), residents around gold mines had averagely 4.69 μ g of mercury per gram of hair tissue samples (50 samples), and consumers of processed water [state company] showed averagely 1.30 μ g mercury per gram of hair sample (40 samples).

A simple statistical significance test (chi-squared test) following Prof. Langley's methods (1970: 269-284) showed that the statistical probability of such occurrence of results to take place by simple chance was higher than 10 percent (chi-squared value = 2.00; $P > 10\%$) (Nevertheless the sensitivity of this chi-squared test is doubtful for values lower than 5 such as the levels of methyl-mercury in samples' nails; better statistical tests are possible only if Yamashita and Serizawa provided the details of each of 150 samples). Thus, the measurement result of Yamashita and Serizawa's test (2004) using an unproven method to measure environmental exposures (Harkins and Susten 2003) was due probably to chances. Probably the levels of mercury in the water and fish body tissues in the places from where they took their human samples (levels of mercury in the rivers and fish unreported) were much lower than in the place where those rivers converged (Pontianak). (Besides, more than 95 percent of methyl mercury absorbed in human bodies is collected inside guts instead of in hair or toenails.) This sample of activities of the "scientific-based

NGOs" speaks volumes about the lackluster quality of their work in a province with little experience with scientific activities.



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Appendix S

The Growth of the Credit Union of Pancur Kasih Foundation (abbreviated thenceforth as CUPK) since June 1987

YR	MEMBE RS	SHARES (SAVINGS) (in IDR)	LOANS (in IDR)	PROFITS (in IDR)	ASSETS (in IDR)	ASSETS GROWT H (%)	MEMBE RSHIP GROWT H (%)
Jun 87	61				167,000		
Dec 87	82	2,179,250	2,548,600	174,950	2,657,700	1,491.4	34.4
Dec 88	258	18,429,030	18,497,610	2,305,230	20,736,760	680.3	214.6
Dec 89	446	53,786,435	59,108,310	8,473,490	62,776,498	202.7	72.9
Dec 90	604	123,128,545	146,890,075	22,691,650	152,567,695	143.0	35.4
Dec 91	931	193,363,280	242,240,025	42,060,025	252,784,147	65.7	54.1
Dec 92	1,209	322,808,215	380,219,300	60,547,618	400,136,883	58.3	29.9
Dec 93	1,554	540,529,055	586,190,675	88,429,979	644,363,909	61.0	28.5
Dec 94	2,647	999,622,205	1,145,863,050	153,427,708	1,220,976,711	89.5	70.3
Dec 95	5,932	2,412,685,615	2,963,056,000	390,934,326	3,063,719,442	150.9	124.1
Dec 96	7,309	3,132,085,420	3,614,310,700	570,322,965	4,177,742,153	36.4	23.2
Dec 97	7,659	3,514,544,955	4,192,844,725	536,112,114	4,622,017,023	10.6	4.8
Dec 98	9,953	5,766,059,210	5,564,466,050	777,506,114	6,891,456,981	49.1	30.0
Dec 99	10,982	7,315,290,785	5,987,911,000	1,022,493,452	9,538,563,433	38.4	10.3
Dec 00	12,628	10,207,120,210	11,837,429,050	1,518,775,263	14,767,800,271	54.8	15.0
Dec 01	13,627	12,492,331,910	17,156,021,910	2,127,030,941	22,138,867,459	49.9	7.9
Dec 02	15,422	20,321,925,860	23,286,655,000	3,277,251,382	33,830,872,749	52.8	13.2
Dec 03	20,909	36,138,422,285	49,025,870,500	5,705,830,445	63,672,224,100	88.2	35.6

03							
Dec 04	28,328	65,799,057,525	91,875,704,170	11,030,483,852	110,038,837,559	72.8	35.5
Dec 05	39,788	10,958,639,750	158,271,153,920	12,972,145,283	186,441,445,562	69.4	40.5
Feb 06	42,258	13,810,756,750	174,513,222,750	958,034,420	206,188,141,015	10.6	6.3

Table A.7: The Growth of Membership and Assets of Credit Union Pancur Kasih, June 1987 to February 2006. (Source: Silvia Sayu 2006: 29.)

The first test. Against the data I try to apply some statistical significance tests to check whether the growth of CU assets is correlated to the growth of its membership by using the Spearman's Correlational Test explained by Langley (1971:199-211). If these two data are statistically correlated, the correlation can explain the reason for the frantic activities of the CUPK to increase its membership. From the data of the picture, the following (overleaf) Table 6.2E can be made.

Having assumed that the two sets of data are not correlated, I test the value of $D^2 + T$ (D-squared plus tied rank) against the Correlational Test Table from Spearman (Langley 1971: 204). First, I must find the value of $(D^2 + T)$. Because two of the ranked data on assets growth are tied into one rank, I must count the value of the tied ranks, which in this case becomes $T = \frac{1}{2} t_2$. Thus T becomes half of 1 (t_2 , or two information tied into one rank, is only one), thus $T = \frac{1}{2}$. $(D^2 + T)$ is thus $202.5 + 0.5$ or 203. Second, I check the value of $D^2 + T$ in 20 pairs of data against the Correlational Test Table (Langley 1971: 204). I find that the probability of the value of 203 to appear for 20 pairs of information to take place is far below 1 percent. It means that the growth of assets is very closely correlated with the growth of membership. (Statistical significance is basically not the same as the real life significance. The "real life" reasons for such occurrence to happen lie beyond the scope of these simple tests.) The tests at least show the reason for the frantic moves by the Credit Union to increase its membership. Assets grow as does the memberships.

Data Values (in Percent)		Rank Values		Differences	D^2
Assets	Membership	Assets Growth (A)	Membership Growth (B)	D	
1,491.4	34.4	20	11	9	81
680.3	214.6	19	20	1	1
202.7	72.9	18	18	0	0
143.0	35.4	16	12	4	16
65.7	54.1	11	16	5	25
58.3	29.9	9	9	0	0
61.0	28.5	10	8	2	4
89.5	70.3	15	17	2	4
150.9	124.1	17	19	2	4
36.4	23.2	3	7	4	16
10.6	4.8	1.5 (tied)	1.5	0.5	0.25
49.1	30.0	5	10	5	25
38.4	10.3	4	4	0	0
54.8	15.0	8	6	2	4
49.9	7.9	6	3	3	9
52.8	13.2	7	5	2	4
88.2	35.6	14	14	0	0
72.8	35.5	13	13	0	0
69.4	40.5	12	15	3	9
10.6	6.3	1.5 (tied)	1.5	0.5	0.25
n=20					$D^2 = 202.5$

Table A.8: Reports of Progress of Pancur Kasih Foundation's Credit Union; Rearranged for Statistical Tests (Source: Silvia Sayu 2006: 29).

The second test. The second test is applied to see whether the statistics given are too good to be true. For this purpose I take the lowest increase of the membership (4.8 percent) related to the horrible ethnic conflicts taking place around the end of 1997 and early 1998. I pick 5 samples from Dec 1997 to Dec 2001 to administer the test (Student's t-test) to see the statistical significance of such a configuration of figures in statistical terms. (The basic question is really, "How high or low is the probability of these configurations of numbers to appear?") The Student's t-test (Langley 1971: 160-65) is using a formula of

$$t = \frac{\sqrt{n} \cdot |M - m|}{s}$$

(t = square root of sheer numbers of samples (n) times the difference between the average of parent groups and the arithmetic means of samples ($M - m$), all divided by standard deviation (s) of the samples.)

To reach to this last operation, I need to perform some preliminary equations: first, to find difference between the average value of parent group and the arithmetic means of the samples ($M - m$); and second, to secure the standard deviation of samples (s). The samples taken are the bold, italicized numbers from the Table 5.2E above (all five samples under "the growth of membership"). The parent group is the 10 numbers above the five samples. The average value of parent group is 68.74 (687.4 divided by 10); the arithmetic means of the samples would be found following the further procedures below.

Step 1

X	$D = x - x_0$	d^2
4.8	$4.8 - 10 = -5.2$	27.04
7.9	$7.9 - 10 = -2.1$	4.41
10.3	$10.3 - 10.0 = +0.3$	0.9
15.0	$15.0 - 10 = +5$	25
30.0	$30.0 - 10 = +20$	400

$x_0 = 10$ (assumed means)	$A = -7.3$	$+25.3$	456.54
$n = 5$	$A = +18$		$B = 456.54$

Table A.9: Data Needed to Calculate the Standard Deviation

Step 2

Arithmetic means (M) of samples is $M = x_0 + A/n$ or $M = 10 + 18/5$ or $M = 13.6$.

Step 3

Standard Deviation (SD) of samples is

$$s = \sqrt{\frac{B - A^2/n}{n - 1}}$$

$s = \sqrt{\frac{456.54 - (18 \times 18)/5}{5 - 1}}$ divided by 4. s is then the square root of 97.935. Therefore s is 9.89. (The Snedecor's Rough Check for this data's approximate Standard Deviation produces the value of 12.6.)

Now I can apply the t-test.

$$t = \sqrt{5} \times M - m / s$$

$$t = 2.23 \times (68.74 - 13.6) / 9.89$$

$$t = 122.96 / 9.89$$

$$t = 12.43$$

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In Student's t Table (Langley 1971: 162) the probability of t value as high as 12.43 to appear in a test with five samples (or the probability that this number appears due to pure chances) is lower than 0.2 percent, or less than 0.2 occurrences in 100 cases (or still fewer than 2 cases in 1,000 occasions). In other words, if there were 1,000 Credit Unions giving their record of membership growth, the number sequences as appear in Table 5.1E would have appeared in about fewer than two Credit Union

branches' records. It is likely, statistically speaking, that the numbers provided by Kalimantan Review, Special Edition 2006, page 26, are not just "happy numbers." Based on mathematical proof, this sequence of numbers is not just taking place because of simple chances.

The sudden upsurge of assets growth in December 1987 (1,491.1 percent) was rather suspect given the average value of the asset growth for the whole 1987 to February 1996 was only 173.79 percent. With a Student's t test, nevertheless, the probability that the composition of 1,491.4 (Dec 1987), 680.4 (Dec 1988), and 202.7 (Dec 1989) appears is more than 10 percent, which means these number, statistically, are due simply to chances ($t = 1.64$, $P > 0.10$). What applies to growth of membership, however, does not apply for the growth of assets. Let's see the Third Test with another method of statistical test of significance.

The third test. The whole numbers for growth of assets (Dec 87 to Dec 05) are added and divided by 18 (total members) to get the arithmetic mean (M) of a "parent group". Then the standard deviation for the series of number are calculated (SD of parent group). The results are $M = 124.90$ and $SD = 356.39$. The following test is done to see the significance levels of the series of the first three years of "growth rate" in assets by using the zM test (using mean of parent group [M], mean of samples [m], and standard deviation of parent group [S]). The test shows that the first three years of recorded growth of assets are significant at the probability level of less than 2 percent ($zM t = 3.23$, $P < 0.02$) or significant. Even when the first five years' record of assets growth are taken (the mean of this 5 samples is thus reduced) and the zM test is done, the value of $zM t$ is still 2.45 ($zM t = 2.45$, $P < 0.05$, "probably significant"). These arithmetics provides a clue that the growth of assets of this Credit Union branch's first three years of life is hardly "natural." The growth of asset as high as 1,491.40 percent in the first year of business operation must have been artificial.

