CHAPTER II
COLONIALITY OF POWER: THE RISE AND FALL OF PONTIANAK SULTANATE (1771-1958) AND THE POST-WORLD WAR II COLD WAR

After a short introduction, this chapter will give a brief history of West Kalimantan, beginning with its pre-1771 Muslim sultanates, the rise of the Pontianak Sultanate (1771 onwards), the subalternizing effects of Dutch rule upon the population and finally, the tumultuous times which heralded the transition into an era of global power politics (1945-1958). This history sheds light on what has happened to shape the social and political situation experienced by the subalternized groups in West Kalimantan, including the Dayak peasantry. Despite the fact that the Dutch created a rigidly stratified society, with very limited social mobility and through a governmentality which was termed by Anibal Quijano (1997) at the global level a "coloniality of power", the indigenous groups remained vigilant to any chances they had to loosen the grip of this power. As a story with two beginnings, one in Greece and the Atlantic coast and the other in the Andes and in Mesoamerica, the *coloniality of power* can be located in the different memories, sensibilities and beliefs held between 1492 and today (Mignolo 2000: 17). Quijano (1997) identifies coloniality of power with capitalism and its consolidation in Europe from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries. It implied and constituted itself through: (1) the classification and re-classification of the planets population (through 'culture'), (2) an institutional structure which functioned to articulate and manage such classifications (state apparatus, universities, church, etc), (3) the definition of spaces appropriate for such goals, and (4) an epistemological perspective from which to articulate the meaning and profile of the new matrix of power and from which the new production of knowledge could be channeled.

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At the global level, coloniality of power underlines the geo-economic organization of the globe, one which articulates the modern/colonial world system. Capitalism is thus linked to labor and race (not only class), as well as to knowledge (Mignolo 2000: 54). In Quijano's (1997: 117) own words:

> Coloniality of power and historico-structural dependency: both imply the hegemony of euro-centrism as an epistemological perspective … in the context of coloniality of power the dominated population, in their new, assigned identities, were also subjected to the euro-centric hegemony as a way of knowing.

Attempts to include the mixture of a tribal and Muslim society into the colonial/modern world system inspired the colonialists to create a civilized society through paradoxical war-making and peace-making and following the ethnicization of social relations. These processes also produced paradoxical results. At the same time that the Dayaks (and the Malays) realized their "differences" from other groups, they also began to share a united feeling of "Dayakness" among themselves. When the post-colonial era arrived, this primordialist urge of shared "Dayakness" was manipulated by the elite Dayaks to sweep the votes in the first post-independence democratic general elections (held in 1955 and 1958, it was split for lack of funding). This chapter charges that the attempts at subjugation of the indigenous groups did not always produce docile subjects, but created subjects conscious of their subjugation and thus willing to break free whenever the chance might arise. Subsequent events at the regional and national level added some important ingredients to the sedimentation of ethnic political consciousness, through the Dayak elite's activism in post-colonial politics.

West Kalimantan is one of five provinces of Kalimantan Island[1], which belongs to Indonesia. With an area of 146.75 thousand sq. km (or around 14.67 million ha) and with 2.6 million inhabitants in 1980 and 3.06 million in 1990, West Kalimantan has Pontianak as its capital. The total area of Kalimantan Island is 746.21 thousand sq. km or 74.62 million ha. Archeological investigations of burial sites in Kalimantan and from other sources have shown that the inhabitants of the island have had long established relations with people from outside Kalimantan. Chinese contact

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[1] The Indonesians accepted the term Kalimantan for the whole island instead of "Borneo," which was a Western corruption of the local word "Burni" (or Brunei), a powerful sixteenth-century Muslim trading state on the north-west Kalimantan coast (King 1993: 17-19). The name Kalimantan was known by some European travelers in the early nineteenth century - see Hunt's text Sketch of Borneo or Pulo Kalamantan (1812) and de Rienzi's (1836) reference to Kalemantan. Kalamantan originated from the word "Kalamantan", or the island of the 'lamanta' (raw sago) (King 1993: 18).

has been proven through the discovery of Chinese-made trade objects, such as porcelain and bowls, dating back to the Sung period (960 AD to 1279 AD) (Ave and King 1986:17). The Chinese looked for Bornean camphor as well as exotic tropical products on the island, including bezoar stones, bird of paradise feathers and birds' nests (Ave and King 1986: 19).

The Javanese may have had contact with the Dayaks, the natives of Kalimantan, as early as the ninth century A.D. The Buddhist temple Borobudur in Central Java has a scene depicting people using blowpipes. The most intense relations were established during the golden age of the East Javanese kingdom of Majapahit, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (Ave and King 1986: 19). The gradual demise in power of Majapahit was accompanied by the resulting spread of Islam through the islands of Southeast Asia and along the trade routes (Ave and King 1986: 19).

Although disputes appear about the time of Islam's arrival in Borneo, Muslim traders had been operating in some of the island's ports as early as the thirteenth century (Ave and King 1986: 19). The interior people, both settled agriculturalists and forest nomads, supplied downstream trading centers, which provided various products sought-after on the Asian markets. Usually hunter-gatherers were the main suppliers, with the settled long-house people acting as intermediaries between the hunter-gatherers and the coastal traders (King 1993: 103). Both terms for the indigenous 'Dayak' and 'Punan' contrast with the 'Malay' (Ave, King, and Wit 1983). The majority of the 'Malays' originated from those of the autochthonous people of Kalimantan who converted to Islam. Over time, this religious conversion resulted in a reclassification of the Dayak converts into 'Malay', with the local Malay term for this process being *masok Melayu* ('to become Malay') or *turun Melayu* ('to come down to become Malay') (Sellato 1989: 20). This popular method of social conversion from the "pagan" Dayaks into the "more civilized" Malays began the process of subjugation of the upstream Dayaks under Malay rule.

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2.1 Process of Subjugation of the Indigenous Dayaks under Muslim-Malay Rule

The relationship between the Dayaknese and the Islamic sultanates and their citizens was not really equal but appeared more like that of the conqueror and the conquered, from the perspective of most Western observers. This section argues that

this rather typical relationship model between the Malays and the Dayaks does not always fit the situation in West Kalimantan. The relationship among ethnic groups there, shows some wide ranges of ramification from one place to the other. These variances, however, provided the pretext for the Dutch to draw West Kalimantan into their modern/colonial world system.

The Dayak Jalai of Ketapang district, for example, were obliged to send 10 slaves (or *kamit*) from each village to work in the capital of Ketapang Sultanate. These 10 slaves served the Sultan (Panembahan Saunan at that time) for half of the year, to be replaced by the next 10 slaves in the other half (Erma S. Ranik 2000a: 28). The Dayaks of Jalai finally rebelled against this slavery under the leadership of Gemalaq Kemisiq. With pressure from the Dutch through its representative in Ketapang in 1932 Panembahan Saunan finally cancelled the obligation for the Dayaks to send Dayak slaves to his sultanate capital.

Before the arrival of the Muslims (from Arabia, India, Sumatera and Bugis/Sulawesi), the Dayaks were influenced mostly by the Indianized or Hindu-influenced Javanese culture, as well as the Chinese from southern parts of China. In the ancient kingdom of Kutei, in East Kalimantan, researchers found *Yupa* inscriptions referring to a King Mulavarman and dating from around the beginning of the fifth century A.D. (Chhabra 1965). In West Kalimantan at Batu Pahat, at a site near the Tekarek river (one of Kapuas river tributaries), a pyramidal boulder was discovered inscribed with eight Buddhist texts in Sanskrit (Christie 1990).

Many of the Indian influences in Borneo may well be derived not directly from India but from Southeast Asia's 'indianized' states, such as Srivijaya (South Sumatera province to date) and many of the Hindu-Buddhist states in eastern and central Java (King 1993: 109). The latter's influence can be seen in the popular account about the founding of one of the earliest sultanates, Sukadana (previous part of this text), which was founded by a descendant of a prince of the Majapahit kingdom who married a local "princess." One of the former heads of the Dayak Adat Council, who stays in Kuala Ambawang (capital of Sungai Ambawang sub-district), believes that those who have a right to be members of the Dayak Adat Council in West Kalimantan are the descendants of a series of mixed marriages between the families of both the Majapahit Javanese warlords (*patih*) and the local Dayak warlords

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(*tumenggung*), during Majapahit's Gajah Mada conquest to "unite *Nusantara*" (modern day Indonesia). A group of Dayaknese called the Dayak Desa, who dwell in Tayan sub-district (100 km east of Pontianak), are believed in their popular accounts to have originated from Javanese immigration (Enthoven 1903).

According to a popular account, the Sukadana Sultanate was founded by a descendant of a prince of the Majapahit Kingdom of Java, who married a local noble in Ketapang in around 1400 AD. The Sultanate of Mempawah (140 km north of Pontianak), was founded by a Dayak warlord (*tumenggung*) by the name of Patih Gumantar, in Sadaniang Hill, Sangking, Mempawah Hulu (*hulu* = upstream)[2]. He died around 1400 AD (Thomas Tion 2000: 6-7) and left a daughter by the name of Dara Hitam (Black Maiden), who was to become very popular in accounts about the history of West Kalimantan. Some popular accounts among the Dayaknese prefer to call this sultanate the Sabukit Kingdom (*Kerajaan* Sabukit), which spanned a period from 1368 to 1680 and with Patih Gumantar as its most popular king (Nyaro 1999: 25). Kudong (1610-1680) was one of the well-known successors of Patih Gumantar. Kudong's successor, by the name of Senggaok, married a prince from the Batu Rizal Kingdom of Indragiri in South Sumatera.

The Kingdom of Sintang is said to have been founded by a Dayak couple by the name of Sabung Mangulur and Pukat Mengawang from time immemorial (Thomas Tion 2000: 6-7). One of the couple's seven children married a person called Aji Melayu (probably from Malacca) and bore a daughter (Dayang Lengkong) who was married to Patih Selatung (unknown origin). One of the descendants of the latter was known as Jubair I. Jubair I bore a daughter who became the ninth ruler and was married to Patih Logender of the Majapahit kingdom in 1385 AD. (If one couple abdicated its reign to its descendants after presumably 50 years, the first Dayak couple of Sabung Mangulur and Pukat Mengawang lived around 400 years before the

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[2] Rahman, Ja' Achmad, and Muhadi (2000: 46-47) dug further into the history of the Mempawah Sultanate, by stating that in the sixteenth century a King by the name of Ne' Rumaga was ruling the Kingdom of Bangkule Rajakng from a capital in Bahana, some 22 km from Karangan (a sub-district to date), or 94 km from Mempawah. Ne' Rumaga bore a son by the name of Patih Gumentar (Patih Gumantar in some other accounts) who became the next King of Bangkule Rajakng, with its capital in Bahana (with Dara Irang as his Queen). Patih Gumentar (for some unstated reason) moved the capital to Bukit (Hill) Kandang, later known better as Sebukit Rama.

marriage of Patih Logender of Majapahit with the daughter of Jubair I.) Other writers, for example Enthoven (1903: 672-74 cited in King 1993: 125), wrote that Sintang (and Sekadau), both of which are upstream of the Sanggau kingdom capital, was probably founded around the seventeenth century.