Appendix T

The Practice of Credit Union

Looking at the practice of the Credit Union *Pancur Kasih* brings one a *déjà vu* of the old form of the time-honored system of labor control: revolving credit. (The Chinese patrons adeptly used the “advanced payment” system using money and kinds to their Dayak clients to ensure their payment.) When the horticulturalist [Dayaks] wanted to attach their more nomadic Punan [Dayak] hunting-gathering groups, who also gathered commercially-valued forest products in the urban markets, the former utilized both the economic and political strategies to keep the latter their loyal clients (Sellato 1994: 165-66). The economic strategies involved the creation of material needs for the nomadic groups, i.e., iron axe (to fell sago efficiently), tobacco. When the nomadic groups grew more experienced and less gullible, they began to bargain for a better return for the forest products wanted by the farmers. This time, the farmers kept their nomadic counterparts in “*a position of permanent debtors, which not only binds the as clients but tends to increase the productivity*” (Sellato 1994: 166, italics added). The political strategies involved the two system of alliance by exchange of blood and by marriages, between nomads and farmers. In Credit Union case, the aspiring members are required to save a certain amount of money (set as at least IDR 1,000,000 or USD 111.11 per May 2006), for which they are granted a rights to borrow some money as much as they have deposited. If they need to borrow more loan than the amount that they save, they need at least three other members as *penjamin* (guarantors), who are willing to demand the payment to the borrower and willing to pay on behalf of the borrowers in case of non-performing loans. The interest for the saving is fixed at 15 percent per year while the interest for the loan (for any purpose from business to school fees) is fixed around 2 percent per month (or 24 percent per year). The repayment term is set from 12 to 60 months. Monthly loan repayment is set at the end of every month, with the fines of 3 percent of the main loan amount plus 3 percent of the payment rate in case of late payment. (To attract members, the Credit Union opens an insurance scheme in a form of savings and

returns the saving for a deceased member in doubled amount of the deceased's saving.)

One of the members feels that the staff of the Credit Union tends to cajole the members into borrowing in excess of their savings amount. Once he had a savings of IDR 6 million (around USD 666) and he agreed to take an offered loan as high as IDR 10 million (around USD 1,111), which luckily he could manage to pay. In 2006 the monthly repayment rate on his shoulders stands as much as IDR 400,000 (USD 44.4) that he has to work very hard to pay. This landless villager belongs to the group of around 30 percent of villagers who have no land; the rest 70 percent has some rice plots that they can be turned into rubber smallholdings. To pay his debts to the Credit Union he must mobilize his wife and daughters (elementary school age) to make and sell home-made foods and drinks.

One of the managers of the Credit Union in Lingga claimed membership of 80 percent of the villagers. Probably this is too high given the distinctive hesitation among the Madurese, a group of pious Muslims who compose more than half of the village population, to join a Church-related or Dayak-related financial institution. The motto of Credit Union Pancur Kasih is "*Barage CU Malangkah Repo*," a Kanayatn Dayak new idiom which means "With CU Stepping Ahead." The membership of the Credit Union of Lingga branch is 1,998 persons in May 2006, which is still much lower than half of Lingga population of 4,429 persons. However, the Credit Union staff have already understood the frugality and working capacity of the Madurese and thus prepared in 2006 onwards to expand its operation into the Madurese hamlets at the southern side of Lingga village.

Appendix U

The Practice of Manual Logging in Pancaroba

The arrangements for tree felling and log prices are clearly set for the disadvantages for the peasant-owners who control the forest lands. The teams (usually 2 to 11 laborers) that go inside the forest to fell of certain trees usually ask permission first from the peasant-owners. The usual main agreement would be about the price paid for the peasant-owners for each log felled by the teams (IDR 2,000 for a piece of good *mabakng* tree, which is known as the second best log after the black iron wood or *belian*; IDR 100 for each piece of low quality trees—10 to 15 cm in diameter and 4-12 m in length—generally known as *tjerotjok*.) The Madurese laborers (usually more than 10 laborers) are usually able to fell around 2,000 *mabakng* trees (one tree can be cut into 2-3 pieces of *mabakng* log in certain sizes, according to buyers' wish) in a typical 18 days of operation. These hardworking and indefatigable Madurese usually bring their own supplies (typically rice, salted fish, salt, dried/fresh chili, coffee powder, sugar, tobacco, gasoline for chainsaws) and thus they usually pay within the range of IDR 8,000,000 to 12,000,000 for the peasant-owners (from 2 pieces out of 2,000 trees to 3 pieces out of 2,000). The Madurese become the owners of the logs felled that they sell around IDR 10,000 per piece of sized *mabakng* wood—from the smallest 8 cm-wide x 8 cm-high x 4 m-long to the largest 9 cm-wide x 18 cm-high x 8m-long—to the buyers (usually the Chinese “bosses” or *tauke* from Pontianak). Thus the Madurese fetch a price ranging from IDR 40 million to 60 million from 4,000 to 6,000 pieces of *mabakng*, IDR 10,000 each). Each of 11 Madurese laborers would therefore get a [maximum] “salary” of IDR 60 million divided to around 10 laborers (because the costs for supplies and rents for chainsaws are not yet counted) or IDR 6 million (around USD 666) for 18 day-work. (But in reality, the typical net gain for one Madurese team of 10 laborers [undivided yet] is not far from IDR 11 million.) The price for *mabakng* in certain sizes can be as high as IDR 50,000 per piece in Pontianak (per December 2006).

From this case, the gains for each actor can be summarized in the following Table A.10 (overleaf).

Actor	Time	Trees Felled	Logs Produced	Costs	Gross Gains
Peasant-owners	18 days uncertain	2,000 trees (<i>mabakng</i>) 2,000 trees (<i>tjerotjok</i>)* (See Picture 5.28)	6,000 2,000	Gasoline, chainsaw maintenance (unknown) Unknown, but likely low.	IDR 12 million (USD 1,333) IDR 200,000 (USD 22.22)
Madurese/Dayak Laborers	18 days uncertain	2,000 trees 2,000 trees	6,000(**) 2,000	Labor, supplies, gasoline, rents of chainsaws (unknown) Wages for tree fellers (cheap)	IDR 60 million (USD 6,666) IDR 2.8 million
Chinese "Bosses" (truck owners) Bosses for cheaper <i>tjerotjok</i> are usually Madurese	Less than a week uncertain	2,000 trees 2,000 trees	6,000(**) 2,000	Truck gasoline, drivers, bribes to officers unknown (See Picture 5.25) Uncertain, mostly truck and driver (bribes for officers for allowing <i>tjerotjok</i> trucks to pass undisturbed are cheaper)	IDR 300 million (USD 33,333) IDR 5 million (1 <i>tjerotjok</i> log may fetch IDR 2,500 at least in Pontianak)
	Maximum 18 days	12,000 trees	24,000 logs		IDR 380 million (USD 42,222); IDR 305 million (80 percent) for "bosses" or <i>tauke</i>

Table A.10: Economic Gains and Actors in Logging Activities

Note:

(*) *Tjerotjok* is the general local name for tree species that can not grow beyond 15 cm in their diameter (probably lack of sunlight in thick forests deters the growth of trunks). After certain age, these species die naturally (locals call it *mati pucuk* or 'dying from the end') and must be felled down anyway. Its commercial size is 7 to 15

cm (diameter) and 4 to 8m (length). The increase in prices of *tjerotjok* is the function of the increase of its diameter size.

(**) This is an optimistic amount; in real life, getting 3 pieces of sized wood out of a *mabakng* log is a state-of-the-art job only a few can perform.

(***) If all is shaped in 8 cm x 8 cm x 4 m, the truck owner needs about 30 round trips to bring all logs to Pontianak (one 8 x 8 x 400 cm sized wood means 2.56 cu. cm or 195 pieces in a typical truck with a loading capacity of 500 cu. cm). The export-size *mabakng* logs (9 cm x 18 cm x 8 m) can fetch a higher price, ranging from IDR 20,000 to 27,000 (USD2.2 to 3) for the laborers who felled it (and IDR 3,000 per log for the peasant-owners).



Picture A.1 Uniformed bribe-takers from truckers, near Jering Hamlet. (The owner of the logs—standing near the police car—in a truck stopped by this police patrol car with four officers admitted that he bargained very hard to reach IDR 100,000 or USD 11.1 as the “leave us alone” price. He knew that the policemen would take it as consolation price after their real, bigger target, had fled beyond their reach.)



Picture A.2: The labor-intensive method for logging with *kuda-kuda*. The laborers tie the log with ropes and pull it over their shoulders by stepping in the horizontal “ladder” (*kuda-kuda* is a ready-to-fight position in Indonesian martial arts: one leg step ahead or spread wide to the side, ready to defend or attack). Judging from the name, this technology is likely imported from the Madurese who have had more experiences in manual logging.



Picture A.3: Wooden planks. This technology uses a two-tier wooden plank: one tier for the bicycle tire and the other for the legs of the bicycle pushers. This Dayak boy is

not so strong that he pushes only 3 pieces of log of *mabakng* (9 x 18 x 400 cm or 64,800 cu. cm); most strong Madurese laborers can push 8 logs in one round (4,000 m-long path) to get a wage, if they are wagers, of IDR 2,000 to 3,000 (USD 0.22 to 0.33) per log. Some Madurese workers were said as able to get a wage of IDR 400,000 (USD 44.4) in a day's work. (Given the heavy load, this is not likely a common occurrence in this place.)



Picture A.4 *Tjerotjok* (sized in 10 cm times 300 cm) brought by the local children of Jering hamlet with a fortified bicycle to the road side for fetching by trucks.

Appendix V

Short Life History of a Settler

This villager arrived in West Kalimantan as a member of a Sukarno-created bureau called “Bureau for National Reconstruction” (*Badan Rekonstruksi Nasional*) which was aiming at “reconstruction” of a war-torn nation in the early 1950s, just two years after the Dutch acknowledged—after a four-year attempt to return to power behind the pretext of the Axis Forces’ interference to stabilize the new nation—the Independence of Indonesia in 1949. Pak Abimanyu joined the forces called *Corps Tjadangan Nasional* (National Reserved Corps) with a salary of IDR 300 (rubber latex price was still IDR 11 per kg in the early 1950s) in 1951. (A military unit named “*Teritorium Militer VI Tanjungpura*” to cover the whole Kalimantan Island was formed in 10 November 1950 under its first commander, Lt. Col. Sukanda Bratamanggala, a Sundanese.) Its smaller unit called *Subteritorium I* for West Kalimantan was created earlier on 2 February 1950.)