The Sanggau kingdom itself has an even more obscure history. Popular accounts have it that it began with a couple (of unstated origin) by the name of Dara Nante and Babai Cinga, who lived in Labai (not found in any modern map of West Kalimantan; probably a small village then and now). After a succession of reigns passed down through oral tradition, the last known ruler of the Sanggau kingdom was Panembahan Gusti Ali Akbar (1944-1956) (Thomas Tion 2000: 6-7).

Beyond the Sintang kingdom there were the smaller "states" of Silat, Suhaid, Selimbau, Jongkong, and Bunut, all with contradictory myths related to their founding. The ruling families of these states along the Kapuas River built relationships with each other through kinship and marriage (Enthoven 1903: 128, 158) and conversion took place partly through pagan leaders marrying into the families of Muslim rulers elsewhere. The capitals of these Malay states were modest in size. Van Lijnden (1851: 573) noticed that the capital of Selimbau had only around 50 households in the 1840s.

The upstream Malay rulers reckoned their power not so much in terms of territory, which was to a large degree uninhabited and economically undeveloped, but by the numbers of Dayaks under their authority and from whom they could expect tribute and taxes. Therefore, Dayak communities did, wherever possible, often move out of the reach of a Malay ruler, if he was perceived to be too exploitative (King 1993: 128). (These observations, as a word of warning, were taken and written by Christian or Catholic observers, who seemed to fail to explain why the Dayaks willingly paid tribute or tax to Muslim rulers, besides via "exploitative relationships.")

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The ability to exercise power over various surrounding populations was how uncertain and yet subordinate-superordinate relations were established. The position of the Malay settlements at the mouths of the main tributaries meant that they could control the flow of crucial trade goods. The Dayaks relied on the Malays for supplies of salt, jars, tobacco, iron, brassware, cloth, porcelain plates, pots, firearms and beads,

some of which were important prestige goods in Dayak societies. To increase their income, the sultans also encouraged entrepreneurs to engage in the collection of jungle produce (Rousseau 1990: 286) and they were given land to settle on, with titles and official positions.

Muslim-Malay rulers also skillfully arranged marriages with the leading families of neighboring Dayak communities and thus could exploit the situation of endemic hostility and feuds between different Dayak groups. For example, Abang Tajak, a Selimbau *raja*, launched raids against the unruly Malohs using friendly Dayak mercenaries (Enthoven 1903: 157-61). Rarely did the Malay rajas keep a standing army, but instead relied on the mobilization of allies and clients. They also had greater access to firearms and ammunition. The nineteenth-century Dutch reports on West Kalimantan say that the relationship between the Malays and their Dayak subjects was based mainly upon exploitation (King 1993: 129). Thus many references show the 'ruthless' and 'cunning' practices of the Malays in their trade with the 'docile' Dayaks. However, European ambitions [of conquest] could only be realized if Muslim rulers were dominated and controlled; European opinions were therefore hardly impartial in this tension between the Islamic world and European Christianity (Bassett 1980: 41, King 1993: 129).

The relations of mutual support and political interest between Malay rulers and leading Dayak families, instead of the usual theme of 'exploitation', were properly illustrated with regard to the Maloh Dayaks of the upper Kapuas (King 1993: 132). Abang Barita, the founder of the Muslim state of Bunut, was of part-Maloh descent because his father, Patih Turan, was a Maloh aristocrat who had embraced Islam when he married a woman from the Malay ruling family of Suhaid. Similarly, the Malay state of Jongkong, downstream of Bunut, was established by converted Maloh Dayaks who had separated from their relatives on the Embaloh River. The conversion process in the circumstances described above, owed much to the decisions of the native Dayaks themselves, rather than simple coercion or positive proselytizing by Malay rulers (King 1993: 133). Some Maloh aristocratic headmen must have seen that it was to their advantage to ally with Malay *rajas* and their relationship was mutually cemented by marriage. Either the *raja* would take a Dayak wife, or offer a daughter in marriage to a Dayak aristocrat.

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One reason for the conversion to Islam of native aristocrats was conflict in a Dayak village between competing and ambitious individuals. To enhance the chances of success, an aristocrat might seek an alliance with Muslim outsiders, or alternatively the loser in a power struggle might decide to express discontent with the prevailing order by moving away, marrying into Malay society and converting to Islam (King 1993: 133). Obviously Islam and Malay culture varied in significance for different individuals and groups in Dayak society. This culture provided an alternative or different set of values, behaviors and possibilities for the prestige-seeking and power conscious Dayaks, or for those who were dissatisfied with their own social and cultural conditions. In this sense it reinforced and accelerated divisions and conflicts in Dayak societies (King 1993: 134). Nevertheless the process and rate of conversion to Islam in Kalimantan was obviously affected by European intervention.

When Europeans first came into contact with the coastal communities of Kalimantan, they were confronted by a series of Muslim states which controlled the main trade routes and which dominated the movement of forest produce from the interior of the island (King 1993: 134). Islam continued to expand after the Europeans themselves expanded on this island, but gradually the European presence had an effect, both on the Muslim states and on tribal societies, particularly from the nineteenth century onwards.

Of interest, although not a major point until entering the stage of deeper analysis, was the relationship between the nomadic Punan (or Bukat Dayaks) who lived around the border of West and East Kalimantan and their close farming or Malayized Dayaks, living near the Muslim sultanates of Jongkong and Nangabunut.

These Bukats, numbering around 600, began to adopt a sedentary life at the beginning of the twentieth century, although they still depended upon wild sago (Sellato 1994: 18). Metal (for efficient felling of wild sago) and dogs (for efficient hunting), brought the nomad's into first contact with the Dayak farming groups. The Dayak groups that had no Punans to draw upon for forest products were less powerful and rich than those who did. The Dayak farmers who had Punans under their command used many strategies to attach their Punan clients to themselves, such as initiating trade with the nomads, drawing more nomad groups into trade, or maintaining a monopoly over forest products (Sellato 1994: 165).

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These economic strategies created needs among the nomads for items only the farmers could provide, such as iron axes and tobacco. Later, the nomads learned to bargain for higher returns on their products. The farming Dayaks then introduced the time-honored system of revolving credit, which allowed the farmers to keep the Punan in the position of permanent debtors to them. Political strategies included the two systems of alliance: by exchange of blood and by marriage between nomads and farmers. Through these alliances, the Punans were placed under a moral obligation to trade with specific partners, who then maintained a monopoly.

This trading relationship turned out to be one in which the farmers had every opportunity to impose their demands upon the Punans, reflecting the fluctuating demands of the downstream markets (Sellato 1994: 166). They directed the Punans toward the most lucrative products, but this direction took place at the expense of their hunting. Although some of the products in greatest demand were obtained by hunting (rhinoceros, bezoar stones, hornbill casques and feathers) the bulk of the transactions involved articles such as resins or rattans[3].

The Punans found themselves obliged to provide, in the context of strictly commercial exchange, an ever-increasing supply of forest products. But in these transactions everybody gained (Sellato 1994: 167). The farmers grew richer and the Punan too benefited economically, given the time they saved through the use of their new acquisitions. The Punans, from having been hunter-gatherers for their subsistence, then became part-time professional collectors. Over time, the relationships between the Dayak groups and the nomadic Dayak groups, as well as the relationship between the Malayized Dayak groups and the Muslims, evolved into more subtle forms as they began to create identities for classification.

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[3] The study of Sellato (1994) was done among a group of nomads with a low population, living in small bands. The Bukats were still largely hunter-gatherers. For a study that discusses the relationship among groups with a more complex means of livelihood, probably the study of Reed E. Wadley (1996) about the territorialization by the Dutch in a part of West Kalimantan's Kapuas river upstream (around Lake Kapuas, near border with Malaysia's Sarawak) would be representative. This study explains the frantic attempts to create boundaries between the groups' territories (Iban, Selimbau, Suhaid and Jongkong), whose members stubbornly defied the Dutch's maps.

In Sekadau district, for example, the older generation of the Malayized Dayaks and Dayaks, differentiated between the *Warga Air* (People of Water, Muslims) and the *Warga Atas* (People of Upstream, non-Muslims), when mentioning the two kinds of Dayaks who shared the same ancestors (D. Siyok 2003b: 24). The founders of the chiefdom of Sekadau were Patih Singa Bardat and Patih Singa Bangi, who built the capital in Kematu (recently a name of a Dayak group; but the site is not found in the modern map of West Kalimantan, made by Pedi Natasuwarna, CV. Juanda LMC 1990). Pangeran Engkong, the successor of Patih Singa Bardat and Patih Singa Bangi, moved the capital to Sekadau (now the capital of Sekadau district, 315km to the west of Pontianak). During the reign of Pangeran Engkong's successor, Pangeran Suma, Islam grew very quickly and a big mosque (*Al-Taqwa Mosque*) was built in 1804 in Mungguk, a village situated not far from the mouth of the Sekadau River where it converges with the Kapuas River. Many among the Kematu Dayaks converted to Islam. (The incumbent Governor of West Kalimantan, who has served since 2003, is claimed by the Dayaks to be one of these *Senganan, Warga Air* or Malayized Dayaks of Kematu.) One of the priests who wrote about the Dayaks of Mualang claimed that the Dayaks who converted to Islam and became Warga Air were granted privileges by the Muslim rulers. They were freed from taxes and allowed to study in schools. In West Kalimantan, these Malayized (or Islamized) Dayaks are called *Senganan* (in the districts upstream of Kapuas), *Sengonan* or *Orang Laut* (Ketapang district, port city), or *Urakng Laut* (in Landak, Pontianak, Bengkayang districts). Muller (n.d, cited in Pasti 2003: 125) boldly claims that of Kalimantan's population of 12 million, only about one fourth are classified as Dayaks - the rest are Malays (and ninety percent of the so-called Malays, all of the Muslim faith, are actually Islamized Dayaks).

The Dayaks who became Muslim experienced some profound changes. Usually it resulted in a change in ethnic affiliation and over time a re-designation as Malay (King 1993: 130). During the transitional period, one would find some communities, groups, families, or individuals combining traits from both Muslim-Malay and Dayak cultures. The longhouse domicile was abandoned in favor of a single-family dwelling. Alcohol and pork consumption ceased. Usually the converts stopped their shifting cultivation altogether in order to trade, carry out inland or coastal fishing, or go into administration and small-scale industries.

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The Dayaks (nomadic or settled, but the former more likely) who resisted this alleged “exploitation” by their farming counterparts not unusually fled the exploitation to move somewhere else. Sellato (1994: 137) even claimed [with some qualifications] that with enemies or neutral groups, the nomads’ usual attitude was one of withdrawal. A habit apparently common among hunting groups is that they seldom defend the borders of their territories (Service 1966: 30). The Punan avoid hostile interaction with their neighbors, keeping away from the zone of contact between their lands. They prefer to retreat from their enemies rather than to kill them, even when they might be able to commit such killings with impunity (Urquhart 1951: 501).