The reason for the predilection of the Indonesian military leaders to assign Sundanese was the distinct capability of these soldier-farmers to adapt to faraway tour of duties in rural areas. After resigning for the Corps in 1958 he became a rubber tapper (with average produce around 15 kg of latex per day, or half of his monthly military service wage in a day’s work in rubber plantation). (Probably the formation of The Territorial/Provincial Military Command West Kalimantan in 17 March 1958 had everything to do with his resignation from military menial jobs. A better structured Military Command Unit no longer needed paramilitary units to do its administrative works.) The National Reserved Corps, his former unit, was a paramilitary unit assigned to assist the Army regular forces in menial jobs in small strategic towns of West Kalimantan, i.e., Singkawang, Samalantan, Bengkayang, Sanggau Ledo, Rawak, Tayan, Sambas, Sukadana, etc. Later, these forces would form the main forces of Sukarno-built Crush Malaysia (“*Ganyang Malaysia*”) campaign as Sukarno’s stubborn refusal to accept the British Crown’s decision to unite East Malaysia (Sarawak and Sabah) with the Peninsular Malaysia 6 years after Malaysia Independence on 31 August 1957.

Appendix W

The History of Madjang Desa War (1945)

The Madjang Desa War launched by the Dayaks against the Japanese occupation forces was claimed as success by many Dayak sources (i.e., Bamba [2000: 45], Erma S. Ranik 2000b: 6). This claim is probably true given the fact that the war was done in a manner where the weaker forces (the Dayaks with rudimentary weaponry and tactics) could overcome the stronger forces (the Japanese navy with firearms and automatic cannons). The small Japanese bases in Meliau and Tayan could be categorized as the “higher-tech force drawn away from its logistical support” (Steed 2002: 50). Mixed with “engaging high-tech forces in severely restricted terrain” (swampy, riparian, and thick Kalimantan forest) (Steed 2002: 53-54), the tactics of the Dayaks overcame the Japanese forces in some battles. These advantages, however, were not used properly by the Dayaks to gain a complete victory on their own sweat. Instead of launching a series of battles for attrition to undermine the Japanese personnel’s willingness to fight a losing war, the Dayaks returned to their primitive tactics of human wave assault to occupy space (to occupy Meliau, from 24 to 30 June 1945). It worked only six days because on 30 June 1945 the higher-tech Japanese forces, refreshed and reinforced from Pontianak, recaptured Meliau. (The retreating Dayak forces, away from its logistics base in upstream Kapuas, tried in vain—even at the cost of its commander’s (Pang Suma) life—to reduce the speed of Japanese superior forces to advance upstream. The resignation of the Japanese Army to the Axis Forces in August 1945 automatically ceased the Madjang Desa War.) This lack of tactics among the Dayaks warrior, which keeps their capability to inflict higher casualties and better results in battles, is probably what the military establishments (Japanese, Dutch, and Indonesian) consider in their apparent dismissals to the strength of the Dayaks’ military action.

Appendix X

Cultural Incompatibility between the Dayaks and the Madurese on Shedding Blood

These intermittent crises had always been typically physical assaults (maims, murders, rape) against the members of Dayak ethnic group perpetrated by the migrant ethnic group portrayed as “fierce, cunning, aggressive,” which were the Madurese. The Madurese, the darlings of the new regime for their indefatigability and frugality as well as of the Islamic parties for their fanaticism and loyalty for the Islamic parties, were known notoriously as quick to surrender themselves to the authority (police) after they hurt their victims. They did this not to surrender to state justice but to bid time for their family members to collected solidarity funds among the Madurese (this practice is called *nabang*) to bail the detained family members. The phlegmatic, corrupt, and circuitous legal practice in criminal courts were usually perceived by the Dayaks as futile to repair the injustice done. The incapability of the state courts to fix the problems of conflicts between ethnic groups separated as such since the colonial time (the Dayaks under Native Authority, the Madurese under state courts) catalyzed the progress of the Dayaks’ simple demands for justice into action to take justice on their own hands. The state-justified ancient practice of headhunting suddenly became an interesting option to voice the Dayaks yearning for justice. The retaliatory campaigns against the Madurese (not only the direct perpetrators but now practically to *any* Madurese stamped as the kins of the perpetrator) were initialized with some rituals to call the angry spirits of the ancestors and were followed by cannibalism. The families of the victimized Dayaks not uncommonly demand some rituals to be performed by the perpetrators to appease the spirits of angry ancestors and to appease the blood relatives. However, as the rituals could be very expensive for Madurese perpetrators, they finally prefer to bribe police officers—or judges if the cases went to court—to stop the case or to minimize the sentences. (The core group of warriors was claimed as possessed by spirits some Dayak authors claimed as hungry for human blood and flesh. The Bakthianian carnivalesque “dismemberment” of body parts and

cannibalism took place because the hungry spirits quenched their thirst and hunger through the bodies of the Dayak warriors.)

The link between practice of everyday life and violence outbreaks is provided by the crisis created by death of family or clan members. The incompatible perceptions for violence known by the Madurese (practice of *carok* or dripping blood to uphold pride) and the Dayaks (dripping blood hurts the whole victim's clan). Suffering for hundreds of year under the Dutch who left them alone to protect their family, the Madurese tend to take justice on their hands against any form of offense from whatever easily translated as insult to physical assault. Unfortunately, the dripping of blood is the threshold of serious offence to the whole blood relatives (who stand as inheritors of the victim's belonging), which can be very extensive because of the extensive lineage lines practiced among the Dayaks (usually eight generations up and eight down). The Dayaks, relying on their time-tested customary laws, usually demand a customary compensation usually in animal sacrifices, in kinds, or in cash (rarely)—to appease not only the totemic deities or ancestors but also the victim's blood relatives—either to the perpetrators and their bloodlines. This incompatibility, created as a part by the colonial legal policy, a part by unmatched worldviews of civic and customary citizens, and a part by the post-colonial state's hesitance to accommodate inter-ethnic criminal cases satisfactorily, has always been a surefire trigger for impending crisis. (Out of curiosity for the roles of sheer numbers of Madurese population, this study finds that proportion of the Madurese in the provinces where anti-Madurese violence has taken place does matter.) This crisis in subaltern group's practical life needs an articulation, which unfortunately available from the state-sanctioned old practice of carnivalesque headhunting.

Appendix Y

The Growth of Church-Led Credit Unions

Credit Union Pancur Kasih is just the biggest out of the big 8 Credit Unions (those with assets larger than IDR 3 billion or USD 333.3 thousands) from 38 surviving Credit Unions in whole Kalimantan. The list for the 8 big Credit Unions runs (as per April 2003), from CU with the biggest to the smaller assets, as Pancur Kasih (17,376 members, IDR 42.9 billion), Lantang Tipo (7,062 members, IDR 23.9 billion), Keling Kumang (6,509 members, IDR 11.4 billion), Daya Lestari (4,661 members, IDR 10.1 billion), Usaha Kita (3,616 members, IDR 8.4 billion), Khatulistiwa Bhakti (2,721 members, IDR 5.9 billion), Sumber Rejeki (3,673 members, IDR 5.4 billion), and Canaga Antutn (2,090 members, IDR 3.7 billion). Total numbers of membership and assets for the biggest eight Credit Unions of West Kalimantan are 47,708 members with IDR 111.7 in assets values (Frans L. Anderson et al. 2003a: 8). Credit Union Pancur Kasih also has introduced the terms such as “financial freedom,” “early retirement,” “self help,” “sowing and reaping,” etc among Dayak or non-Dayak peasants. One teacher of economics from Faculty of Economics of Universitas Tanjungpura state university Pontianak even boldly claimed that Credit Union has been unaffected by monetary crises (Frans L. Anderson et al. 2003b: 11). In April 2005, the numbers of CU branches whose assets have exceeded IDR 3 billion have increased to 23 CU branches (and total number of CU branches increases to 43 CU branches) (Gunui' and Agus R.J. 2005: 45).)

Appendix Z**Madurese Cultural Practice of Blood Revenge (Carok)**

Carok (*ca-* pronounced as *cha-*) is a culturally legitimate media for [male] Madurese (not all) to take a socially legitimate revenge over those who have brought them shame (assaulted personal pride, cajoled wife, or anything culturally defined as such). *Carok* takes place in two main forms which are *nyelep* (quietly planned and executed assault) and *ngonggai* (openly challenging the opponent) (Erma S. Ranik 2002b: 20). The assaulting parties usually avoid their dangerous action to become a negative reciprocity (do unto other what thou expect others to do unto thou) by surrendering themselves into police custody, not to get a proper state punishment but to protect themselves from retaliation of the victim's families. Meanwhile, the family members of the *carok* perpetrators quietly launch *nabang* or collection of funds from family members or acquaintances to bribe the police from pursuing the case further to court. Police force, having a better financial interest to accept the bribe rather than bringing the assault case to court, quietly become the important part of the perpetuation of *carok* practice. (As a legacy of the Dutch criminal code system adopted in the Indonesia criminal courts, the police institution has a discretionary authority to decide to process a case further to court or freeze it in "ice box".) Latief Wiyata, a teacher of University of Jember, East Java, noticed that recently the *carok* perpetrators prefer the quiet attack from behind that the "ethics of [Madurese] manhood" has turned into brutality and egoism away from the saying about peaceful society the Madurese believed (*rampa' naong baringen korong*, soothing peace under a shady banyan tree) (Erma S. Ranik 2002b: 20). John Bamba, Director of Institut Dayakology, believed that *carok* has been a cultural product of the ignorant judicial practices by the colonialist Dutch that the Madurese were left on their own to protect their families. In fact the Dutch had constructed Madurese as "fierce and ruthless" people and conscripted them as elite troops for the Dutch. Smith (1996) even suggested that the forced conscription on Madurese during the colonial time was so high that it became the major cause of out-migration to East Java in the nineteenth century.

Appendix AA**The Statistical Test for the Effects of Madurese Relative Population Size on
Their Aggressive Behavior**

From the table provided by Subro (2006: 97), the following data about the Madurese population in 30 provinces nationwide can be extracted. In 28 provinces with peaceful existence between the Madurese and other ethnic groups, the arithmetical means (M) of their population percentage compared against the whole provinces' population is 0.231 percent per province. After a simple operation involving each percentage of the Madurese in each of the 27 "peaceful" provinces is done, the Standard Deviation of the percentages is found to be 0.378. (Juxtaposed with Snedecor's Rough Check to quickly estimate the Standard Deviation of a list of information [from Langley 1971: 59], this Standard Deviation is acceptable.) Using this data as the basic information, a simple test can be done to answer the question: "how high is the probability to find a province with a percentage of Madurese population as high as 5.46 percent simply by chance?"

Province	Province Population	Madurese Population		
		In Province	Percentage in Nationwide Pop.	Percentage in Province
East Java	34,756,400	6,281,058	92.75	18.072
West Kalimantan	3,732,419	203,612	3.01	5.463
Central Kalimantan	1,800,713	62,228	0.92	3.464
East Kalimantan	2,441,533	30,181	0.45	1.245
South Kalimantan	2,975,440	36,181	0.45	1.226
Bangka Belitung	898,889	9,985	0.15	1.117
Bali	3,145,368	18,593	0.27	0.598
Jakarta	8,324,707	47,055	0.69	0.579
Papua	1,695,932	2,595	0.04	0.15
South Sumatra	6,856,258	9,248	0.14	0.13
Bengkulu	2,561,852	1,857	0.03	0.12
Riau	4,750,068	5,338	0.08	0.11
Southeast Sulawesi	2,011,298	2,147	0.03	0.11
North Maluku	668,837	634	0.01	0.09
Lampung	6,646,890	6,208	0.09	0.09
Jogjakarta	3,119,397	2,739	0.04	0.09
Jambi	2,405,378	1,854	0.03	0.08
South Sulawesi	7,794,923	5,788	0.09	0.07
Maluku	1,148,294	749	0.01	0.07
North Sulawesi	1,776,278	981	0.01	0.06
West Java	35,668,374	17,914	0.26	0.05
West Nusa Tenggara	3,829,905	1,787	0.03	0.05
Banten	8,079,938	3,719	0.05	0.05
Central Java	30,917,298	14,166	0.21	0.05
Aceh	1,732,627	471	0.01	0.03
East Nusa Tenggara	3,802,995	947	0.01	0.02
North Sulawesi	1,972,738	472	0.01	0.02
North Sumatra	11,506,577	2,649	0.04	0.02
West Sumatra	4,241,256	370	0.01	0.01
Gorontalo	829,948	48	0.00	0.01
Total 30 provinces	201,092,238	6,771,727	100.00	3.37

Table A.11: Madurese Population Percentage per Province

Source: Subro (2006: 97).

With a statistical test called the zM test (Langley 1971: 152-159), this question can be answered.

$$z = \frac{\sqrt{n} \cdot |M - m|}{S}$$

Where n = number of sample (1 province), M = Arithmetic Means of the percentage of Madurese per total population in parent group (28 provinces), m = percentage of Madurese in taken sample, and S = the Standard Deviation of the parent group.

Thus


$$z = \frac{\sqrt{1} \cdot |0.231 - 5.46|}{0.378}$$

$$z = 13.833$$

The probability to find a province with a percentage of Madurese population as high as 5.46 percent is thus much lower than 0.2 percent (set significance level). The z value of 13.833 is far lower than $P = 0.2\%$ (Langley 1971: 154). The similar zM test for Central Kalimantan provides a value of z as high as 8.5, which means the probability to find a province with Central Kalimantan's percentage of Madurese population (3.46 percent) by pure coincidence is still lower than 0.2 percent. These calculations suggest a mathematical clue for probability that the sheer percentage of Madurese per total province population might have something to do with the volatility of the relationship between the Madurese and other native ethnic groups. The probability to find a province with rather high proportion of Madurese per total population like West Kalimantan by chance is very small. (Interestingly, the proportion of Madurese per total population of Malay-dominated Sambas district, with a horrible Malays' anti-Madurese pogrom riot in 1999, was 9.4 percent in 1996 [Purwana 2003: 28].)

This finding may give credential to the concept of “tipping point” offered by Harvard economist Thomas Schelling (Cole 1998: 64-65) to explain how small

quantitative changes in behavior lead to huge qualitative differences. Developed to study racial segregation in housing in the U.S, this “tipping point” answers the question of “at what point do white families begin to think about moving out (when black families began to pour in their neighborhood)?” For the Sambas riot of 1999, the question would be “at what levels of Madurese population density among the Malay neighborhood do the latter began to think about and actually launch retaliation against provocations by these Madurese?” The traditionally known as docile—even called as cowards—groups, the Malays appeared to have a higher “tipping point” (of Madurese proportion in their neighborhood) to launch a retaliation against the latter’s provocation compared to the “tipping point” of the Dayaks.



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Appendix AB

The Explanation of Non Zero-Sum Game (after the Dayak Assault on a Madurese Hamlet) between the Madurese Settlers and the Native Dayaks in Lingga (1997)

		Dayaks	
			Keep Pact
non-Aggression Break Pact Madurese Attack		A. Dayaks would surely act on 'self-defense' claim. Madurese on lower moral ground. Outbreak probably limited. (2)	C. Dayaks would probably retaliate with deadly measures within and without the village boundaries. Larger outbreak. (1)
		B. Madurese suffered minor casualty. Peace kept. (3)	D. Dayaks retaliate only after provocation. Unlikely result. (0)
Not Attack			

Table A.12: 2 x 2 Matrix for Game Theory explanation for Dayak-Madurese decision in Riots

With the Madurese settlers' turn to "move", they have to consider the likely results commencing from the 2 x 2 table above. A zero-sum game, which means that the maximum gain for one player is the minimum for the other, is not the case here because the possibility of Dayak retaliation for any Madurese "maximum" gain annuls the possibility of gaining that maximum gain.

If the Madurese decide to attack and the Dayaks break their non-aggression pact, the result C would be the least preferred (payoff is 1) as the outbreak would expand beyond the village boundaries. The next possibility after Madurese attack is the consistency of the Dayaks for keeping their non-aggression pact or keeping the defensive measure within the Dayak village boundaries. The payoff would stand about 2 because the Madurese would stand on lower moral ground (attacking the non-aggressive party) but the outbreak would be limited (under condition that the Dayaks

of Lingga could refrain violent reactions of their siblings from other subdistricts or villages). The best payoff (3) appears on choice B because the Madurese only suffered minor casualty (an old sick man, Agambenian “bare life”) but they keep the peace in their ethnically tense village. (Choice D is unlikely because if the Madurese cancelled any attack, the Dayaks were unlikely to get provoked.)

In conclusion, the Madurese must take no-attack decision to maximize their levels of security from the violent reaction of their close neighbor. As the result, the strategy of previous Dayak’s pre-emptive and punitive strike also works. The Dayaks, despite their aggression against a Madurese hamlet remain in high security levels. Both sides took the *maximin* strategy, which meant they maximize their levels of security. This case represents what John Nash’s approach to non-cooperative games which emphasize “equilibrium points” (Poundstone 1992: 97-99). Equilibrium points are outcomes where the players have no regrets. The Nash’s *maximin* strategy for non zero-sum game expands von Neumann’s *minimax* strategy (both rational parties are convinced they can’t do any better) for zero-sum game where the parties’ interests are diametrically opposite.

Appendix AC

Dubious Interests of Donors for NGOs

In April 2000, the Washington-based Biodiversity Support Program (BSP-Kemala) sent a letter to a network of Indonesian anti-mining NGOs (*JATAM*) that it would not renew its commitment (after a previous disbursement of USD 75,000) to more grants after the main source of its funds, the USAID (US Agency for International Development) cut funding to critical NGOs that worked against US mining corporations (Danielle Knight, *The Inter Press Service* 16 May 2000). The cut also allegedly affected WALHI (The Environmental Forum of Indonesia, working with The Friends of Earth Indonesia) that worked against Freeport McMoran's Grasberg Mine in West Papua (using a grant as much as USD 400,000 disbursed since 1997 from the USAID). (From 1984 to 1995 the USAID endowed WALHI a USD1.1 million in grant; from 1995 to 1997 another USD250,000 was granted [<http://www.monitor.net/monitor/11-14-95/kissinger.htm>].)

WALHI-The Friends of Earth Indonesia quickly launched a mobilization of supporting letters to its cause among its supporters and gathered around 6,000 letters urging the US State Department to continue funding WALHI because "... making courageous efforts to establish a clean, effective, responsive government ... a just society ... safeguard ... natural heritage." The spokeswoman of USAID Kim Walz neither confirmed nor denied the allegation of funding cut; she simply explained "WALHI is up for routine renewal and they are currently in negotiations." The situation was ludicrously reversed after the US invasion to Iraq in the early 2004 when WALHI announced a 'boycott' against the institutions based in the countries supporting the US invasion such as USAID, DFID ([US] Department for International Development), and AusAID. Shortly after the announcement, however, a new round of negotiation with USAID regarding an IDR2.5 billion-worth (USD 277,700) project on development democratic institutions was begun. Another IDR 8 billion-worth (USD 888,000) project was also simultaneously negotiated by WALHI with the DFID and AusAID (*Kompas* 25 March 2003).

Appendix AD

Short History of the Rise of Sultans from Pontianak Sultanate (1771-1950) under the Dutch Domination and the Fall of the Last Sultan under Sukarno's Regime

1. Sultan Syarif Abdurrahman Alkadri (1739-1808)

Shortly after his crowning as the Sultan of Pontianak in 1777, Syarif Abdurrahman was disturbed by the brother of the French ship captain Syarif Abdurrahman killed in Pasir, East Kalimantan, before he fled back to Mempawah in 1771. Taking the revenge, the brother of the deceased captain destroyed some ships in Kapuas river nearby the Pontianak port and fled quickly. Syarif Abdurrahman was aware that he needed stronger fleet, which he built shortly later. In 1777 (*Jumadilakhir* 1191 H) Syarif Abdurrahman prepared a navy fleet of 40 vessels to “visit” Tayan, Sanggau and Sekadau in the Kapuas upstream districts. The main place to visit was Sekadau, the farthest district upstream, which meant the fleet must pass Tayan and Sanggau first.

The safety passage demanded by the fleet through Sanggau was denied by the wary Panembahan (*leader*) Sanggau. Syarif Abdurrahman decided to resolve the conflict with cannons, which unfortunately failed. The battles went on until seven days but no conclusion reached. The exhausted fleet returned to Pontianak for resupply. In 1778 (12 *Muharram* 1192, or about one year from the previous battle), Syarif Abdurrahman prepared specially two big battle ships, some medium sized battle ships, and 28 fast ships, fully armed. This time he also brought Yam Tuan Muda Raja Haji from Riau kingdom (Sumatera) and his own forces. Panembahan Sanggau ambushed the fleet in Tayan but these early attackers were repelled back to their main base in Sanggau after three days of battle. The forces of Sanggau regrouped in Kayu Tunuk (not found in map; probably a small village) to set another fortress to stop Syarif Abdurrahman fleet.

On 26 *Muharram* 1192 (the second week of Syarif Abdurrahman’s expedition), another battle broke in Kayu Tunuk, which as a grueling battle that went on until two weeks. Exhausted and mentally bruised by the previous lost in Tayan battle, the forces of Panembahan Sanggau surrendered. On 11 *Safar* 1192 (the

fifteenth day after the battle of Kayu Tunuk began, 1778), Sultan Syarif Abdurrahman reached the capital of Sanggau triumphantly. After 12 days in Sanggau, he declared Sanggau as his vassal chiefdom. He took the door of the Sanggau palace to be the main door as the Palace of Kadriah (to be built very soon) in Pontianak. On his way back to Pontianak, Syarif Abdurrahman built a fortress of *Jambu Basrah* at the island of Simpang Labi and left six cannons with some personnel.

In the same year (1778, 8 Sya'ban 1192 H), Syarif Abdurrahman (aged 39 at the time) was declared in front of the sultans of Matan, Sukadana, Simpang, Landak, Mempawah, and Sambas as the sultan of Pontianak. Yam Tuan Muda Raja Haji from Riau kingdom (Sumatera), who assisted him in the battles against Panembahan Sanggau, returned to Riau to be crowned as *Yam Tuan Muda Kemaharajaan Melayu Riau IV*, as which he reigned from 1777 to 1784.