Sellato (1994: 137), however, qualified these assertions on two points. The first concerns the nomads’ real vulnerability. Although it is probably true that the nomad warriors are untouchable when they are away from their home base, even raiding the farming people as some cases have shown. However, the bands are very vulnerable when attacked at their home base by groups of warriors, nomads or farmers (see Elshout 1926: 243); for example, there are many references to massacres of the Punan by headhunters all across Kalimantan (Deshon 1901, Hildebrand 1982, Rutten 1916, etc). The impunity or immunity of Punan in their forests is therefore largely mythical, and their suspicion and withdrawal entirely justified (Sellato 1994: 138).

The second point concerns the ability of the nomads to fight for their territory. If the interaction with the “enemy” is static, that is, when the hostility takes place with no desire to take over nomad territories, the nomads keep their distance from the limit of their territories and from possible headhunting raids. In the case of a dispute in 1865 between the [Islamicized] Dayaks of Suhaid and the [hunter-gatherer] Ibans living near the Kapuas Lake (at the border between West and East Kalimantan, not far from Sarawak border), the Suhaids took some rattans to a place that was later claimed by the Iban as their land (Wadley 1996: 97). The Suhaids excused themselves with the permission given by their king (chief) and with the fact that some of them had stayed in that place during peaceful times in the past. The dispute’s resolution was not clear, but the author (Wadley 1996: 97) learnt first, that each group needed a map of territories of each others making and, second, the colonial Dutch maintained an

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assumption that local [Muslim] rulers were greedy, profiteering extortionists. (Probably for the limited amount of rattans taken by the Suhaids, the Ibans did not pursue the conflict further.)

In cases where the farming group tried to take over the nomad's territory for their own farming needs, the nomads apparently tried to defend it. The Bukat of Baleh, for example, resisted the invasion of the Iban's pioneering new farmlands, over every foot of ground and for a period of several decades, until finally they gave up the struggle when they were decimated (Sellato 1994: 138). The Lisum, Beketan, Punan Aput, and other groups of Sarawak, also took up arms against the Iban, waging a guerilla war of rearguard actions, even retaliating against Iban incursions while they slowly retreated.

One might notice that this resistance is the work of isolated local bands directly affected by outside aggression, rather than a coalition of all the bands within the nomad groups, joining to force the enemy out of their territory. It is a *limited* and *local* response to an *immediate* and *concrete* threat and bands not directly concerned *do not mobilize* against, what is for them, only a potential danger (Sellato 1994: 138, italics added). The possibility of an expansion of nomad territory through the conquest of farmers' land appears only in one case (Sellato 1994: 138). This case was of the Kereho in Busang, in which joint military action by different nomad groups of the Muller mountains was taken against the Ot Danum of the Busang and was possible only with the direct or indirect intervention of the Aoheng and Seputan, who were already sedentary and were the masterminds of this conquest. This background provides the stage for the next phase of socio-political control by the strongest sultanates of all the Muslim sultanates in West Kalimantan.

Although most Western scholars viewed the relationships between the coastal Malay-Sultans and their Dayak counterparts as mainly exploitative, there are some reasons to also claim that the inclusion of the Dayaks into the Malay-dominated coastal society, took place through social relationships (intermarriage), religious conversions, trading relationships, or a mixture of these. The Dayaks themselves always retained the right to alter their allegiance to other groups, or simply to migrate away deeper into the upstream forest. After exposing the ramifications of the forms of relationship between the upstream Dayaks and the coastal Malays, the next section

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reveals how the Dutch learned about this complicated situation and then manipulated it for their own advantage.

2.2 The Justification of Colonial Rule through Involvement of the Governing Local Elite

This section shows how the Dutch rode on the back of the well-known ambition of the first Sultan of Pontianak in order to rise above the rest of the Sultanates in the province. Noticing that the Sultan of Pontianak had been enjoying acceptance among the Dayaks as their legitimate ruler, the Dutch officers decided to use this legitimacy to stamp their authority on the Dayak population through the Sultan. Using and acknowledging the Sultans of Pontianak as the ultimate rulers, the Dutch were able to launch what is commonly known as indirect rule, a method at which the Dutch were acknowledged as masters. This method, however, cannot be treated as the general method used and maintained over the whole of Kalimantan Island. The case of Southern Kalimantan, for example (see Klinken 2004: 107-128), whose Malay sultanate of Banjarmasin was abolished at the end of the Banjarmasin War (1856-1863), shows how the Dutch debated among themselves whether to use indirect rule (through bureaucratization of the Dayak Adat communities), or direct rule (direct administration by Dutch residents). The later agreement by the Dutch administration and the missionaries to protect the Dayaks from Muslim influence, through "nurturing the Dayaks in isolation", unintentionally created a new kind of strong urban Dayak middle class in the 1920s to 1930s (Klinken 2004), which characterized the history of colonialism in Southern Kalimantan, as different to that of West Kalimantan. The coming of the Chinese, who were later 'racialized' as "Foreigner East Indian", was quickly manipulated by the Dutch who turned the Chinese into proxy rulers among the upstream Dayaks, who were unreachable by the colonialists.

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The fundamental law of the Indies (Article 118) defined the meaning of indirect rule as "in so far as the circumstances admit it, the native population will be left under the immediate leadership of its own heads; appointed or recognized by the government" (Emerson 1964: 412). Similarly, the recognition of native societies and institutions and the aim of developing them along their own lines was a cardinal

principle of Dutch colonial policy (Vandenbosch 1941). Pontianak, the present capital of West Kalimantan province, was a sultanate founded by a descendant of an Arabic Muslim teacher, who married a Dayak (converted to Islam) and served as a royal servant in the Mempawah sultanate court. Born in 1742, Syarif Abdurrahman, the son of the Muslim teacher, showed a talent for sailing to and trading (spice) with Siak and Palembang on Sumatra Island (Nurcahyani 2000: 14). Syarif Abdurrahman also defeated France battleships and Chinese ships in Banjarmasin (South Kalimantan). The Sultan of Banjarmasin allowed him to be a son-in-law and assigned him the royal title of Pangeran (Prince) Syarif Abdurrahman Nur Alam (Light of the Universe).

Jealousy from the local elites in the Banjarmasin Sultanate forced Syarif Abdurrahman to return in 1768 to Mempawah Sultanate[4], the court of his mother. Another assignment fell to him to clear the upstream Kapuas of the pirates who had stolen spices and diamonds from the Dutch trade expedition (Nurcahyani 2000: 14). In November 1771 Syarif Abdurrahman, as the Sultan of Mempawah, brought 15 battleships with Bugis crews, to comb the delta of the Kapuas River for signs of pirate settlements. Finally the pirate village was found and annihilated, at sites between Batu Layang and Nipah Kuning.

Noticing the strategic site where the Kapuas River met the Landak River as ideal for a new port, Syarif Abdurrahman (refer to Appendix A for his short history) cleaned the forest site to build a new settlement. After cleaning the forest of forest-dwelling ghosts called *Puntianak* (or *Kuntilanak*) by shooting cannons towards the forest, he gave the name Pontianak to the new site. The date of the opening of the new site was 7 January 1772 (Veth's version), after which a little mosque and a simple palace (*kraton*) were built. The year 1771, or the date of 20 Rajab 1185 H (Arabic Lunar Calendar), is therefore known as the birth date of Pontianak Sultanate (Nurcahyani 2000: 15). Six years later in 1777 (8 Sya'ban 1192 H), the sultans from

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[4] The process of assimilation, for the Malay-speaking groups to be accepted as "indigenous" groups of West Kalimantan, had begun since the Malays from Malacca and Sumatra (and later from Arabia, Bugis, Semit, Saudi Arabia, India and Pakistan) had come to spread Islam. These people spread Islam first along the Sambas River (leading to the center of the later Sambas Sultanate), then Singkawang, Mempawah and Pontianak along the Kapuas River. From Sungai Landak the spread of Islam continued upstream to Tayan, Sintang and Nanga Pinoh. This process took place between 1550 AD and 1800 AD (Nurcahyani 2000: 44).

the other coastal sultanates in West Kalimantan attended the crowning of Sultan Syarif Abdurrahman of Pontianak Sultanate.

After the new sultanate gained a foothold, many Dayaks from the interior joined the new sultanate and built new settlements along the Ambawang River. The first five groups who came along the Ambawang River settled in Kampung Durian (20 families), Cabang Kiri (40 families, led by Macan Sumit), Simpang Kanan (60 families led by Tumenggung Maja), Kampung Pasak (80 families under the leadership of Mangku Kipang) and Pancaroba (120 families) (Nurcahyani 2000: 16, citing Lontaan 1975: 232-3). Nurcahyani [2000: 16] provides information that these last 120 families settled around Pancaroba [village], Ngabang and Landak. However this information is unlikely to be accurate given the apparent distance between these three places.

The protection by the Pontianak Sultanate over the trade routes along the Landak and Little Kapuas rivers allowed commercial activities to flourish. Growing in strength from the increasing revenues made from the trade, the Sultan of Pontianak planned an expansion into other sultanates, among which the Sultanate of Sanggau was the first potential victim (Nurcahyani 2000: 17). (Rahman, Ja' Achmad and Muhadi [2000: 86-7] and King [1993: 138-39] provided more accurate information that the closest rival and neighboring states of the Pontianak sultanates, were the Landak, Mempawah and Sukadana sultanates.) Sanggau begged for help from the Dutch (through its trading agent the *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* or VOC or East Indies Company), but to no avail.

A decision from Batavia (Jakarta today) was announced on 26 December 1778. This said that the supreme ruler over Pontianak and Sanggau sultanates was Sultan Syarif Abdurrahman of Pontianak Sultanate (Rahman, Achmad and Muhadi 2000: 87-8). The next victims of the sultanate's expansion were the Landak and Sukadana sultanates. Given to the Dutch by the Sultan of Banten (West Java) in 26 March 1778, by an agreement made in Diamont Fort (Banten, West Java), Landak and Sukadana sultanates placed under the auspices of the Pontianak sultanate. In July 1779, the VOC sent Willem Adriaan Palm as the VOC Commissar on Trade and Rule, to Pontianak. Commissar Palm brought along the text of a humiliating agreement

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("*Acte van Investiture*", or Act of Occupation), to be signed by Sultan Syarif Abdurrahman of the Pontianak sultanate[5].

At around the time of this turmoil, Chinese communities were also flourishing in West Kalimantan. Attracted by gold, diamonds, silver and fertile land, a group of 100 Chinese families from Canton province and led by Lo Fong arrived in Pontianak in 1772. This group was warmly welcomed by the previous arrivals from the Teo Chiu clan, who lived in Siantan village in Pontianak (La Ode 1997: 109). Looking for more gold, the group under Lo Fong moved to Mandor (88 km to the north of Pontianak; to date the capital of Mandor sub-district). After a series of successful conquests over the previously established Chinese gold mining trading groups (*kongsi*s) around Mandor, the Lo Fong group became the strongest gold mining group in 1777. Long Fo gave himself the title 'Big Leader' (*Tai Ko*) and sent tributes (*upeti*) directly to the Chinese Emperor, instead of the local sultanates. Later, in 1795, he died, leaving unfinished the dream of building a Chinese kingdom outside of the Chinese motherland (La Ode 1997: 111).