The Dutch was too busy with their *divide et impera* politics to separate the Kingdom of Mataram in Central Java into Kesultanan Jogjakarta and Kasunanan Surakarta to deal with the new Sultanate of Pontianak. However, at the end of 1778 the Dutch sent Nicholas de Cloek with two small frigates and some sailors to Pontianak. Sultan Syarif Abdurrahman was sailing to Batavia (Jakarta today) to report himself to the Governor General of VOC (East India Company) at this time. The Dutch fleet set themselves just in front of the Pontianak palace without the permission from Sultan Syarif Abdurrahman (of course, he was away). (This was deemed inappropriate by the VOC as its envoy's conduct to the Pontianak Sultanate.)

On 26 December 1778, however, VOC decided to announce Sultan Syarif Abdurrahman as the supreme ruler of the sultanates of Pontianak and Sanggau. His bold action and shrewdness in Banjarmasin, Pasir, etc, were too significant for the Dutch to ignore this "Arab piratic adventurer" (*Arabische Zeerover*). Nicholas de Cloek was summoned back to Batavia for his "impoliteness" in Pontianak. In July 1779, VOC sent a new envoy, a previous Assistant Resident of Rembang (a city in northern coast of Central Java) by the name of Willem Adriaan Palm as the VOC Commissariat of Trading and Administration in Pontianak. He brought along a well-drafted "Agreement" ("Acte van Investiture," to allow the overwhelming authority given to the Dutch) set by the VOC Governor General Reinier de Klerk for Sultan

Syarif Abdurrahman to sign, which he readily signed in 5 July 1779 (Rahman, Ja' Achmad, and Muhadi 2000: 88).

Willem Adriaan Palm accompanied Sultan Syarif Abdurrahman in 7 July 1779 to visit Landak and Ngabang sultanates. To plant the seed of conflict, the Dutch envoy stated that some parts of Landak sultanate were put under the power of Sultan Pontianak. (The dispute between Sultan of Pontianak and Panembahan of Landak indeed was resolved much later in 3 August 1886 after a map was used.) Willem Adriaan Palm's duty was done and he was replaced by Wolter Markus Stuart as the *Resident van Borneo's Wester Afdeeling* (1779-1784) in Pontianak. This new Resident built a trading representative in Pontianak with some ships, and 60 personnel composed of few officers, 25 soldiers, and some administration staff. VOC also erected a fortress at the western side of Kapuas river (Kadriah Palace in the eastern side) and built the business and housing centers along the Verkendepaal (along Tanjungpura and Pak Kasih streets to date) or "one thousand land."

Sultan Syarif Abdurrahman's appetite for power and jealousy over the growth of the other port cities along West Kalimantan coastline grew and therefore he besieged the sultanates of Sukadana and Mempawah (under his own in-laws' reign)¹ in 1786-1787. Sultan Ahmad Kamaluddin of Sukadana was unable to resist the forces of Sultan Syarif Abdurrahman and the Dutch fleet and retreated to Matan in 1786. Similarly, Panembahan Gusti Jamiril of Mempawah Sultanate retreated to Karangan in 1787. Sultan Syarif Abdurrahman quickly appointed his own son Syarif Kasim as the Panembahan of Mempawah in 1787. (Sultan Syarif Abdurrahman's attempts to control the Sultanate of Landak failed because the Dutch had their own direct interest in diamond there and refused to assist his ambition.) Sultan Syarif Abdurrahman passed away on 28 February 1808. According the *Acte van Investiture* of 1779, the Dutch appointed his son Syarif Kasim (also Panembahan of Mempawah) as the new sultan of Pontianak; he reported his new status as the Sultan of Pontianak to Batavia on 12 March 1808.

2. Sultan Syarif Kasim Alkadri (1767-1819)

Sultan Syarif Kasim's problems directly after he came to the throne in 1808 were the pirates, rebellion in Sambas, and the problems related to the rebellious Chinese. To deal with a murder of the captain of the "Commerce" (trading) ship that was hijacked by pirates, for example, Sultan Syarif Kasim sent a letter to the British Governor General Thomas Stanford Raffles on 14 February 1811 who was in charge to rule the Netherlands India in a short interregnum between 1811 and 1816. When the British returned the control over the Netherlands India to the Dutch in 1816, Sultan Syarif Kasim discharged an envoy to Batavia to demand a Dutch acknowledgement to his throne for many lingering troubles (and he did not want the Dutch to be the additional one).

During ten years of his reign, Sultan Syarif Kasim was the center of hatred among the families and ranks within the Kadriah Palace. Instead of paying back the family's father debts, he took more debts from his trading with the British and Chinese traders. He also justified murders to crush his political foes or the annoying criminals. (A rivulet ironically called "Selamat" or "Safe" was the alleged murder site for the Sultan's enemies.) His expensive and carefree lifestyle was reflected in a habit of selling the Palace's valuables. For all of these problems of his own making, the Sultan begged to the Dutch in Batavia in 1818 to send soldiers to protect his safety on the pretext of invitation to open a trading representative office. On 9 August 1818 the Dutch flag was rising again in Pontianak.

On 12 August 1819 the Dutch Commissariat Nahuys (or Neyhuis) renewed a contract with Sultan Syarif Kasim in which the Sultan would get a proper protection by the Netherlands India government. For the payment of the costs needed for the protection, the Sultan agreed to share half of the state revenues to the Netherlands India government. The Netherlands India government also got exclusive rights to manage the import and export levies, the trading of opium and salt monopoly, the taxes for the Chinese citizens, etc. The Court for the Europeans and the Chinese was under the government's jurisdiction; the Sultan took care for the justice among his own subjects. (And all Sultans were to be appointed by the Dutch Queen after they swore loyalty to her.) The government was also allowed to build a fortress in

Pontianak. (The Marianne Fort—after the name of a daughter of Willem I—was built later by the Governor General Du Bus. Later it became Du Bus Fort after the name of the Commissioner-General Viscount Du Bus de Gisignies who served from 1826 to 1830 to calculate the costs of the Java War from 1825 to 1830.)

Most of the Kadriah Palace's members disagreed with the humiliating agreement between Sultan Syarif Kasim and the Dutch and left in disgust to build in a new village called *Kampung Luar* (External Village). Sultan Syarif Kasim Alkadri passed away in 25 February 1819 just few weeks after he signed the agreement with the Netherlands India government. His son Syarif Abubakar Alkadri wanted the throne but he was largely rejected by the Pontianak population who preferred the Crown Prince (*Pangeran Ratu*) Syarif Usman Alkadri rather than a son of a murderer to be their Sultan. Despite Syarif Abubakar Alkadri's attempts to beg for the throne to Batavia, the Netherlands India government chose Syarif Usman Alkadri the Crown Prince in 1819 (Rahman, Ja' Achmad, and Muhadi 2000: 117). The Crown Prince had shown his "loyalty" for 11 years of waiting for his turn to be the Sultan and was also awarded a medal for loyalty by the Dutch.

3. Sultan Syarif Usman Alkadri (1777-1860)

To this new docile Sultan, the Dutch increased their repression toward the Palace. On 16 March 1822, or three years after the crowning, the Dutch reduced the share of state revenues to the Sultan from half (as the agreement with the late Sultan Syarif Kasim Alkadri) into a simple "salary" as much as 42,000 guilders per year. In 14 October 1823, the Dutch also took over the court over the Sultan's subjects. The son of the late Sultan Kasim Alkadri who also wanted the crown, Syarif Abubakar, was granted a title of *Pangeran Muda* (Young Prince) and a "salary" of 6,000 guilder per year (Rahman, Ja' Achmad, and Muhadi 2000: 118).

Sultan Syarif Usman himself, deprived much of his power and state revenues, was busy rebuilding the Palace. Between 1822 and 1845 he renovated the Grand Mosque of the Palace and enlarged the Palace. The year 1822 also earmarked the first direct involvement of the Dutch into the economic and politics affairs by its interference into the affairs of the Chinese *kongsi* Lan Fong of Mandor (gold mining),

which had been rightfully managed under the Landak sultanate's jurisdiction. Having very little to do, Sultan Syarif Usman abdicated his throne in 1855 (he later died in 1860).

4. Sultan Syarif Hamid Alkadri (1802-1872)

The eldest son of the previous Sultan Syarif Usman, Syarif Hamid Alkadri began his reign on 12 April 1855. The Dutch significantly increased their control over West Kalimantan. Since 1856 the “salary” for the Sultan of Pontianak was increased into 50,400 guilders, largely because the Culture System in Java—and to a limited extent in Pontianak—was gaining profits. (The families of previous Sultan Syarif Usman and *Pangeran Muda* Syarif Abubakar got 6,000 guilders a year.) In 1856 the authority of court for the jurisdiction of the Palace was overtaken by the Dutch court. In a letter signed in 4 January 1857 by the Resident of West Borneo, the Dutch included the Chinese district of Mandor as a part of Pontianak Sultanate. The pretext was that the previous Sultan Syarif Usman stood “neutral” during the riots of 1850 in the Mandor’s Chinese (gold mining) district; so the Pontianak Sultanate deserved control of a “new district”.

Sultan Syarif Hamid Alkadri lost much of the support of his subjects because he modified the Islamic law about inheritance rights (Rahman, Ja’ Achmad, and Muhadi 2000: 124). (The modification was not explained but the lost of support for the Sultan may signify that the modification was enforced against popular consent.) The Sultan also allegedly overtook large plots of lands in Sungai Kakap from their rightful owners and grabbed a big fortune from copra production in those lands. Realizing the danger of popular dissent related to this Sultan’s policies, the Dutch set a kind of *Majelis Ulama* (a Council of Islamic Teachers) controlled through the hands of the Sultan to ensure the “consistency” between the laws of the sultanate and the laws of government. Sultan Syarif Hamid Alkadri died in 1872.

5. Sultan Syarif Yusuf Alkadri (1850-1895)

The eldest son of the late Sultan Syarif Hamid Alkadri, Syarif Yusuf Alkadri, took over the reign in 1872. Sultan Syarif Yusuf Alkadri was known as aloof from the

governance matters; he became a trader and Islamic teacher instead (Rahman, Ja’Achmad, and Muhadi 2000: 124). In 22 August 1872, the Dutch returned the police jurisdiction for the indigenous subjects (Malays, Dayaks, Bugis, Javanese, etc) of the sultanate back to the Pontianak sultanate. The Sultan, for this newly returned police authority, was allowed to levy taxes in the areas outside of the Netherlands India government’s jurisdiction.

During the reign of Sultan Syarif Yusuf, many notable migrants came to Pontianak and settled down as farmers, sailors, traders, etc. These newcomers came from Banjarmasin, Bangka and Belitung islands, Serasan, Tambelan, Malacca, even Cambodia and Vietnam. The most popular migrants (after their achievements were known, of course) were Haji Muhammad Yusuf from Banjarmasin (who brought his Vietnamese wife and kins from Saigon and thus built *Kampung Saigon*) in 1884, Abdul Kahfi from Banjarmasin (who built *Kampung Banjar* of Pontianak) in 1846. Haji Muhammad Yusuf also brought back to Pontianak the rubber tree species from Vietnam, which grew well in Pontianak swampy peat soil.

The bankruptcy of the East India Company (after 1850, allegedly for deficits caused by outrageous military spending to quench rebellions¹) forced the Dutch to stop the trading monopoly and open the markets of investors. Thus in 1870 the Netherlands India government announced a new Agrarian Law of 1870 that allowed investors to build plantations, forest industries, etc, in the Netherlands Indië. Thus the Netherlands India needed a more peaceful West Kalimantan. On 3 August 1886 the long-winding dispute about the boundary agreement between the Pontianak Sultanate and Landak Sultanate was settled. A map was made to mark the boundaries—along the Landak river around Sungai Ambawang subdistrict and Kuala Mandor village today—for both Sultanates.

Sultan Syarif Yusuf was more popular for his trading and teaching activities rather than as a governing Sultan. For these religious activities he was largely respected by the other Sultans of West Kalimantan. He died on 15 March 1895 (aged 45) to be replaced by his oldest son Syarif Muhammad Alkadri who was crowned on 6 August 1895.

6. Sultan Syarif Muhammad Alkadri (1872-1944)

Sultan Syarif Muhammad, crowned at the age of 29 in 1895, inherited the increasingly limited power from the Dutch's growing power in the Palace. On 26 March 1912 he must sign an agreement with the Dutch in which the latter actively (1) decided the personnel for the Palace, (2) utilized the Dutch's Laws—both Criminal and Civil Laws—within the Palace, and (3) paid the salaries for the Palace staff. These agreements degraded the Sultanate into “the staff of Netherlands India government” (Rahman, Ja’ Achmad, and Muhadi 2000: 138). Sultan Syarif Muhammad, the longest reigning Sultan of Pontianak Sultanate (49 years), however, was living in an era of swapping consciousness for the freedom from the colonization.

Many institutions for education that spread the nationalist idea about freedom were spawning. Sultan Syarif Muhammad himself founded the *Perguruan Alkadriah* (Alkadriah School) for the sultanate staff and families in 1926, hand in hand with the foundation of Al Islamiyah, Muhammadiyah, Taman Siswa Schools, etc. He also initiated the wearing of European-style costumes for official occasions beside the usual Malay-style uniforms. The beginning of the *Ethische Politiek* (Politics of Ethics) and the end of the bankrupt Cultivation System all took place during Sultan Syarif Muhammad's reign, all of which emanated the aura of prosperity to the Sultanate.

The watershed transformation heralded by the Agrarian Law of 1870 was coming from its implementation together the Sugar Law (also of 1870). The Sugar Law abolished the forced cultivation of sugar cane by Javanese villagers, thus marking the end of the old [conservative] regime characterized by the Cultivation System running since 1830 (Kahn 1993: 191), which mobilized land and labor for the cultivation of export crops (mainly sugar, coffee, indigo, etc). The Agrarian Law changed the legal provisions that gave foreigners access to land in the colony (in 75 year-long leasing). These two laws undermined the basis of a state-centered, mercantilist colonial system while at the same time opening up the agrarian sector to exploitation by private capital.

Almost all the historians of Indonesia agree that the most far-reaching effects of post-1870 transformations in the economic climate, economic policy, and form and

function of the colonial state were actually experienced not on Java at all but on the so-called Outer Islands of Indonesia—most notably the Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and Sumatra (Kahn 1993: 194). The new agrarian legislation stimulated the most extensive economic expansion, and that Holland's equivalent of imperial expansion was most powerful. (Van Goor wrote in 1986 about the Dutch imperialism as the imperialism “at the margin,” or others spoke of a “rounding off of empire”.) Beginning late in the nineteenth century the Outer Islands of Indonesia began to replace Java as the stronghold of the colonial export economy. As the century progressed, colonial exports increased quickly.

During the 1880s and the early 1890s the total value of exports remained very stable averaging 41-48 million guilders (Lindblad 1989: 5 cited in Kahn 1993: 195). The ascent began in 1897 and from 1905 the aggregate always exceeded 100 million guilders. Total values quadrupled between the late 1890s (from 82 million guilders) and the first half of the 1910s (244 million guilders on average). In the Outer Islands this value of export rose from 30 percent (from the total values) prior to 1900 to 40 percent at the beginning of World War I (Kahn 1993: 195). This ‘optimistic’ numbers, however, only appeared in the surface. Deep inside the country, the inequality between the Indonesians (*pribumi*) and the other ethnic groups or foreigners was growing wild.

It was with such an auspicious backdrop that Sultan Syarif Muhammad was able to gain such a respect among the population. The thirtieth anniversary of Sultan Syarif Muhammad coronation (in 14 August 1925) was celebrated in a big party of 40 days and 40 nights, along with the banquets for the marriage of his four daughters. He traveled extensively that he met and married more wives from Turkey and Singapore (in addition to his five wives) (Rahman, Ja' Achmad, and Muhadi 2000: 145). The Dutch, however, did not loosen their grips to the growingly tense politics.

In 1912 some family members of Sultan Syarif Muhammad who resisted openly the taxes levied by the Dutch were expelled out of the Palace. *Pangeran Bendahara* (Prince of State Treasury) Syarif Jakfar (the uncle of the Sultan) was cast out of the Palace in 1912 when he loudly protested the heavy taxes burdened to his subjects (probably to himself). Syarif Husein or *Pangeran Adipati*, another uncle of

the Sultan, empathically beat a tax collector as a protest. The latter also actively joined the youth organization called *Persatuan Anak Borneo* (*PAB* or Unity of Borneo Youth). This Pangeran Adipati also formed Pasukan Sukaraja (Brigade of Sukaraja) that recruited cadets among the youth in Pontianak. Sultan Syarif Muhammad once was invited to attend the birthday of Queen Wilhelmina (31 January 1938) in Holland.

During the invasion of Japan in World War II (1941-1945), Sultan Syarif Muhammad was accused by the Japanese as the leader of insurgency against the occupation forces because he often invited the other Sultans and *Panembahans* to Pontianak to discuss the new development in his Sultanate. Suspecting the Kadriah Palace was the center of insurgency against the Japanese forces, the Japanese military arrested the suspected family members of the Sultan in 1943, including the Sultan himself. On the night of 23 January 1943 the Sultan, along with 30 other family members, was taken by the Japanese military intelligence and brought them to a secret site¹. The military mob also ransacked and robbed the Palace treasures and weaponry. (The dead body of the Sultan was found only a year later through information from a grave digger who successfully fled from the Japanese soldiers under heavy pouring rain during the digging of the mass grave for the Sultan's family.)

Freed from the Dutch, with some Japanese still hanging around, the family of Kadriah Palace was in a painful search for a new Sultan to replace the slaughtered Sultan Syarif Muhammad. With the Japanese military still around, the Palace family and some Japanese officials discussed the matter in 29 August 1945 (the Declaration of Independence was read by Sukarno on 17 August 1945 in Jakarta). After a long discussion (the late Sultan had no son from the main wife or queen, *gahra ratu*), one 18 year-old grandson, through the line of main wife, by the name of Syarif Thaha Alkadri was anointed as the new Sultan of Pontianak.

7. Sultan Syarif Thaha Alkadri (1927-1984)

Deemed as too young and unfit to run the administration properly, the new Sultan was assisted by a Council of Sultanate (*Zitiryo Hyogikai* in Japanese terms) (Rahman, Ja' Achmad, and Muhadi 2000: 163). The unsettling uncertainties suddenly facing the Pontianak population were composed of four facts. First, the rumor was

spreading about the coming Axis forces, including the Dutch forces, to Pontianak to disarm the Japanese forces. Second, the Sultan of Pontianak was still uncrowned while the civilian government was handed by the fleeing Japanese forces to the Resident Asikin Noor. Third, the Dayak forces popularly known as Majang Desa Forces¹ under the leadership of Panglima Burung was entering Pontianak to demand the quick crowning of the new Sultan (because, they said, the Japanese had lost the war) or they would launch a rebellion. Fourth, the Chinese in Pontianak and Singkawang were also preparing their own Public Guardian Forces (*Penjaga Keamanan Oemoem* or *Poh An Tui*) to prepare the coming of the victorious Chinese troops from China mainland (Rahmad, Ja' Achmad, and Muhadi 2000: 104-105).

Meanwhile the situation was growingly uncertain with the Japanese forces surrendering to the Axis forces led by the United States but in a process of disarming. On 14 October 1945 the Axis forces arrived in Pontianak¹ and tried to settle a new Dutch-led civil government (Netherlands India Civil Administration or NICA). They desperately needed a leader acknowledged by the population. Here they found Syarif Hamid Alkadri II in handy. The Dutch Lieutenant Governor Dr. H.J. van Mook brought Syarif Hamid Alkadri II (a Major General in the Dutch-led auxiliaries forces called KNIL) to Pontianak on 17 October 1945. (Syarif Hamid Alkadri II was the oldest son of the murdered Sultan Syarif Muhammad from his third wife (not the main wife or non-*gahra ratu*)¹. Despite the popular protest against this Syarif Hamid Alkadri II for his Dutch-based education and military rank, he claimed that the 18 year-old Sultan Syarif Thaha was too inexperienced to lead the Sultanate. "You are still too young to be a Sultan," claimed Syarif Hamid II to his 18-year old nephew (the grandson of his father) when they met. The young Sultan replied, "People asked me to be the Sultan otherwise the Dayak forces would fiercely rebel" (Rahman, Ja' Achmad, and Muhadi, 2000: 166). On 29 October 1945, the Dutch-led NICA government announced the crowning of the new Sultan Hamid Alkadri II.

8. Sultan Syarif Hamid Alkadri II (1913-1978)

Under the tutorial of his Dutch-led forces commanders, Sultan Syarif Hamid II campaigned for a system of a federal state (*Negara Serikat*, probably close to the

system used in Malaysia) in which West Kalimantan was to be part of a Dutch government. This idea was the reason for the refusal among the ranks of Independence Fighters (*Pejuang Kemerdekaan*), who mainly demanded a form of a United Republic Indonesia (*Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia*), against Sultan Syarif Hamid II. Supported by the Resident of West Kalimantan Dr. van der Zwaal, Sultan Syarif Hamid II actively sought supports from the other “federal states” from the other places in Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan that had been manufactured by the Dutch to split the war-torn new state of Indonesia. On 5 July 1946, he attended the Dutch-sponsored Conference of Malino which was held to accommodate the “federal states” such as West Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, North Maluku, Sangihe Talaud, and Papua (Rahman, Ja' Achmad, and Muhadi 2000: 175).

In another Dutch-sponsored Conference of Denpasar (Bali) on 18 December 1946, the Dutch Governor General van Mook manufactured more “federal states” such as Pasundan State, Southeast Kalimantan, East Java, Madura, and East Sumatra. On 12 May 1947 the Dutch officially announced the formation of *Daerah Istimewa Kalimantan Barat* or Special Region of West Kalimantan under Sultan Syarif Hamid II. After a year, on 28 May 1948 the “federal states” and “special regions” created by the Dutch were united under the *Bijeenkomst voor Federal Overleg* (BFO or Unity for Federal States), with which Sultan Syarif Hamid II was able to negotiate with Sukarno and Hatta who were under seclusion in Bangka Island, South Sumatra.