[5] The Act of Occupation was written, containing 18 Articles: (1) the VOC lends Pontianak and Sanggau to the Sultan of Pontianak, (2) the VOC decides the successor of the Sultan of Pontianak, (3) the VOC oversees the appointment of the Sultan's ministers, (4) the General Governor in Batavia oversees the building of forts in Pontianak, (5) the Sultan must permit and assist building of VOC forts, (6) the Sultan must return deserters amongst the Dutch soldiers, (7) the Dutch currency in Batavia must be also used in Pontianak, (8) the Sultan cannot levy taxes for imports and exports, (9) the VOC is the sole collector of diamonds, gold, spice, birds nests, fur, sago and at preset prices, (10) the people of Pontianak and Sanggau are forbidden to plant spices and coffee, (11) the Sultan is not allowed to trade. Traders in Pontianak and Sanggau must bring licenses from the VOC, (12) the Sultan's wives and children staying in Banjarmasin sultanate must be returned back to Pontianak, (13) the VOC is responsible for defending Pontianak in the case of attack from other forces or sultanates, (14) the Sultan must assist the VOC in fighting her enemies, (15) the Chinese in Pontianak and Sanggau are under the auspices of the VOC, (16) the Chinese who converted to Islam remain under VOC surveillance; and only the Muslim children of these Chinese are under the Sultan's auspices, (17) immigrants, either Javanese, Malay, Balinese, Bugis, or Chinese, can only stay in Pontianak and Sanggau with the VOC's permission, (18) the Sultan must hold a ceremony of "Acceptance of Lending", where everyone must vow allegiance to the VOC, the General Governor and Prince van Oranje and Nassau (Rachman, Ja' Achmad, Muhadi 2000: 95-6).

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The first group of Chinese to work as gold miners under the jurisdiction of the Sultan of Sambas (220 km to the north of Pontianak) came under the invitation of the Sultan in 1760 (La Ode 1997: 111). These groups later rebelled against the Sultan and took over all management and work in the mines. Under the principle of sanguinity (*ius sanguinitas*), used by the Chinese government to classify its citizens, these overseas Chinese were treated by them as mainland Chinese. After 1843, the Dutch government controlled the Chinese through a mechanism of granting the rank of *Kapitan Demang* (*kapitan* is the Dutch equivalent for English captain; *demang* is a Javanese word for a sub-district leader) to the heads of the Chinese settlements who, in turn, had to pay an annual tribute of *f*20,000 (*gulden or* guilders; NLG, Netherlands Guilder) to the Dutch (Vleming 1926: 256).

The relationship between the Dutch government and the Chinese communities, especially those outside of the province capital, were not smooth all the time. In 1817, 1819 and 1823 some groups of Chinese launched retaliatory attacks against the Dutch forces in Pontianak for the latter's campaigns against the smuggling of *candu* (opium) into Mandor, West Kalimantan. In the 1819 attack, which was repelled by the Dutch forces, the rebel leader by the name of Kapitan Tjap offered an apology and pledged allegiance to the Sultan of Pontianak, excusing the attack as mainly against the Dutch instead of the Sultan (Veth 1856: 80-81 cited in Nurchayani 2000: 61). Afterwards, the Dutch revoked its license to all of the Chinese *kongsi* in Pontianak and other places and put them under its direct control.

The Chinese activities in gold and diamond mining also provoked enmities and rivalries among the Dayaks. In their expansive activities, the Chinese often needed to attack Dayak settlements for wealth, slaves or territory (Nurcahyani 2000: 62). The biggest conflicts between the Chinese and the Dayaks took place in Landak (now Landak District, covering Mandor) in 1841 and 1846. The Dutch was forced to intervene through the hand of the *Pangeran Bendahara* (Officer of Kingdom's Treasury) of Pontianak Sultanate, who was largely respected along the Kapuas and Landak rivers. On 20 May 1844, the Chinese *kongsi* under Lo Fong was forced to pay its unpaid tribute of *f* 4,000 to the Dutch government (Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia 1973: 218).

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Around 1847, another conflict took place between the Chinese, under the *kongsi* of Tai Kong (centered in Montrado), and the Malays from Mempawah sultanate. Three Malays from Mempawah badly mauled two Chinese. The retaliatory expedition however, which was planned by the Chinese to go from Montrado to Mempawah, was successfully stopped by the Dutch. The Dutch arrested the three Malays from Mempawah and managed to deliver a death sentence to one of them. However, the other two were freed against Dutch wishes, because of their relationship with the Sultan of Mempawah (National Archive or *Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia* 1973: 221).

The growing uncertainties around gold mining activities in Mandor and Montrado, turned the Chinese to trading and farming around the mid-1850s. They slowly moved closer to Pontianak, with its big ports and markets attracting traders from Indonesia ("*Nusantara*", or "islands in between" at that time) as well as from foreign lands. After that, rubber became the main, profitable market commodity and so the Chinese established their positions as rubber traders in Pontianak and West Kalimantan's upland territories (Vleming 1926: 257). To run the city administration, the Dutch brought many Javanese who had had administration experience in Javanese cities.

Besides managing the plantations and farms (rubber and coconut), the Javanese were also good farmers needed by the Dutch. Thus the door for immigration into West Kalimantan was wide open for the Javanese (or generally other 'outer' islands). After 1905, the Dutch government launched a program called "*kolonisasi*", or colonization, intended to solve the problem of poverty and lack of farm lands in Java. The program was able to move 1.22 million people from Java to other islands, from 1905 to 1979 (Warsito 1984: vi). The Madurese who came from Madura, a small island on the northern side of East Java province, arrived in West Kalimantan after 1902. In West Kalimantan, their population by 1980 was 62,135 people, or 2.5 percent of the total province population (Sudagung 2001: 66).

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Well known for their perseverance and hard work, the earliest Madurese in West Kalimantan worked in the forest, cutting logs and turning the land into rubber or coconut plantations under the "masters" (*majikan*). If they had no money to pay the transportation costs, mainly by sea, somebody would pay the costs in Pontianak port

and so become their master. Their masters, usually Bugis, Malays, or those of Arab descent, paid them either *f* 1.5 (guilder) per month (with which the Madurese freed themselves later), or a share (master paid half, worker paid half). After they freed themselves from their masters, the Madurese worked together with their own people to clear more forests. However, as time went by, this system of "ransomed" migration gradually disappeared. The later Madurese who came to West Kalimantan, usually went through an easier process to begin their lives, because the pioneering Madurese who had had some success were able to assist them (Sudagung 2001: 81-82).

The Madurese who now live in Lingga village are most likely the descendants of the earliest Madurese who arrived in the 1930s in Pasak village, the southern neighbor of Lingga (in Sungai Ambawang sub-district). The Javanese, mostly from Central Java, East Java and Jogjakarta, can claim a deeper acquaintance with Kalimantan history. The Sultanate of Sukadana (Ketapang, 350 km south of Pontianak) was founded, according to a local legend, by a prince of a castaway Javanese king. The prince, named Prabu Jaya, was prepared by King Brawijaya (the second king of Majapahit Kingdom)[6] to replace him, but the prince's brothers sabotaged the plan and spread an incurable skin disease to him. Prabu Jaya was then expelled to Ketapang (West Kalimantan). He then recovered, after a kind of local fish known as *a paten* licked his skin. After that, he met a local princess named Putri Junjung Buih around 1400 AD and she bore three princes. One of these princes founded the Sukadana sultanate, the earliest sultanate known in West Kalimantan. This sultanate faced defeat against the Sultanate of Pontianak under Sultan Syarif Abdurrahman (with the assistance of the Dutch) in 1786 (Thomas Tion 2000: 6-7) and its sultan (Kamaluddin) moved the Sultanate capital further south to Ketapang.

The height of trading activity in Pontianak, under the control of the Dutch East India Company, was reached in 1843 and 1850 when the tonnage of traded goods

[6] Majapahit (with its capital in Mojokerto city of East Java) was the last strong Hindu-Buddhist kingdom in Java, before the coming of Islam. It spanned from around 1294 A.D. (with the rise of King Kertajasa Jayawerdhana) to 1478 A.D. (defeated by the Islam Kingdom of Demak). Its most glorious time came under King Sri Rajasanagara and his most able general, Gajah Mada (around 1300 to 1370 AD), who was claimed as being able to unite a group of islands about the size of modern Indonesia (including the Philippines). Gajah Mada was also believed to be a great Javanese general, who once arrived in West Kalimantan and waged battles against local warlords.

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between Pontianak and foreign ports alone (not with other port cities in West Kalimantan), reached 5,020 tons and 5,049 tons respectively (Veth 1854-56: 20 cited in Nurcahyani 2000: 89-92). (See Table 2.1 for trading tonnage to and from Pontianak port.)

Table 2.1 Ships and Tonnage to and from Pontianak port, 1843-1850.

Year	From Europe		To Europe		From Indonesian Cities		To Indonesian Cities	
	Ship #	Tons	Ship #	Tons	Ship #	Tons	Ship #	Tons
1843	16	1,561	19	1,888	53	720	61	580
1844	23	2,359	18	1,850	54	687	45	533
1845	25	2,811	32	3,348	44	386	56	642
1846	18	1,663	24	2,204	51	709	50	707
1847	24	2,125	20	2,038	62	831	61	853
1848	14	1,248	19	1,475	33	450	43	884
1849	22	2,026	17	1,746	53	653	60	699
1850	16	1,580	18	1,624	62	1,032	67	822

Source: Nurcahyani (2000).

This hiatus in 1850 can be explained by the fact that after 1850, the balance between territorial revenue and expenditure in the Dutch Indies (Indonesia), was upset by a large rise in military expenditure (Fasseur 1992: 157). Government revenue in 1849 from land rent, tax farms, import and export duties, the salt monopoly, as well as various smaller revenues, amounted to more that 34 million guilders and expenditure for the Indies administration (excluding that for the cultivation system) was approximately 27.5 million guilders. By 1858, this surplus of 6.5 million guilders had turned into a deficit of more than 3.5 million guilders, because territorial revenues had risen to almost 43 million guilders, whereas actual government expenditures had risen to about 46.5 million (van Bosse 1862: 130). A sweeping transformation in the society of subsistence peasants, with limited access to the global market for their forest products, then took place between 1870 and 1940 (Steinberg 1971: 211).

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In the 1860s after the arrival of the steamship with its cheap bulk transportation, the Southeast Asian export industry developed quickly, due to some general features of the "pre-modern" Southeast Asian economy: a sparse population, barter-dominated exchanges, taxes in labor and in kind, little useful currency and credit and with self-sufficient economies loosely associated by provinces and kingdoms whose common bonds were more cultural and social, than economic. On the eve of the export boom, the willingness and ability of most peasants to assume new economic roles in Southeast Asian countries, was very limited. The peasants were settled in a subsistence way of life, with enough land to produce most of what they needed, bartering a few necessities like salt and fish and bargaining on fairly even terms against the demands of the elites in their societies (Steinberg 1971: 212-13). Most of them were also subject to *corvée* labor, or attached to patrons as clients or debt-bondsmen, which further restricted their economic mobility.