Sukarno was able to bring the Republic Indonesia and the BFO to the Conference of Inter Indonesia in Jogjakarta from 19 to 23 July 1948. Sultan Syarif Hamid II was the representative of the BFO in the following Round Table Conference in Den Haag (The Hague), Holland. Sukarno shrewdly brought together the “Republiken” Provinces and the “Federal States” of Indonesia to unite them later. Seemingly agreed first to the name of “*Republik Indonesia Serikat*” (or the United [Federal] States of Republic Indonesia) that covered all provinces, Sukarno turned the table later after he managed to call upon these “federal states” to resign their federal statuses and to re-group under “*Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia*” or United Republic of Indonesia.

After the Dutch, out of political consideration, acknowledged the sovereignty of the “*Republik Indonesia Serikat*” (and hoped to face a split Indonesia) on 27 December 1949, Sultan Syarif Hamid II was appointed as the member of the council made to form a new cabinet together with Muhammad Hatta, Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, and Anak Agung Gede Agung. In this new cabinet, Sultan Syarif Hamid II was set as the *Menteri Negara* or State Minister (without department). Sultan Syarif Hamid II was utterly disappointed with the role as a State Minister without department. (He admitted that “as a State Minister my job was only to prepare a parliamentary building and the plan for the state symbol—until I was sentenced to jail [in 1953]” (Rahman, Ja’ Achmad, and Muhadi 2000: 178). The other disappointment came as the members of the BFO were given only petty positions in the new Cabinet of *Republik Indonesia Serikat*.

Sultan Hamid II was also very disgusted about the domination of the members of the Japanese-trained TNI (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia* or National Army of Indonesia) within the ranks of the newly formed *Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Serikat* or Army of the United [Federal] States of Republic Indonesia. He was hoping for a position as a Minister of Defense but he later conceded to the refusals against his hope in Ministry of Defense from the *Republik Indonesia*’s side. The previous agreement stated that the new Army of the United States of Republik Indonesia should be composed of TNI as the main forces, and the former Dutch-trained units of KNIL, KM, VB, etc were its additional forces. (There was no known Regular Army unit in West Kalimantan from 1945 to 1949. Sultan Syarif Hamid II had prepared some army units for West Kalimantan, “his province.”) These agreements were never upheld.

When the Sovereignty Handover (*Penyerahan Kedaulatan*) from the Dutch Government to the *Republik Indonesia Serikat* took place in the end of 1949, the Commander of Territorium VI (Kalimantan) Lt.Col. Soekanda Bratamanggala from Banjarmasin (South Kalimantan) headquarters was sent to bring a delegation led by Major Dr. Sudarsono as the representatives of the *Republik Indonesia Serikat*. The delegation received the handover and formed a TNI (National Army of Indonesia) unit in Pontianak, to which a unit of TNI under Maj. Firmansyah was sent to

Pontianak on 16 January 1950. Sultan Syarif Hamid II was utterly dejected by this development.

His anger grew when the people of Pontianak demonstrated against the “Special Region of West Kalimantan” (for which he was the appointed governor previously) as well as welcomed the TNI units warmly. His disappointment broke beyond imagination when the National Committee of West Kalimantan appointed Maj. Dr. Sudarsono as the Head of the Region [West Kalimantan] instead of Sultan Syarif Hamid II who had “abdicated this position [as the Head of Special Region of West Kalimantan] as he was the Minister in the Cabinet of *Republik Indonesia Serikat*.”

Finally he remembered his refusal (in January 1948 in one of Jakarta’s dance clubs) to the offer of a Dutch soldier of fortune by the name of Capt. Raymond Westerling to lead a new force called “*Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil*” or the Army of Just King. Capt. Westerling openly hated Sukarno and wanted to destroy the Cabinet of *Republik Indonesia Serikat* to pieces. He thus built a new force—he did not tell it was a ragtag army made of the previously Dutch-trained forces—to unleash his hatred; and he offered the leadership of this army to Sultan Syarif Hamid II, a Major General of Dutch-trained KNIL. When Sultan Syarif Hamid II’s temper was uncontrolled, he finally accepted the offer by the soldier of fortune in a hotel of Bandung, West Java, in the mid of January 1950 (Rahman, Ja’ Achmad, and Muhadi 2000: 180-181). He wanted to protect his interests in a “Federal State of Republic Indonesia” and he found the army he needed to achieve that aim. Capt. Westerling, however, kept Sultan Syarif Hamid II in the dark about the strength and plans of his Army of Just King.

This the captain did on 24 January 1950 after he (and a Police Inspector by the name of Frans Nayoan) reported a surprise attack with a ragtag small army composed of Dutch-trained KNIL and some other units from the State of Pasundan in a target in Bandung, to which Sultan Syarif Hamid II was allegedly ignorant. His knowledge about a planned meeting of the cabinet members at the same day, 24 January 1950, brought him a violent idea. He asked Capt. Westerling and Police Inspector Nayoan to sally a RIS (Sukarno) Cabinet meeting scheduled at 5 pm to 8 pm and capture all

ministers alive. The assault unit must eliminate the Defense Minister Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, Secretary General Ali Budiarjo and Col. Simatupang. “Give me a light wound,” Sultan Syarif Hamid II allegedly said to Capt. Westerling and Inspector Nayoan.

On the second thought after a shower in that early afternoon, Sultan Syarif Hamid II realized that the plan was inappropriate and he cancelled the assault command to the Capt. Westerling’s rouge army. Fortunately nothing happened on that difficult afternoon. (Probably that was enough for whoever who gained advantage out of the fact that Capt. Westerling the soldier of fortune had successfully lured Sultan Syarif Hamid II into such a murderous plan.) Yet the Supreme Court found him guilty of planning a *coup d'etat*, a punishable grave crime despite of its failure to materialize or, in Dutch legal terminology, a “*formal delict*” in contrast to “*materiel delict*,” which is punishable only when it already takes place. The Supreme Court of Republic Indonesia convicted him 10 years of imprisonment on 8 April 1953. (He was arrested in April 1950, around two months after his alleged “crime.”) His appeal for a pardon from President Sukarno was refused. He left his prison in 1967 and thereafter worked as the President Commissary of PT. Indonesia Air Transport until he passed away in peace on 30 March 1978. The last Sultan of Pontianak Sultanate was buried with a proper ceremony in the Sultanate graveyard in Batu Layang, Pontianak.

Appendix AE
The Military Decision on KODAM Issue (1999)

A Letter of Decision (*Surat Keputusan*) No. 08/P/V/1999 dated 7 May 1999 by the Armed Forces Commander Gen. Wiranto decreed the KODAM establishment for West Kalimantan as the top priority (number three after the troubled Aceh and Maluku provinces). The spoke-person of Armed Forces Maj. Gen. Sudrajat already confirmed the plan to increase the status of the military command headquarter in West Kalimantan in year 2003 into KODAM (Thomas Tion et. al 2000: 5). However, some minority groups among the military officers within the rank and file of the then President Abdurrahman Wahid's cabinet, notably Lt. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah (commander of KOSTRAD or Army Strategic Command per 28 February 2000 under President Abdurrahman Wahid) had commented against the military establishment down to the village level as practiced by the New Order regime (Yulianto 2002: 410 citing *Media Indonesia* 14 December 1999). By October 2003 the commander of KOREM (Resort Military Command Headquarter) 121 ABW (*Alambanawanawai*) Col. Marciano Norman revealed that the plan in 1999 for a new KODAM in West Kalimantan per 2003 was delayed to give way to the more crucially needed KODAMs in Aceh and Maluku provinces (E. Ngiuk, D. Uyub and Thomas Tion 2003: 12). With around 7,000 personnel scattered in six KODIMs (District Military Command Headquarters), three infantry battalions, artillery and cavalry detachments, etc, KOREM 121 ABW West Kalimantan was good enough to cover its jobs.

Appendix AF

Short Biography of Cornelius Kimha (Native of Pancaroba, Former District Head of Pontianak District)

After a tough election by 45 members of People Representative Assembly District Level, Drs. Cornelius Kimha (with his furious Dayak supporters) collected the same votes as his closest rival, Drs. H. Agus Salim (also with fierce Malay supporters), with one abstain vote (D. Uyub 2004: 32) in 1999. To avoid clash between the two candidates and their rueful supporters, the People Representative Assembly delegated the decision to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (*Menteri Dalam Negeri*). After incessant protests from Dayak mobs to have their Dayak district head, the Ministry of Internal Affairs appointed Drs. Cornelius Kimha as District Head of Pontianak District—and Drs. H. Agus Salim to be ad interim District Head of a newly made Landak District (a splinter district lying just northern side of Pontianak District). (In a day where unknown mobs burned the office of the People Representative Assembly.) Along with Drs. H. Agus Salim's appointment as District Head of Landak were 13 members of People Representative Assembly from Landak District who had voted for Drs. Cornelius Kimha. Having only ruled for a year and without supports from 13 members of People Representative Assembly, Drs. Cornelius Kimha faced his first test from the People Representative Assembly District Level of (office in Mempawah) when the latter rejected his *Laporan Pertanggungjawaban* (Annual Responsibility Report) on 7 October 2000 and then on 8 January 2001 (Anonym 2001: 18). The reasons cited for the rejections were frauds in the distribution of government's subsidy for kerosene among poor households (President Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati were forced to relieve the burden of increasing prices for household use among the poorest households during oil price hike of 2000). Another reason cited from anonymous internal source of the People Representative Assembly was to get rid of Drs. Cornelius Kimha whose position would be given the Drs. H. Agus Salim. Drs. H. Agus Salim's position as the ad interim District Head of Landak District would then be granted to another candidate.

Near the end of his rule as District Head of Pontianak District on 24 April 2004, the People Representative Assembly delivered another blow against Drs. Cornelius Kimha: an advanced election for district head position on January 2004 instead of April 2004 to cut short his incumbency. The real reason behind this early election was the exposed bribe cases between the incumbent District Head and the members of People Representative Assembly. On 27 October 2002 the government of Pontianak District revealed that a foundation (*Yayasan Bestari*) founded by the members of People Representative Assembly District Level (DPRD) was used since 1999 to 2003 to flow some funds—estimated around IDR 4.7 billion or about USD 522,000 and another IDR 2.8 billion since 2003—from the District Government Revenue and Income Budget (APBD or *Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah*) signed by the District Head Drs. Cornelius Kimha to the members of People Representative Assembly (Tim 2003: 8). (The Chairman of People Representative was paid IDR 30 million (USD 3.3 thousand) and three deputies collected IDR 27.5 million each; the rest 41 members got IDR 25 million each.) Only one member of People Representative Assembly, by the name of Makmur Abdullah, willingly revealed that all members had received those funds and then signed their names. One unnamed source claimed that the whistle blower of this bribery case was those insiders within the ranks of Pontianak district government unit who wanted to get rid of Drs. Cornelius Kimha.