Throughout Southeast Asia, the peasantry's first response to this change was smallholder production of export crops, sometimes in their home villages and on forest land in the vicinity, or in a new holding on a nearby agricultural frontier. This was a swift and massive response, because the requirements needed to change peasant practices and economic values were very minimal. Planting familiar crops like rice, coconuts, rubber and tea was a natural extension of the peasants' established subsistence agriculture. In 1870, only a very few peasants were willing to leave their villages to work for wages in plantations, or in the cities, and this situation lasted right up until around 1940 (Steinberg 1971: 213). This limited willingness to respond to the opportunities opened by the growing markets for tropical export commodities also applied to Southeast Asians of all other classes beside the peasantry. This opened room for immigrant entrepreneurs, such as the Chinese, Indians and Europeans, to play roles of unprecedented importance in the societies of Southeast Asia (Steinberg 1971: 215).

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Malaysian plantations were the first to respond to the sudden rise in world demand for rubber after 1900, followed shortly after by those in the Dutch Indies (Indonesia today). In 1929, plantations from these two countries exported almost 40 percent of the world's rubber but a decade later, around one million smallholders in Sumatra, Malaya and Borneo had more than four million acres of mature rubber trees.

This swing to smallholder rubber cultivation can be explained by the advantages of rubber, in terms of its ecological, economic and social value for subsistence peasants[7]. In West Kalimantan, the Chinese responded quickly to this new trading opportunity by migrating upriver (Nanga Pinoh, Bunut and Putus Sibau) after 1872, for gold mining and trade (Heidhues 2003: 136). Colonial officials noticed this trend, because traders who moved away from the coast were also leaving the protection of the colonial authorities. The Dayaks easily entered into commercial relations with the Chinese, referred as *sobat* (from the Arabic *sohib,* or close friend), who trustingly paid the Dayaks in advance with salt, earthenware, tobacco, *arak* (local rice wine) and other necessities the Dayaks greatly liked. The Dutch quickly took advantage of this, by directly governing the Chinese (and erecting Dutch stations) beyond the influence of the usual Muslim-Malay sultans.

This period from 1900 to 1930 brought relative prosperity for the exporters of West Kalimantan and Southeast Asian raw materials, as seen in Table 2.2. The dependence of native peasants on imported consumer goods and rice, offered the Chinese traders ample opportunities. The distribution of imports and the collection of most exports remained in Chinese hands, despite controls imposed by European trading concerns (Heidhues 2003: 141).

Dutch officials also noticed that the presence of the Chinese trading network in the interior, saved the Dayak from taking inferior food when the local rice harvest failed. The outsider's worries about indebtedness among the Dayaks notwithstanding, the system worked well in order to bring the Dayak's necessities to their hands. With Chinese "secret societies" and direct links to Singapore, West Kalimantan was one of

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[7] The rubber tree is very well adapted to the poor soils and fierce botanical competition of Southeast Asian forests. While waiting for their seedlings to mature and in bad times when rubber prices were low, peasants could live as before on their wet rice or swidden. (Peasant export production needed middlemen, usually Chinese merchants, to transport the rubber latex to the market.) Rubber was also ideal in social terms, for subsistence peasants venturing into a cash economy. Although some could hire share-tappers to assist at peak periods, nearly all the million or so smallholders of the 1930s owned just a few acres of trees, which they operated with the help of relatives.

the five Indies residencies that traded least with Java between 1924 and 1933 (Zondervan 1928: 499).

Table 2.2 Trends in the Export/ GDP Ratio 1901-1938 (percentage)

Year	**NEI**	Thailand	Philippines	Vietnam	Burma
1901	12	n.a(*)	28 (1902)	19	30
1906	16	n.a	n.a	16	42
1911	17	17 (1913)	n.a	18	41
1916	22	n.a	32 (1918)	18	35
1921	16	n.a	n.a	20	47
1926	26	22 (1929)	n.a	25	36
1931	16	n.a	n.a	14	40
1936	17	n.a	n.a	21	50
1938	17	25	34	22	48

(*)n.a: not available
Sources: NEI (Netherlands East Indies or Indonesia): export data from Booth (2004).

Related to the success of the Chinese in the West Kalimantan interior, Heidhues (2003: 144) noticed two transformations taking place in the traditional trade in forest product during the nineteenth century. First, the Dutch limited by contract the rights of Malay rulers to collect taxes and tribute from the Dayaks and this greatly weakened the Malay rulers. Second, the demand for forest products on the international markets increased greatly.

Dutch inventiveness was demonstrated, as they were able to apply the principle of indirect/direct rule at different times and places, and under a bewildering variety of forms and manifestations. In West Kalimantan, the Dutch rode on the back of the ambition of the strongest sultan (the First Sultan of Pontianak Sultanate), in order to expand their influence deeper into the other Muslim-Malay sultanates and their Malay subjects. However, the Dayaks, deemed more appropriate for “protection” from the Muslim Sultans’ proselytizing influence, were nurtured in isolation through the missionaries and also through direct rule, under a Dutch resident leadership. The Chinese gold miners, perceived as rebellious, were ruled through appointed Chinese who bore the awarded Dutch rank of “Kapitan Demang” and also received support in return for an annual tribute.

This arrangement left the migrants from Java and Madura islands to fill the required labor for the coastal cities. The limited economic mobility among the

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subsistence peasants (the Dayaks), who were bonded as clients or bondsmen to their societal elites, constrained their chances at grabbing the opportunities offered by the newly opened global market for tropical and sub-tropical products, made accessible through steamships (since the 1860s). The subsistence peasants, however, were able to maximize their opportunity to produce a globally demanded product (rubber), while maneuvering within their limitations. The social and cultural values held among the other classes (such as servicemen, noblemen and kings) similarly stopped them from accessing the global market's opportunities. Thus, most of the distribution functions for trading in raw materials within the export economy were taken away by the experienced Chinese.

This section has revealed the general economic, social and political transformation that took place in West Kalimantan, from 1771 to the 1930s and which began with a series of rather turbulent events in which the Dutch gained supremacy and ended with relative security among the Dayaks. The larger global markets created after the invention of the steamship in the 1860s and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1898, were also ignored by the aristocrat Dayaks, who thought materials had nothing to do with their aristocratic pride. The lower classes among the Dayaks, who lived around the tumultuous district, nevertheless grabbed their chance for economic opportunities in the newly opened global port of Pontianak. Thus began an epoch of rule, whereby the Dutch mastered the provinces population through subalternization of the indigenous groups.

2.3 The Dutch's Direct/Indirect Rule and its Subalternizing Effects over the Indigenous Groups

This section explains how the arrival and subsequent rule of the colonial forces deepened the claimed ethnic-based social "divisions", brought by the Malay-Muslims ruling over the coastal or river trading ports. If the Malay sultans tried to incorporate the Dayaks into their influence through social, economic and cultural means; such as inter-marriage, proselytizing Dayaks into Muslims and the trading of forest products, the Dutch had a larger repertoire of control than the Malay Muslims in the form of an army and weaponry. The previous social divisions gained a new momentum shortly after the Dutch unleashed the means they held, but that the Malays

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lacked. The argument of this section therefore, is to emphasize the obvious linkages between the colonial governmentality and its subalternizing effects over the colony's population and between the "natives" and the "settlers" through war- and peace-making, both of which planted the seeds for the future use of violence.

After the Dutch gained control over Pontianak port, the biggest port on the delta of the longest river on the island, with a series of pacts with its sultan in 1779, the difficult environment of the island, with a scattered population, still posed a big challenge for them. They were still only one set of traders competing with others, including natives such as the Malays, Javanese and Bugis and outsiders like the Chinese and Indians (van Leur 1955 cited in King 1993:135). Before the Dutch and British gained unrivalled ascendancy in Kalimantan, local processes and events such as conversion to Islam, the establishment of Muslim states, native migrations and the eventual settlement of most of the island were the most significant.

The Portuguese, the first Europeans to establish commercial relations with Kalimantan from their Malacca base, visited Brunei for camphor (their main interests were spice in Eastern Indonesia). The Spanish, who were wary of the dangerous influence of the Muslim sultanate of Brunei and who visited the southern parts (Sulu islands) of the Philippine islands, attacked Brunei in April 1578 and briefly controlled the port city (Brown 1970: 142). Despite this struggle for power, in the sixteenth and the early part of seventeenth century, no outside power succeeded in establishing a permanent dominion over Brunei, or indeed any other part of Borneo (Irwin 1967: 4). This was a task left to the Dutch and the British.

The first Dutch fleets of the East Indies Company (*Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*, VOC) arrived in Brunei (Brunei Darussalam Sultanate to date) in December 1600 to January 1601. The Dutch's main interests, however, were the pepper exports from Banjarmasin (South Kalimantan) and gaining a foothold in Bantam (Banten), West Java. Dutch attempts to establish a firm commercial presence (gold and diamonds) on the west coast of Kalimantan, failed. A factory built in Sambas during the early part of the seventeenth century and a settlement at Sukadana (in the southern part of West Kalimantan) were floundered. To ensure that the sultans complied with the terms of the trade contracts was extremely difficult, as the Dutch

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had no resources or manpower to support a permanent military presence. In 1698 the Dutch sided with the Sultan of Landak to defeat Sukadana.

The internal corruption and poor administration of the Dutch's VOC (along with more problems in Europe, competition from other European powers and the temporary occupation of East Indies by the British) led to its collapse. As a result, any further initiatives in Kalimantan were stalled until the latter part of the nineteenth century (Ricklefs 1981). The British, nevertheless, who had turned their main interests towards India (for tea, raw cotton and opium), viewed the northern coast of Borneo as part of an important trading route between China and India (carrying silk, silver, opium, lead, iron, gunpowder and cannons). Therefore for the British, the interest in the Kalimantan coast was to protect their shipping trade routes from China to India, without the need to encumber themselves with the administration of its territories (King 1993: 141).

The Dutch viewed Kalimantan differently in terms of its relation to Java and hoped to make it part of the Dutch Indies (Irwin 1967: 10). Thus the Dutch colonial government was the direct agent of incorporation in southern [and western] Kalimantan, while the north was brought into the British imperial system through indirect means. When the Dutch regained possession from the British's short interregnum in 1816, they quickly reasserted their earlier claims to sovereignty on the southern and western Borneo coasts. The new Dutch Commissioner for Borneo, Mr. Jacob d'Arnaud van Bockholtz, reclaimed the acknowledgement of Dutch sovereignty by the sultans of Pontianak and Sambas in 1818. Henceforth, Dutch Residents were assigned to Pontianak, Sambas, and Banjarmasin, and Assistant Residents to Mempawah and Landak (King 1993: 141).

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The short but strong resistance of a Javanese prince in Central Java (Prince Diponegoro, 1825-30) sapped the Dutch strength needed to expand its domination elsewhere. When their capacities and resources improved again from the mid-nineteenth century, the Dutch prioritized their claims to sovereignty in Kalimantan and established an environment for trade and commerce in order to realize profits. Then, the traditional political systems (Muslim-Malay states, traditional bands of the Dayaks) which had sustained piratical raiding and inter-tribal feuding and headhunting, had to be transformed (King 1993: 142). With a growth in the notion of

a European ‘civilizing’ mission, perceived barbaric institutions such as slavery and severing heads could not be tolerated.

Christian missionaries had always been an essential part of the Western enterprise, in company with administrators and traders (King 1993: 142). The introduction of churches and priests was not just guided by religious and ethical aims; political and motives were also at work. Religion conversion was claimed by the King as an effective means to undermine the power-base of the Muslim sultanates, which would subsequently lose followers and their access to labor resources (1993: 142-43). Conversions were also an important way of establishing law and order, of reducing slavery and headhunting, and of socializing European subjects into the culture of the dominating power. Military action alone would have been insufficient to pacify the hostile tribes.

The Dutch’s interest in Kalimantan was reinvigorated significantly by the activities of an English adventurer, James Brooke, at the Sarawak River in 1839 and in order to give some advantage to British interests (Crisswell 1978). The political position of Brunei had been weakened by the rise of Sulu (southern Philippines), Dutch action on the west coasts and a rebellion of Dayaks and Malays in Sarawak. Brooke intervened to quash the rebellion on the side of the Brunei governor of this district, Pengiran Muda Hashim, in return for his installation as Governor of Sarawak (in 1841) (or more popularly known as the “White Rajah”). By 1842, Brooke had obtained the rights over the territories in what is now the western region of Sarawak and in return for an annual tribute to the Sultan (Omar Ali Saifuddin II).

Despite Brooke’s request to establish a Crown Colony, Sarawak was only granted Protectorate status in 1888 (Brooke was appointed British confidential agent in Borneo by the Foreign Office in 1844) (King 1993: 144). James Brooke and his successor and nephew, Charles, had swallowed up Brunei possessions along the coasts of Borneo by the 1880s, subdued the rebellious regions of the Skrang and Saribas during the 1850s and controlled sago-producing regions between the Rejang rivers and Bintulu in the 1860s. In October 1863, a great peace-making venture was sponsored by the Brooke administration and concluded at Kanowit on the Rejang river between the Ibans of the lower Rejang and the Kayans of the interior (Freeman 1970: 134 cited by King 1993: 144). The Kayans thereafter accepted Brooke’s rule

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and the Kayans and Kenyahs of the Baram area came under Brooke's control (Rousseau 1990: 32).

To forestall these activities, the Dutch attempted to make arrangements with the Sultan of Brunei in the 1830s but failed. In 1844, the Dutch appointed A.L. Weddik as the Commissioner and Inspector for Borneo, Riau and Lingga in order to establish Dutch sovereign rights there. The Dutch promoted fresh initiatives to renegotiate contracts and treaties with local rulers, secure law and order and encourage scientific exploration into the interior (Enthoven 1903). The Dutch expanded attempts to negotiate treaties with the east coast, which comprised of a series of sultanates: Bulungan, Gunung Tabur, Sambaliung, Kutei and Pasir.

In 1846 Weddik, as the first Governor of Borneo and its dependencies, decided to establish a unified administration with the capital at Sintang (some 300 miles into the interior). Meant to warn off the expansionist Rajah Brooke to the north, this move was still premature, because the Dutch still did not have the resources, infrastructure or transportation links, to sustain a capital and a significant administration presence in the interior. Therefore in 1848, the administrative divisions were divided into the *Westerafdeeling* (Western Division) with its seat at Pontianak and the *Zuider-en Ooster-afdeeling* (Southern and Eastern Division), with its capital at Banjarmasin (the capital of South Kalimantan to date). These administrative arrangements began to examine the economic and commercial possibilities of the interior, and obviously mineral exploration was an early focus of attention (King 1993: 147).

A Government Mining Service was established in 1852 but achieved only limited success in exploiting Kalimantan's coal deposits as a result of native resistance, extreme environmental conditions, transportation problems and a lack of labor. In 1854, the Dutch sent a large military expedition to subdue the Chinese *kongsi* working on the gold deposits (concentrated between Mandor and Montrado) of West Kalimantan. The *kongsis* were gradually abolished, but as the gold deposits were exhausted the Chinese communities moved away: some to other interior regions for gold (Tayan, Sekadau and Sintang), others to cultivate cash crops (pepper, *gambier*, coconuts and rubber) or to trade and run shops in upstream settlements. In the south, the Dutch faced a prolonged armed resistance (1859-1905) from members

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of the Banjarmasin sultanate, who refused the candidate for Sultan hand-picked by the Dutch.

Over the next five decades, the Dutch extended their political control into the interior and were involved in pacifying headhunters and eliminating inter-tribal feuding (as James Brooke did in the Sarawak). A great peace treaty between the hostile Iban and Maloh communities in West Kalimantan, was concluded in the 1880s in Tumbang Anoi, a small village near the border between West and Central Kalimantan (King 1985: 65 cited in King 1993: 149). (The Dayaks themselves perceived these peace deals, given that in many places Dayak communities were widely scattered, as one of three great achievements of the Dayaks, these being: the Tumbang Anoi Peace treaty in 1882, the governorship of Oevang Oeray between 1960 and 1966 and the establishment of the Dayak based Pancur Kasih Foundation in 1981 [Albertus 2005: 61].)

The overall results of Dutch colonization in West Kalimantan, however, were considered a failure. In the words of Heidhues (2001: 139-151), “Borneo’s fabled wealth has turned out to be just that - a fable.” Gold mining activities, for example, diminished rapidly, not only because of natural depletion, but also due to the Dutch’s failure to organize the Chinese labor, as their *kongsi*s dismantled (Heidhues 2001: 145). The successful forced-labor plantation, called the ‘Culture System’ in Java, was deemed unsuitable for the under-populated outer islands like Kalimantan (Furnivall 1939: 177). The government revenue in 1849, that had amounted to more than 34 million guilders, with a profit of 6.5 million guilders (expenditure for the Indies administration was 27.5 million guilders), diminished to a deficit of more than 3.5 million guilder in 1860 (van Bosse 1862: 130).

European colonial conceptions of race, ethnicity and hierarchy hued the Dutch policy as they advanced upstream along the Kapuas river. For the purposes of administration, the Dutch differentiated between the non-Muslim Dayak farmers (eligible for tribute, corveé labor, taxation and Christian salvation) and the Muslim ‘Malay’ elite (eligible for indirect rule and control of trade) (Harwell 2000: 32). Davidson (2003a: 3) and quickly asserted that “colonialism did not create this divide, which was hastened by the arrival of and conversions to Islam”. Thus the Dutch instituted a system of indirect rule, whereby Malay princes produced revenues and

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ensured law and order on behalf of the colonialists. For this service, the Malay princes (see Appendix A for the history of sultans of Pontianak) further subjugated their non-Muslim subjects through excessive taxation and compulsory labor (Davidson 2003a: 3). The Dutch, in effect, facilitated the hardening and the fashioning of a political polarization by forging a homogeneous "Dayak" identity out of a non-Muslim population, to be juxtaposed against the "Malays".

Under indirect rule, the great part of the burden of maintaining the authority of the [colonial] government was removed from the Europeans and placed on the shoulders of the already established rulers, with their more direct access to the loyalty of the people (Emerson 1964: 389-90). Snouck Hurgronje, the Dutchman who pretended to be a Muslim and lived in rebel-infested Aceh to analyze its society, portrayed the complexities of this system when he wrote a memorandum on 26 January 1900, "it is difficult to decide in general whether the direct form of government deserved preference in the Indian States or rather the indirect; that depends on all sorts of local circumstances, considerations of expediency, and above all the strength of the native government with which one is concerned" (Emerson 1964: 389). The case of West Kalimantan was one in which the Dutch conveniently supported the ambitious and strong Sultan Abdurrahman Alkadri, in order to defeat the other Muslim sultanates along the Kapuas River and at the end, rule these sultanates through his hands.

Beside indirect rule, Davidson added another two further means through which the colonialists, the Dutch, the British and others, generated a monolithic Dayak identity (2003a: 4): (1) a series of wars and peace making, and (2) missionary work. The imposition of Dutch rule and the new status relations between the rulers and the ruled had set off a flurry of low-level incidents of violence, to which the rulers responded with their own violence. To quash unrest instigated by the natives, the British (Rajah Brooke) and Dutch regimes frequently hired non-Muslim native, "Dayak" auxiliaries (Pringle 1970). The Dutch, for example, hired Dayaks to quell a revolt of gold miners from the Lanfang *kongsi* in Pontianak district, in 1885.

The other theater of violence appeared along the Sarawak border, as the Dutch increasingly intervened among strife-torn Malay principalities (Wadley 1996: 627). The Dutch did not seem to understand, claimed Tagliacozzo (2000: 75), that their

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state-making project in fact “created much of this violence…it was natural that there would be resistance to this evolving matrix of power”. After the war-making, the peace-making ceremonies (paradoxical as they were) also figured prominently in forming the Dayak identity. To achieve stability in the upstream Kapuas and to crush unrest, the Dutch negotiated cease-fires, fortified villages and evacuated threatened populations to safer locales (Davidson 2003a: 5). The famous peace conference in [Tumbang] Anoi (Central Kalimantan) in 1894 exemplified these attempts to outlaw inter-tribal warfare, slavery and head-hunting. By assembling Kalimantan-wide “Dayak” representatives, the regime fostered among the attendees, a growing consciousness of a common fate and a familiar recognizability.

At the same time, in an attempt to curtail Islam’s advance into the upstream Kapuas river areas, the colonial authorities turned to missionary work. This new reliance on missionaries, however, put the colonialists into a quandary as they, askance at efforts to convert the “heathen” into Christians, thought that proselytizing might compromise the regime’s primary objective of full-blown economic exploitation (Davidson 2003a: 5). This hesitancy softened later during the Ethical Policy (beginning in 1901), which was designed to strive, as an ideal, for a morally and materially “uplifted” indigenous society. This Ethical Policy thus justified higher levels of interference (beyond simple economic exploitation) in indigenous societies; it facilitated significant “cultural transformations of traditional societies” (Coté 1996: 89).

The Capuchin Order (conservative, rather hermetic order, or Catholic Church) gained exclusive access to West Kalimantan in 1905, in order to start a momentum. Although the growth in absolute numbers of converts was glacially slow, the Church’s influence on its few converts was disproportional to the actual conversions (Davidson 2003a: 6). Missionary education was the medium through which western idealism, that is democracy, egalitarianism and self-empowerment, were inculcated to the Dayaks who successfully graduated from the Church-based schools.