The election of Pontianak District Head for the 2004-2009 period saw that the previous District Head Drs. Cornelius Kimha resigned from further process to leave four pair of District Head/Vice District Head. Drs. H. Agus Salim (candidate from Islamic party *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*) was finally elected with 26 votes out of 45 votes from the members of People Representative Assembly (D. Uyub 2004a: 32). On 17 March 2005 three members of People Representative Assembly (only pseudonyms given as MA, EC, and St) were convicted with 2 years imprisonment and fine as high as IDR 50 million (USD 5,555) each; the rest 38 members went unscathed. Two commission members of the foundation (*Yayasan Bestari*) (with pseudonyms of AF and HM) were similarly sentenced, 2 years imprisonment and IDR 50 million fines (Stefe 2005: 45).

Appendix AG
Short Details of the Ethnic-based Conflict in
Sungai Ambawang Subdistrict (1983)

The village turned out to be Sungai Enau village (2,439 males per 2003), one of five villages belonging to Kuala Mandor B subdistrict which lies about 7km northern side of Lingga and Korek village. The number of house burned (100 houses or about two to three Group of Neighbors units) meant that the local leaders were successful to curb the escalation of conflict. The village head of Korek, a Dayak, proudly told a story about his travels and speeches to some state [Islamic] universities—closely related with the leading groups among the Madurese and East Javanese—in several Central Java and East Java cities after the riots subsided. The likely explanation for such travels is that the ruling people in Central and East Java were launching a damage control regarding the reputation of some transmigration sites near Pontianak. In some other cases of conflict related with the Dayak groups, usually they quickly accept honest and truthful apology from the perpetrators (usually along with some adat fines paid to the family members—to certain degree, not all—of the victims). The Dayaks, the descendants of hunter-gatherers who appreciated a value of group for survival, were believing that a breach against one's well-being is an offense against one's group of people (or tribe) who have rights to get a portion of one's inheritance (the whole group of people is called “*waris*”—from Arabic “those who rightfully through blood relations inherit”).

Appendix AH


Chronology of Sanggau Ledo Violence Outbreak (1997)

The trouble began at a wedding party of a villager in Tanjung Village of Ledo subdistrict celebrated with a popular *dang dut* concert on 30 December 1996. Two young men of Ledo subdistrict by the name of Yokundus bin Pagau and Rakim Teman (Dayaks as their names signify) were intercepted and maimed by seven young men from Sanggau Ledo led by Bakrie, a son of a Dayak Sungkung mother with a Madurese father. Bakrie already kept a grudge against Yokundus bin Pagau from a previous quarrel. While the wounds suffered by Yokundus bin Pagau and Rakim Teman were recovering in a hospital, their unhappy friends demanded the police to arrest Bakrie and his accomplices. Police indifference endangered the growingly larger groups who then threatened to arrest Bakrie on their own. The group split into two directions to find its target: to Sanggau Ledo subdistrict and two transmigration sites (Lembang and Marabu sites).

The terrified population of Madurese settlers were quickly evacuated to other places and some took refuge to Singkawang, a coastal city 70 km away (refugee number swelled to 5,780 person in 8 January 1997). Finding largely emptied places, the Dayak marauders burned 1,129 houses, killed 22 Madurese settlers and wounded tens of Madurese (Situmorang 1999: 114-121) in four days. In early morning on 29 January 1997, around 35 masked people attacked an office and a Credit Union of Dayak-based Yayasan Karya Sosial Pancur Kasih (Pancur Kasih Foundation) in Pontianak, maiming two resident female staff (Dayak). The series of Dayak-Madurese vengeance began again. A big momentum for the cycle of violence arrived when a group of Madurese settlers of Peniraman (30 km outside of Pontianak) stopped a public bus on 31 January 1997 and murdered Martinus Nyangkot, a village head of Maribas Village of Tebas subdistrict and an Adat Council Head there. The riots spread horrendously to Sanggau District (eastern side of Sambas District, the original center of violence) as well as Pontianak District.

In a report to the President Suharto on 3 April 1997, the Governor of West Kalimantan (Maj. Gen.) Aspar Aswin specified the numbers of Madurese refugees as

14,000 people, 200 casualties (all ethnics), 2,469 houses burned, 24 cars and 34 motorcycles, all valued at IDR 13.5 billion (but no church or mosque ransacked) (Situmorang 1999: 224). The security forces arrested 23 Madurese, 158 Dayaks, and some from other ethnic groups.



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
Appendix AI

Short Biography of L. Bakweng (GOLKAR Party Canvasser Functionary)

The wife of Head of Group of Neighbors (*Rukun Tetangga*) no 22 of Lingga (Lingga has 22 Groups of Neighbor) explained that Drs. Laurentius Bakweng is her cousin from the same late grandfather, who was the brave warlord well-known in Lingga, Korek, Pancaroba villages. After the general election of 2004, L. Bakweng was appointed as one of 17-member Dewan Penasehat (Council of Advisors) of Golkar Party (*Equator* 20 April 2007). In 2004 general election he was put at the last number of 11 candidates from Golkar Party, which meant he was unlikely to get a seat in People Representative Assembly Republic Indonesia (DPR-RI); his “job” was clearly a vote-getter to collect Dayak votes. He also served as a member of a Special Committee (*Panitia Khusus*, chaired by Golkar’s leader Ir. H. Zulfadhl) made to analyze and “accept” the first “responsibility letter” (May 2004) of the incumbent Governor Usman Djafar at the beginning of his first term (2003-2008) (*Equator* 14 May 2004). In an interview in his distinctively (shaped and ornamented with North Sulawesi’s long house style) different house—compared to other houses in the village—in Korek village, the west side neighbor of Lingga village, he admitted that some times during the reign of Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2003) he stopped a minister who visited the Pontianak-Tayan road and demanded the minister to begin the road hardening project. The timing was right before the general election of 2004 and he was one of the important vote-getters to collect Dayak votes for Golkar Party to which he has been worked for. The victory of Golkar Party in general election 2004 spoke volumes of the efficacy of the Dayak leaders belonging to the party in garnering votes among the Dayaks. Drs. Laurentius Bakweng, however, remained low-profile and largely unknown.

His main activities after his formal “retirement” from government (but still in Golkar Party, although there were reports that he was mainly “inactive”) are taking care of his land (exact location and size unknown) that some informants reported as “planted with oil palm and ready to harvest). (A Decision Letter made by District Head of Pontianak—numbered 42 Year 1997, dated 19 May 1997—Drs. H. Henri

Usman gave 312 members of “farmers group” in Sungai Ambawang subdistrict rights over “lands”—sized 624 ha in Pancaroba village—and Laurentius Bakweng stood as “farmer” number 225—as well as H. Henri Usman (number 220) and Drs. Jacobus Luna (the one who signed the very same Decision Letter as Secretary of District) (number 224).)



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Appendix AJ

The Most Horrible Violence Outbreaks in Sambas District (the Dayaks against the Madurese in 1979 and the Malays against the Madurese in 1999)

The government only built a serious “monument for peace” (finished in 1981) after a major conflict between Dayaks and Madurese erupted in Samalantan subdistrict (near Singkawang) in 1979 (still related to the 1967 conflict in terms of competition over lands left by the fleeing Chinese). Provoked by the stabbing of a Dayak by the name of Sidik from Pak Kucing (Samalantan subdistrict). (The monument showed 10 pairs (man and woman) of human-size statues wearing 10 ethnic costumes in front of a big Indonesian flag and 5 big pillars.) The death of Sidik burned Sambas district: at least 22 killed and hundreds of houses destroyed (Frans L. Anderson 2003b: 32). The circulation of red bowl (*mangkok merah*) in Samalantan 1979, which was very effective to mobilize the Dayaks to the military side in the 1967 conflict, probably awakened the sense of danger among the military leaders. Thus the monument was built for West Kalimantan population to see. The reason for the military underestimation for the explosiveness of Dayak peasant assault was derived from the military science. The Dayaks were very unlikely to understand the eight methods (or the combination of them) for weak forces or countries to beat superior forces. The Dayak battle tactics have always been rudimentary in terms of weaponry, supply, mobility and tactics. Basically the Dayaks attack with inefficient infantry (walking soldiers) units. If the target is numerically and technically superior, surprise ambush is used; if the target is numerically inferior or large but immobile, frontal assault is used. These methods are retarded compared to the regular army’s superior weaponry and tactics.

A Madurese petty thief was caught in action—and probably, as common in villages, beaten—by the Malay villagers of Parit Setia (a coastal village near Sambas) on 18 January 1999, one day before the celebration of Idul Fitri. At 3.45 pm the next day, 200 Madurese from Rambayan village (30 km from Parit Setia) surprisingly attacked the villagers, claiming three villagers’ life. Nothing happened for a month for the local police did not pursue the manslaughter cases further, until a Madurese

stabbed a Malay on 21 February 1999. The revengeful lynching mobs of Malays ran amok until 22 April 1999, claiming 186 lives (per 26 March 1999), evicting 28,000-35,000 refugees, burning 2,490 houses (all Madurese's) despite mobilization of 9 companies of anti-riot military forces from other provinces (Stanley 2000: 3-19). On 6 April 1999, thousands of Malays from many subdistricts of Sambas forced their ways into Singkawang City, the capital of Sambas District, to demand release of their Malay colleagues in police custody after the military fires failed to stop them in a village before Singkawang city gate (some Malays injured or died here) and inside Singkawang city (at least 12 Malays died here). On 9 April 1999, around 162 Malays were apprehended. On 10 April, hundreds of Madurese attacked the hospital where the wounded Malays were staying but the well-prepared security forces repelled the Madurese. After a series of retaliatory assaults by both sides, on 26 April 1999 the representatives of all non-Madurese groups in Batu Ampar subdistrict refused the relocation of Madurese refugees in the subdistrict. On 25 March 1999 hundreds of Dayaks of Ketapang District protested the planned relocation of the Madurese refugees in their district in front of the Governor's Office Pontianak.

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1998	: Researcher for Jakarta-based Institute for Study and Advocacy for People or ELSAM
1998-2000	: Campaigner for Bangkok-based Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Dec 1998 to Dec 2000)
2001-2002	: Researcher for ICRAF Bogor
Research Work	
	: “Towards a People-based Resource Management from a State-based One: Legal Overview” (unpublished by ICRAF Bogor, Sept 1998)
	: “Human Rights Abuses in Forest Policies in Sumatera: Three Cases of Aceh Province” (unpublished by ELSAM, Nov 1999)
	: Adaptation of “Lead Battery Overload Report” made by Manila-based Campaigners to Bangkok situation (unpublished by Greenpeace, Jan 2000)

- : “Visit Report on Greenpeace Eco-timber Project in Solomon Islands” (Unpublished by Greenpeace, March 1999)
- : “Dossiers for Activities of Indonesian-based Forestry Institutions Prior to Forest Stewardship Certification in Mexico City (Aug 2000)” (unpublished, June 2000)
- : “Organizational Options for the Farmers in the Indonesian Legal Framework” (Unpublished by ICRAF Bogor, Feb 2002)
- : “How Participatory is Thailand’s Forestry Policy?” (Published by Japan-based International Global Environmental Strategy, 2004) at <http://www.iges.or.jp/en/fc/pdf/report11/05Thailand.pdf>
- : “Politics of the Subaltern: Tribal Peasant Resistance through Civil Society in West Kalimantan, Indonesia” in Socio-Humanities Journal Vol. 1 Number 2, Dec 2006 (<http://www.lemlit-unmul.net>)

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