Having divided the population into Malays, Dayaks, Chinese and others**,** the Dutch subjugated each group using different means of control. The proselytizing of the Dayaks into Christians was not really successful in terms of the quantity of conversions, but the deeper changes, albeit unintentionally through the post-war peace

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making campaigns as well as the missionary work, affected the creation of a monolithic Dayak identity among the scattered Dayak groups. The following section continues the proposition that the previously sedimented ethnic consciousness raised its status to become an ethnic political consciousness, under the changing nature of colonial governmentality shortly after the end of World War II in 1945. As the Fergusonian (2006) 'nation-building' paradigm had just begun, so ethnic political consciousness appeared along this changing paradigm.

2.4 National Games of Power and the Rise of the Dayaks' Political Consciousness

The history of most of the colonized states in Southeast Asia took a sharp turn after World War II (1941-1945) broke out. The sudden vacuum of power that existed after the surrender of the Japan Imperial Army to the Allied Forces in August 1945, offered these colonized states a chance to free themselves. Their previous colonialist masters, however, also grabbed the chance to reclaim back their "possessions". This section shows how the Dutch attempted to return to power over the thousands of Indonesian islands and also how Sukarno, the first Indonesian president, unleashed all the means at his disposal to repel the Dutch. More important were the impacts of this frantic, complicated struggle on the history of Dayak movements in West Kalimantan. This section first explains the rise of the Dayaks' political consciousness, or what Klinken (2004) termed as Dayak ethno-genesis, during the colonial time and then the rise of Dayak political consciousness after the 1945 independence, both at the regional and national levels of political events.

Davidson (2003a: 4) claims that besides indirect rule, the colonialists (Dutch and British) generated a monolithic "Dayak" identity through two other methods: war making and peace making. (Bigalke [1981] added another method for the creation of Dayak identity; the conversion of "pagans" into Christians). Both the imposition of Dutch rule and the new status relations between the rulers and the ruled, had set off incidents of low level violence. To quash this unrest, the British and Dutch regimes frequently deployed non-Muslim native "Dayak" auxiliaries and in the process, forged this subject's identity. In 1885, for example, the Dutch employed Dayaks to quell a revolt of gold miners from the Lanfang *kongsi* (Chinese business group) in Pontianak district (Heidhues 2003: 104-111). The Dutch joined the Briton Charles

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Brooke, in order to stage a punitive expedition employing 11,000 Dayak auxiliaries against a group of Iban Dayak, who had disturbed British interests and raided neighboring Dayak populations in 1886 (Wadley 2001: 636). These tensions and hostilities among the Dayak groups were also prominent in forming Dayak identity.

To achieve stability in the upstream Kapuas River, apart from crushing unrest, the Dutch also negotiated cease fires, fortified villages and moved entire populations to safer places. The much-cited Pan-Dayak peace conference in Anoi (Central Kalimantan) in 1894, whereby warfare, slavery and headhunting were outlawed, exemplified these peace-making efforts. By assembling Borneo-wide "Dayak" representatives, the colonial regimes fostered among attendants a growing consciousness of a common fate and a familiar recognizability (Davidson 2003a: 5). These attempts illustrate the colonialists' desire to create a quasi-homogeneous identity for non-Muslim indigenous groups. The most important moment in the development of this political consciousness, happened when young Dayak student boarders gathered at missionary schools and began to vocalize what the Dutch already believed: that these groups were "Dayak". The post-independence history of the building of Dayak political consciousness, as shown in the following sections, reveals the accuracy of this observation with respect to the Dayaks in West Kalimantan's case.

After the resignation of the Japanese Imperial Army in August 1945, all of the attempts by the Dutch to regain their previous level of control in Indonesia were preliminarily supported by the leader of the Allied forces, the United States. Almost all the planes, tanks and trucks used were still stamped with the U.S. Army symbol and most of the U.S aid to Europe through the Marshall Plan, was part of the anti-communist campaign (Kahin and Kahin 1995: 36). The US, however, no longer treated Indonesia as a possible harborer of communism and turned its support to the Republic of Indonesia, instead of its old ally the Netherlands, with respect to two later episodes: the Madiun rebellion (September to November 1948, in Central and East Java) and the Dutch military assault against the Indonesian leadership (19 December 1948, Yogyakarta) (Kahin and Kahin 1995: 38).

The Madiun rebellion (from September to November 1948), which was launched against the young Republic of Indonesia by a Soviet-oriented communist

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group, was quickly crushed by the National Army of Indonesia (TNI) under the Sukarno-Hatta leadership. This episode stopped short the propaganda of the Dutch, designed to gain support from the US in order to crush the Republic as a “future home” for the communists. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), unconcerned about Dutch anger, quickly sent a senior agent to recruit the best officers among the TNI forces that had successfully destroyed the communist rebellion, to be trainees on US soil.

The surprise attack launched by the Dutch against the Indonesian leadership in Jogjakarta (19 December 1948) to capture Sukarno and Hatta was surprisingly and stubbornly resisted by the new Republic’s tiny but effective guerilla forces. Going against an agreement made with the United Nations less than a year before, the Dutch aroused irritation among their own supporters, especially the U.S. Some of the important figures in the US (US Navy Intelligence officers, for example) (Kahin and Kahin 1995: 325) were wary that the Indonesians would quickly turn to more radical figures, such as Tan Malaka, an anti-Stalin nationalist communist, if Sukarno and Hatta were imprisoned for a long period by the Dutch.

Members of the US Congress and other high ranking figures, who had been staunch supporters of the Dutch’s action, suddenly pressurized the US Minister of Foreign Affairs Dean Acheson, to turn their support towards the Indonesians. This development brought a quick hand-over of sovereignty from the Dutch to the Indonesians in December 1949, thus ending all attempts by the Dutch to regain their power in Indonesia. However, during the Round Table Conference in Den Haag, November to December 1949, the representative of the US, Merle Cochran, who acted as a moderator, appeared biased toward Dutch interests. In the economic realm and because the US still had grave concerns for the Dutch’s rickety economy, Cochran demanded that the Indonesian government take over the debts of the previous Netherlands Indies government, which amounted to as much as USD 1.13 billion and of which 70 percent was the mainland’s (Netherland) debts. The Indonesian delegation stated adamantly that 42 percent of that debt was used to finance the military operation against the young republic; yet the demand was granted (Kahin and Kahin 1995: 40). Later, Cochran promised “big” aid to Indonesia to assist

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in the debt repayment, which turned out to be a measly USD 100 million in the form of an export-import credit that had to be repaid as a "loan".

Within the political realm, Cochran demanded that half of New Guinea (West Papua for the Indonesians) should be kept under Dutch control, because the matter would be discussed further within a year. The US needed to appease the chauvinistic ranks within the Dutch parliament, who wanted to keep the Dutch flag flying in West Papua. In its conclusion, the "honeymoon" of sovereignty handover was ended by a relationship that turned quickly sour. Sukarno's admiration for Yugoslavia's Josip Broz Tito and Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh, and later Mao Tse Tung (and Chou En Lai), brought him closer to accept an "independent" Indonesia Communist Party, which appeared free from China or Russia's influence, but was looked upon with suspicion by foreign diplomats. Supported by his brainchild, the *Partai Nasionalis Indonesia or PNI*, he believed instead that the real threat to democracy came from the right-wing political parties, *Masyumi* and *Nahdlatul Ulama*, the two biggest Islamic parties (Kahin and Kahin 1995: 53).

Two main strands of thought were slowly separating Sukarno from his vice president Hatta, an economist and a pious Muslim. The first strand was Hatta's belief regarding the advantages of a quasi-federal state, one that decentralized some of its authority to the federal states, an idea which Sukarno accepted, but with a worry that decentralization would spawn separatist movements in the countryside. The more depressing problem for both of them was that of the representatives of the Communist Party in the Cabinet. Hatta staunchly rejected the desire of Sukarno to allow the Communists into the Cabinet. These contradictions (Islam versus Communism, Nationalism and Communism versus Islam, Federalism versus Unitary State, Dutch-trained versus Japanese-trained army) materialized later in the first general election in 1955, when the four strongest parties represented the Nationalists (PNI, 22.3 percent of votes), Islam (Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama, 20.9 and 18.4 percent respectively), and the Communists (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, 16.4 percent) (Asfar 2006: 67)[8].

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[8] Sukarno's lack of ability on economic matters was balanced by the economist within Muhammad Hatta, who studied economy in Rotterdam's High School of Economics in the late 1920s. Hatta's belief that Islam and Socialism were incompatible was shared among the largest and most progressive Islamic Party, Masyumi (one of the

This general result was mirrored in West Kalimantan, but with a significant twist in the appearance of a victorious ethnic-based party, *Partai Persatuan Dayak* or the Unity of Dayaks Party that won 12 seats out of an available 30 seats for the Provincial People Representatives Board (T. Kusmiran 2003: 20). Here, the parties with nationalist/socialist ideology won 20.4 percent of the total provincial votes, the Islamic parties gathered 41.9 percent of the votes and the Christian parties, 0.5 percent (the Communist Party only won one seat). The ratio of winning votes in the result of the 1955 general election was: 38.3: 22.3: 16.4 (religious: nationalist: communist)[9], whereas in West Kalimantan it was: 42.4: 20.4: 20.4 (religious: nationalist: ethnic) (see Tables 2.3 and 2.4 for West Kalimantan's 1955 general election and 1958 regional election results). This provincial result in the general election turned the political situation in West Kalimantan an unexpected way, which was, the triumph of the [indigenous] ethnic-based political groups.

The history of the *Partai Persatuan Dayak* or PD can be traced back to the involvement of missionaries, who attempted to "graduate" the Dayaks they tried to proselytize, with arguably both liberating and contradictory results (Davidson 2003a: 6). While teaching them the experience of reform and the democratic impulse to bring an end to the plight of the Dayaks, these attempts also wedded the movement to the missionaries. The conservative and highly hierarchical Church struggled to shed its patronizing outlook during the post-war period, over the *Partai Persatuan Dayak* leadership, which similarly fought to develop an appropriate relationship with the Church. In 1941, a Catholic schoolteachers' retreat in Sanggau began the genesis of an organized Dayak movement. The Japanese Imperial Army's invasion of Southeast Asia and the Pacific, which wasted the lives of thousands of important Malay leaders, brought an opportunity to the unscathed Dayak elite. On 30 October 1945, amidst the crumbling Japanese administration in the eastern-most district of Putussibau, a

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four winning parties in the 1955 general election). For Sukarno, the main concern was to unite an archipelagic and multi-ethnic country like Indonesia, through which he traveled extensively during the 1950s. Unity for him was not only geographical, but also ideological (his favorite thinkers were Thomas Jefferson and the French socialist-revisionist Jen Jaures) (Kahin and Kahin 1995: 49).

[9] These numbers are not rounded up to the full 100 percent, because this composition is only for the winning votes. There were also smaller parties that used other methods to gain votes (a total of around 44 parties participated in the 1955 general election).

Javanese priest by the name of A. Adikardjana (Davidson 2003a: 11) led Dayak personalities, principally [Catholic] schoolteachers, to form the Daya in Action (DIA - Daya without a "k").

Under the leadership of F.C. Palaunsoeka, the DIA was transformed into the *Persatuan Dayak* (Dayak Unity, which can easily, by a slip of the tongue, become *Partai Dayak*) in 1946, with Pontianak (the province capital) as its center of operations. Another important figure by the name of Oevang Oeray, also a student of the missionary school, was claimed by F.C. Palaunsoeka's supporters to be absent during this formative year. The supporters of Oevang Oeray insisted adamantly that Oeray had been involved, even since the Putussibau affair[10]. On New Year's Eve, 1947 (as recorded in Dutch Indies Civil Administration files), Oeray proclaimed the *Persatuan Dayak*'s founding in a public speech. The returning Dutch Administration (NICA) attempted to recruit the Persatuan Dayak's leadership into its rank and file, as much as Persatuan Dayak (mostly under Oevang Oeray's leadership) sought NICA's support (Davidson 2003a: 11). The NICA needed the loyalty of the Dayak warriors.

Table 2.3 The 1955 General Election Results in West Kalimantan.

No	Party	Total
1	*Partai Persatuan Dayak*	9 seats
2	Partai Masyumi	10 seats
3	Partai Nasionalis Indonesia	4 seats
4	Partai Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	3 seats
5	Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI)	1 seat
6	Partai Indonesia Raya	1 seat
7	Partai Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia	1 seat
8	Partai Komunis Indonesia	1 seat
	All 44 parties	30 seats (for membership on the People's Representative Board, Provincial level)

Source: La Ode (1997: 115).

[10] This bitter enmity between Oevang Oeray and F.C. Palaunsoeka for recognition of both camps continued until the aftermath of the anti-Chinese eviction in 1967 (see Chapter III). F.C. Palaunsoeka claimed that Oevang Oeray's hand was tainted with the blood spilled during this eviction (Davidson 2003: 63).

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The Dayak elite sent their representatives into civil service, army and police posts and created a Dayak Affairs Office (*Kantor Urusan Dayak*, headed by Oeray).

This new game of divide and rule between the old players worried Sukarno, the first president of post-colonial Indonesia, whose main concern was the unity of the new-born republic. Oeray, however, accused not only the Dutch but also the Malay elites (represented by Sultan Hamid II, a Major General of Dutch-trained KNIL forces) of working together like "husband and wife" to suppress Dayak rights and freedoms. In 1947, Oeray wrote that the "*Daya* are Kalimantan's indigenous people (*pendoedoek asli*), but in everyday life are treated as if they are foreigners, newcomers … the Daya have become water buffalo that have had to work and sacrifice themselves for King and Government …" (Davidson 2003a: 12). For the other *Persatuan Dayak*'s officials, NICA

Table 2.4 The 1958 Regional Election Results in West Kalimantan.

No	Party	Total
1	Partai Persatuan Dayak	12 seats
2	Partai Masyumi	9 seats
3	Partai Nasionalis Indonesia	4 seats
4	Partai Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	2 seats
5	Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI)	1 seat
6	Partai Indonesia Raya	1 seat
7	Partai Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia	1 seat
8	Partai Komunis Indonesia	1 seat
	All 44 parties	30 seats (*sic*) (for membership in People Representative Board, Provincial level). F.C. Palaoensuka of Unity of Dayaks Party became the lone representative of the party at the national parliament.

Source: La Ode (1997: 115).

support was very important. Nevertheless, despite the scorn of the PD rank and file over the rule of Malay elite, they accepted the positions on the West Kalimantan Council (not part of Republik Indonesia under Sukarno) and under the Malay Sultanate's blood lineage, as well as the Dutch military officer Sultan Hamid II.

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The internal ambivalence of *Persatuan Dayak*'s stance toward the NICA was as contradictory as the colonial and missionary policy had been toward the Dayaks. Edgy relationships with the NICA also extended to the Church. The Church, as its critics charged, was slow to rid itself of colonial thinking and its paternalistic attitude was incongruent in a democratic age. Disputes also stemmed from the preferential treatment given to the Chinese missionary students (beneficiaries of Church-sponsored education in Java and the Netherlands) and the Church's objection to Dayak civil servants interacting with non-Christian colleagues (Davidson 2003a: 14). In the end, however, political calculations and the scant resources given to the Dayaks' self-empowerment message fostered a dependency on the NICA and the Church, as proven through education cases (Davidson 2003a: 14).

At the national level, Sukarno's obsession with the geographical and ideological unity of the multi-ethnic country led his unifying policies to unite the main political elements despite their apparent 'incompatibilities' within the young republic. In West Kalimantan, this policy brought some profound changes that lingered for a very long time: Sukarno's obsession with uniting the whole of Kalimantan (including the British-Malaysian side of the island, Sarawak and Sabah) (refer to Appendix B for a short history of the Sukarno-instigated anti-Malaysia confrontation) and his determination to undermine the ethnic-based primordialism in local politics. As it turned out, the latter changes remained the never-ending contention between national and local politics in a resource-rich country such as Indonesia, especially a province rich in forest and minerals like West Kalimantan. The former obsession, as can be clearly seen, sowed the seeds for the downfall of Sukarno.

After the fires of the struggles for independence had been quelled, the seeds of the Dayak's monolithic identity in West Kalimantan grew into a political force in the new republic's first general election in 1955 and 1958. If at the national level, three forces (religious, nationalist and communist parties) emerged victorious, the results of the general election in West Kalimantan were favorable to the religious, nationalist and ethnic parties. The electoral victory for the "representatives" of the Dayaks was the result of the building up of Dayak ethnic and political consciousness, something which had been engineered during the colonial time, under the colonists' war and peace policies among the indigenous groups, as well as the activities of the missionary

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schools. This ethnic consciousness is defined by Klinken (2004: 3) as a sense of homogenous, bounded and politicized Dayak ethnicity that arose in step with the modern colonial state and the Christian mission, and which produced 'urban Dayaks' in the process. These 'urban Dayaks' later turned themselves into the leaders of the Dayaks in the case of West Kalimantan. Unfortunately, the strength of President Sukarno's charismatic call for a united Indonesia demanded the abandonment of all kinds of "regional" or "primordial-based" politics from the post-colonial national political scene from 1958 onwards.

2.5 Summary

Although most Western scholars view the relationships between the coastal Malay-Sultans and their Dayak counterparts as mainly exploitative, there are some reasons to claim that the inclusion of the Dayaks within the Malay-dominated coastal society took place through social relationships (intermarriage), religious conversions, trading relationships, or through a mixture of some or all of these relationships. The Dayaks themselves always conserved their choice to alter their allegiance to other groups, or to simply migrate deeper into the upstream forest.

Dutch inventiveness was shown when they were able to apply the principle of indirect/direct rule at different times and in different places and in a bewildering variety of forms and manifestations. In West Kalimantan, the Dutch rode on the back of the ambition of the strongest sultan (the first Sultan of Pontianak Sultanate), in order to expand their influence deeper into the other Muslim-Malay sultanates and their Malay subjects. It was, however, deemed more appropriate to "protect" the Dayaks from the Muslim Sultans' proselytizing influence, by nurturing them in isolation through both the missionaries and also through direct rule under a Dutch resident leadership. The Chinese gold miners, perceived as rebellious, were ruled through appointed Chinese, who bore the Dutch rank of "Kapitan Demang" and received other Dutch support in return for an annual tribute.

This arrangement left the migrants from Java and Madura islands to fill the needed labor forces in the coastal cities. The limited economic mobility among the subsistence peasants (the Dayaks), who were bonded as clients or bondsmen to their societal elites, constrained their chances at grabbing the opportunities offered by the

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newly opened global market for tropical and sub-tropical products, made accessible through steamships (after the 1860s). The subsistence peasants, however, were able to maximize their opportunities to produce a globally demanded product (rubber), while maneuvering within their limitations. The social and cultural values held among the other classes (servicemen, noblemen and kings) similarly prevented them from accessing the global market's opportunities. Thus, most of the distribution functions for trading within the raw material export economy were taken up by the experienced Chinese.

Having divided the population into Malays, Dayaks, Chinese, and others**,** the Dutch subjugated each group with different means of controls. The proselytizing of Dayaks into Christians was not really successful in term of quantity of conversions but the deeper changes, albeit unintentionally after the war- and peace-making campaigns as well as missionary works affected the creation of monolithic Dayak identity among the scattered Dayak groups.

The Sultanate of Pontianak rose and fell after a long history (1771-1958) of the Dutch control, and of a new republic led by the charismatic Sukarno (who led the nation to proclaim its independence in August 1945 after the defeat of the Japanese Imperial Army by the US-led Allied Forces). However, the turbulence which occurred from 1945 to 1958 in West Kalimantan and which was dominated by the rise of ethnic-based political consciousness had worried Sukarno after a nightmarish experience trouncing the Dutch plan to create a federalized state of Indonesia. At the national level, the victorious political powers arising after the democratic general election of 1955 were the religious parties, nationalist parties and the communist party, whereas the winners in West Kalimantan were the religious parties, nationalist parties and the ethnic-based Dayak party.

To sum up, this chapter has re-conceptualized the linkages between the attempts by the colonial rulers to subjugate the whole population of West Kalimantan throughout Quijano's coloniality of power (1997), which was translated into political reality in the field, as Mamdanian's (2001) ethnicization and racialization of social relations, followed by the successive post-colonial regimes (after a short, brutal reign by the Imperial Japan Army, from the end of 1941 to August 1945), notably President Sukarno and President Suharto. President Sukarno's attempts at de-ethnicization and

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de-racialization of social relations (Fergusonian ‘nation-building’) were failures, because of the unfavorable pressures from the regional politics (the Cold War) towards the left-leaning, rather anti-US, Sukarno. The growing Dayak ethnic political consciousness, as materialized in the primordialist party’s victories in the early democratic general elections, was crushed by President Sukarno through shrewd manipulation of the parliamentary authority to dissolve the Dayak Party in 1959. For a moment, the Dayaks apparently succumbed to the forcible de-politicization of politics.

The next chapter will show how the political games of Sukarno annihilated the victorious Dayak Party (*Partai Persatuan Dayak*, Dayak Unity Party) that swept the general election of 1955 and 1958 in West Kalimantan. Also revealed, will be the tumultuous situation that arises from Sukarno’s obsession with uniting the archipelago, through the attempts to recoup the Malaysian-British-controlled Sabah and Sarawak States. The failed quasi-guerilla campaign on the provincial borders was the last straw for Sukarno; thus the next chapter also shows how Suharto took over power in 1967 and ruled West Kalimantan with an iron fist until the regime’s final hours in 1998. Given the authoritarian nature of the Suharto regime, the subaltern groups (mainly the Dayaks, under the leadership of the Church and their aristocratic ranks) launched their opportunistic resistance, whose shapes were accorded to the economic and political situation of the regime. The apparent concession of the Dayaks to the forcible de-politicization of politics was turning out as only momentarily because whenever the chances arose the Dayaks were able to quickly take their chances to resist.

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